

HAS THE CHURCH, OR THE STATE, THE
POWER TO EDUCATE THE NATION?

A

COURSE OF LECTURES.

BY

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"SUBSCRIPTION NO BONPAGE," ETC.

LONDON :

J. G. AND F. RIVINGTON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD ;

AND

DARTON AND CLARK, HOLBORN HILL.

1839.

LONDON :

PRINTED BY J. GREEN AND CO., BARTLETT'S BUILDINGS, HOLBORN.

LC89
M44h

ADVERTISEMENT.

THESE Lectures were delivered in the course of the last and the present months, to a few exceedingly kind and patient listeners. They are now published, in compliance with the wishes of some, whose good opinion I have reason to value very highly. The recapitulations which were necessary in oral lectures have been omitted, a few passages have been introduced, and some explanatory and illustrative notes subjoined. More alterations might have been made if time had permitted; but as I had very slight claims to be heard upon this or any subject, I thought it would be well not to lose the advantage of a seasonable moment for speaking.

London, July 24th, 1839.

ERRATA.

- In Contents, Page vi, line 7 from top, *for* State *read* Education.
“ “ xii, *for* Mr. *read* Mrs.
Page 11, line 13 from top, *for* degrading *read* denying.
“ 16, line 11 from top, *dele* (Note A).
“ 21, line 7 from top, *for* it *read* this.
“ 38, line 2 from top, *dele* ”
“ 67, line 7 from top, *insert* become.
“ 117, line 15 from bottom, *for* of *read* for.
“ 138, line 16 from top, *for* you must supply it *read* it must
be supplied.
“ 193, line 3 from top, *for* possessions *read* professions.
“ 265, line 12 from top *for* examiners *read* examinees.
“ 359, line 17 from bottom, *dele* as.
“ 364, *for* clericy *read* clerisy.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

Theories of Education—Why apparently so numerous—May be reduced to three—Two of these are ancient notions reproduced of late years—The great practical Experiments of their worth in Sparta and Athens—What Common End the Legislators of these two nations professed to themselves—What Specific End the Spartan proposed to himself—This Specific End he completely attained—But failed in his Ultimate End—The Spartan principle ascertained to be an important principle in Education—Ascertained to be an insufficient principle—The Specific End which the Athenian proposed to himself—This end he completely attained—Extraordinary character of the Athenian people—Yet the nation perished not in spite of its Education, but through it—The Athenian principle found to be true—Found to be inefficient—Found to be incapable of coalescing with the Spartan principle—Modern principle of Education—Indicates

great advancement—Must be a true principle—But those who support it expect to form a nation by means of it—This end they have not attained—Nay their Education seems to have hindered the attainment of it—These principles must in some way be reconciled in some higher principle—Idea of Christian Education—Harmonises the Spartan, the Athenian, and the modern ideas.

LECTURE II.

In what sense is Education Universal—In what sense National—History of English Education—The Spiritual Body and the State—Powers of the former how asserted—When they began to interfere with each other—The Spiritual Body finds that it has not properly estimated its own dignity—Finds that its great office is to educate the nation—Finds that while it fulfils this office it does not interfere with the State, but co-operates with it—The Reformation—English Education then assumed a definite form—Why it does not include any scheme of Female Instruction—Or of Infant Instruction—THE GRAMMAR SCHOOLS—Their main study—Why they teach Latin and Greek—Why they teach Poetry, History, Geography—Their discipline—Modern novelty introduced into it—How the system has been injured by this innovation—Religious Instruction—Worship—THE UNIVERSITIES—How they differ from the Grammar Schools—Their Scientific Character—Chief Instrumental Science of

Oxford—Chief Instrumental Science of Cambridge—What real science is meant to be the central study in both—Life in Oxford and Cambridge—University and College System—How connected—Ecclesiastical character of the whole Education.

LECTURE III.

Two kinds of persons in England admire Continental State—Its worth to be ascertained by its effect upon the Universities, not upon the Lower Schools—The Education of the different nations of Christendom of old committed to the Clergy—How the belief that it belonged to them affected the State Power—How the belief was weakened—Jesuitism—Scepticism—Influence of French principles in Prussia—Establishment of a merely Military Power there—Progress of the same feelings in other nations—How arrested—Change since the Peace—The State Education in the different nations not desired by them now—But inevitable—Effects of it—German Universities—Intended to fit men for professions—Their admirers ridicule our system—Their complaints of it examined—Proofs from the Modern History of Germany that a human cultivation is necessary—Want of it felt there—Why the State cannot supply it—England would suffer more than Germany from State Interference with the Universities—Why—Public Opinion—The changes it has undergone in the last fifty years—Effect of subjecting the Universities to these

changes—In what sense the Universities may assert a right to be free from State Controul—But the State would be foolish as well as wrong to meddle with them—Ecclesiastical arrogance not checked but excited by assumption on the part of the State—Case of Prussia—Inference as to the duty of both Statesmen and Clergymen.

LECTURE IV.

Those who plead for the continuance of Education in the hands of the Clergy are charged with a wish to perpetuate the notions and maxims of a former Age—Charge considered—Alleged Incapacity of the Clergy to educate, in consequence of the change which has taken place in our views respecting Physics—The subject considered—How Physical Science established itself—Dangers which now threaten it—The Clergy can arrest these Dangers—The State cannot—Alleged Incapacity of the Clergy to educate in consequence of a change in our notions respecting Morals—Locke—His influence admitted to be entirely Antiecclesiastical—But his Influence is at an end—Modern Notions on Morals and Metaphysics connect them again with the Clerical office—Alleged incapacity of the Clergy to meet the demand for knowledge respecting Political Economy—This question examined—How Political Economy has suffered from a mixture with crude notions of morality. The Clergy can separate the True Science from these

Spurious Additions—The State cannot—The rise of Sects another favourite Argument with those who contend for State, and against Clerical Education—This Argument examined—The State wishes to unite Sects, and yet seeks to destroy the only witness against Sectarianism—Way to real union—Compulsory union—Evidence of Professor Pillans—Catechisms—Truth and Charity inseparable—The change in the constitution of English Society another Argument against Clerical Education—How far it is applicable—Attempt to unite the different classes by establishing a race of Schoolmasters—Why this attempt must fail—The Clerical Class the real bond between the classes—How it may become a more effectual bond—Dissent—Methodism.

LECTURE V.

Distinction between Professions and Trades—Importance of this distinction—Tradesmen interested in the Preservation of it—Consequent necessity of a separate Education for Tradesmen—But this Education must not be to fit them for their respective Trades—Circumstances of Yeomen and Tradesmen—What kind of Education the Middle Class wishes for itself—What it wants—A political position may be acquired through Education—Peculiarly English Character of the Middle Class—Advisableness of giving them a peculiarly English Education—This not impossible—Education in the English Language

—In English History—In English Poetry—Composition—Arithmetic—Effect of such an Education—On what it must be based—How to connect the Middle Class with the other classes—Ecclesiastical Feelings—How communicated—Need of Training Schools—Their relation to the Middle Schools—Character of the Instruction which should be given them—Cathedrals—General Conclusion.

LECTURE VI.

Fearful ignorance of the Lower Classes, the chief plea for at once calling in the aid of the State—The sins of the Clergy not to be dissembled—But the acknowledgment of them does not excuse them from working now—The question is: Can they work?—Question considered—Physical circumstances of the Lower Class—These, it is said, the Clergy can do nothing for, their functions being Spiritual—Popular use of this Argument—Egregious fallacy involved in it—The State has recently confessed that its only duty is to save the People from starvation—Position of the Clergy enables them to supply the deficiency of the State in this respect—And to remove the painful impressions produced in the minds of the Lower Classes by the language of some who profess to sympathize with them—How the Poor learn to take an interest in the Education of their Children—The feelings of the Parents a guide to the wants of the Children—Political Feelings of the Poor—Combina-

tions—How these are to be met—Moral Feelings of the Poor—Conscience—How to be met—Religious Feelings of the Poor—Cries for an actual Living and Divine Deliverer—How these must be met—Modern Education of the Poor—Bell and Lancaster—Infant-school System—English passion for Machinery—The Continental Authors have discovered our Error—Consequent Improvements in their System—Its Popularity caused by the Consciousness of our own Deficiencies—These Deficiencies not attributable to our Ecclesiastical System; but to a departure from it—Testimony of Cousin—Sketch of a really Ecclesiastical Education—Effects upon England—And upon the most remote Colonies—Extract from Wordsworth.

NOTES.

LECTURE I.

Pestalozzi—Quotation from Aristotle's Politics—Aristophanes and Socrates—Useful Knowledge Society.

LECTURE II.

Church and State, (Dr. Chalmers and Dr. Wardlaw; Edinburgh Review of Mr. Gladstone's Work)—Mathematics and Logic—University and College System, (Remarks on Articles in the Edinburgh Review and Extract from Cousin.)

LECTURE III.

Extract from Mr. Wyse on the Prussian System—From Cousin's Account of the Education in Saxony—From Cousin's Account of the University of Jena—From Cousin on the French Universities—From Cousin on the want of a Constitution in Prussia—From De Tocqueville on Public Opinion—An Oxford Latin Essay.

LECTURE IV.

Clerical Pretensions at the Reformation and now—Extract from Mrs. Austin on the power of the Clergy and on the Sects—Extract from Mr. Wilberforce's Letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne—Extracts from Professor Long on the character of Modern Civilization.

LECTURE V.

Opinion of Cousin on Middle Schools—Mr. Hussey's opinion of Latin Instruction considered—Thoughts on reading the old Latin Historians of England.

LECTURE VI.

Extracts from Mr. Tuckfield's Book on the Education of the Poor—On the Question whether Teachers of Schools shall receive Ordination.

LECTURES ON EDUCATION.

LECTURE I.

It might seem, that a person who undertook to enumerate the different notions of Education which exist now, and have existed in the world, was imposing upon himself a hopeless and impossible task. Almost every one we meet has some theory of his own upon the subject, and can give some reasons for thinking his neighbour's theory erroneous or imperfect; and it is a very plausible supposition that a number of doctrines which were once maintained respecting it, have become obsolete for a time and may re-appear, so that even if we could reduce into any order those which each day brings forth, our work would still be very partially accomplished.

But, possibly this multitude of opinions may not so entirely defy classification, as we are at first disposed to imagine. The authors of different systems and projects very often refuse to tell us, and very often do not know themselves, whether

they are suggesting some new end of Education, or whether they are only devising some new means for attaining an end, which we, as well as they, confess to be the true one. If we can persuade them to make this distinction, or if, in default of help from them, we will be at the pains of making it for ourselves, one great obstacle to the study of this subject will be taken out of our way. We shall then be startled, not so much at the infinite variety of projects which our time has produced, as by the strange consent with which persons, otherwise most opposed, have assumed one object, as that after which we ought to be striving. I cannot find, and I do not think the most laborious student of different systems or the person who has most diligently examined his own thoughts upon them will be able to find, that more than three distinct doctrines respecting the object of Education are prevalent among us. One of these seems to me to be characteristic of the last century, and by far the most common opinion in this; the one which we all of us hold, unless we have been led out of it by reflection. It is the doctrine that *Education is the giving of Information*. The questions, What information should be given? To whom it should be given? By whom it should be given? How it should be given? call forth, of course, the most different answers. But you will find, I think, that a tacit assumption of this,

as the purpose which we are to keep in view in our Education, is most general in the writers upon it since the time of Locke; and, till a very late period, was all but universal.

The second doctrine is that which was put forth with so much earnest faith, and illustrated with so much practical talent by M. Pestalozzi. It treats *the development of the faculties* as the end of Education. What these faculties are; whether they exist in the same, or in different degrees in different individuals, or classes, or races; who are the persons marked out for the work of calling them forth in their brethren; by what instruments they are to be called forth, are the questions to which this opinion gives rise. The propounder of it never fancied that it could be in any wise amalgamated with that of which we spoke first. You must either, he thought, make the giving of information or the development of the faculties your aim; if you wish to have partly one object, partly the other, you will be involved in endless confusion. Of late many persons have adopted the phrases of Pestalozzi, whose minds are evidently impregnated with the maxims of the older school; but I am not aware that they have proved by the clearness of their practical suggestions, that his warning was unnecessary.

As this last doctrine has become popular in England, it has provoked a reaction, by means of

which a third doctrine has been brought out, with sufficient distinctness to show that there are some who strongly and intelligently maintain it. It is that, not development but *restraint* is the end of all sound Education. The questions, What is it that you have need to *restrain*? To whom must the task of restraining be committed? What is the restraining power? instantly suggest themselves to those who are possessed by this opinion. It stands out in more direct and formal opposition to the second doctrine than to the first; yet, obviously, so far as it assumes restraint to be the end of Education, it is at variance with any theory which affirms something else to be the end of it: and the practical machinery which a person would devise, who kept this object steadily in view, would probably be as different from that which a person would devise who made the giving of information his main object, as from the machinery of Pestalozzi.

Under these heads, we may, I believe, safely bring all the theories concerning Education which are so rife among us; and therefore, before we trouble ourselves with any of these theories, it must be worth while to inquire whether any one of these principles be a sound and sufficient foundation to build upon. It must be waste of time to compare the means which different ingenious men are contriving, in order to compass certain

ends, until we have determined whether these are the ends which we desire to see compassed. With this inquiry, I think such a course of Lectures as that I have proposed to deliver, should commence. We should try to ascertain what each of these principles is good for; if each is good for something, how it is that they seem incompatible; if they can be reconciled, what is that higher principle which reconciles them. When we have concluded this inquiry, we may safely proceed to consider the different conditions of a sound National Education; for if it should appear that any of those particular purposes which we shall examine, is better than the others, and cannot be pursued along with them, then, omitting all consideration of the plans which have been suggested for accomplishing the other two, we shall compare those which have been suggested for accomplishing this. If there be one general purpose which includes them all, we shall inquire how *that* may best be pursued, and steadfastly reject all contrivances, however well adapted for another end, which do not assist us in pursuing it.

It must, then, I think, be very desirable, that we should see these different principles somewhere at work; for while we look at them as dry, skeleton opinions in books, we cannot appreciate them, we cannot even understand them. Illustrations of the first principle we have about us in abundance;

the difficulty will be in the selection ; we shall be embarrassed with our riches, not with our poverty. But it is not so with the other two. I do not think we have a fair experiment of them in this age. The defenders of them are often timid and inconsistent in the proclamation of them. The systems which have been established in conformity to them, are mixed with many heterogeneous elements : we must look elsewhere if we would see them brought to a decisive test. But when we begin to reflect, we find that the experiment of each has been made under the most advantageous circumstances, and, that if we do not see it actually before our eyes, as in the other case, we have the records of it in the history of a country, with which, from childhood, we are familiar. We find, that long before that notion of Education which we have so generally received had its birth, the notions of it, as identical with restraining discipline, and with the development of the faculties, were—not recognised by some single adventurous thinker, but adopted as the characteristic badges of the two greatest tribes of the most remarkable nation (except one), in the ancient world. The theatres of these experiments were not schools, but nations ; and their histories are the tests of the success or the failure of each.

As the great interest of Roman history arises from the proof it gives us, that there is an order

or constitution intended for each nation, which works itself out in despite of, and by means of individual caprice and self-will; so the great interest of Greek history seems to arise from the picture it gives us of men's efforts to understand their own position, and to create an order and discipline for themselves. Hence the one presents itself to us as a most wonderful chapter in the history of government; and the other as a no less wonderful chapter in the history of Education. Roman Education seems to be only a part of its government; the Greek governments seem systems of education. This remark applies equally to both the tribes we have spoken of.

Though it may be true that there were old forms of polity, out of which the systems of Sparta and Athens were fashioned, it seems to be equally true, that at some certain period they *were* fashioned, and that upon a model or design in the minds of certain architects. These were not such vain and ignorant men, as to fancy that they could rear up institutions upon a foundation of their own laying; but neither were they like those simple,unconscious builders of a great commonwealth, whose minds are inspired by principles of which they can give no account; and who follow them out in their acts, when they seem to themselves and to others to be obeying some chance impulse or personal interest. The Greek legislators had cer-

tainly a purpose present to them in all that they did. I do not mean that they had a theory of human nature before them, and that they resolutely worked out a system in accordance with it. If they had been pedants of this kind, we should have had no occasion to consider their works now ; twenty years would have destroyed all traces of them. The end which they proposed to themselves was entirely practical—the accomplishment of something which experience showed to be necessary. Still they addressed themselves directly to the minds of their countrymen ; it was the regulation of their minds, which by one plan or another they aimed at ; and hence their projects become so important to us in our present inquiry.

After what I have said, it will be obvious in what sense, and to what extent I describe restraint, or the cultivation of the faculties as the end of their Education : I mean, that to this purpose all their practical schemes were directed. In this way they would have defined Education. They supposed it to mean this, and nothing else than this. But of course there was an end at which they supposed Education itself to aim. That end was the formation of a consistent, orderly, powerful nation. The Spartan legislator found himself one of a race of conquerors, which had in former days subjected and enslaved a weaker tribe. He saw these conquerors, these whom he called his

countrymen, weak and disorganized, in no slight danger, perhaps, of sinking into the condition of those over whom they ruled, or of being mastered by them. The questions—What gave my brethren the power which they once exercised? What is the secret of their present degradation?—must have been the first that presented themselves to his mind, when he felt within himself a greater capacity for reflection than belonged to those about him. And the answer which offered itself was this,—We were one people, we had common traditions, we were marshalled under leaders, we were subjected to restraint and discipline. They were a poor, miscellaneous horde, having no common soul, each of them gratifying certain tempers and instincts of his own. We, the conquerors, are falling into the condition of our vassals, because we have lost this distinction. We fancy it is the privilege of us, the ruling class, to gratify all our individual propensities; we look upon it as the misery of the slaves, that they cannot gratify theirs. But if we would really be what we were, if we would really be a nation, must not exactly the opposite feeling to this be the one which possesses us? Must we not be made to understand that the suppression of all such individual tastes and impulses is our characteristic, the secret of our strength, the security of our predominance; that the indulgence of these with the

disorganization and powerlessness which are the consequences of it, are to be the badges of the slaves? To work this change in the minds of his countrymen; to root this thought in them, ‘power and self-gratification do not mean the same thing, but, on the contrary, are incompatible with each other;’ to make it the principle upon which they acted in childhood and grew to manhood; to crush in infancy all seeds which might hereafter produce the fruits of individual peculiarities, habits, or tempers; to remove from them every temptation which should lead them to feel themselves anything, or to be anything but members of a compact, organized state, these were the Spartan’s objects. He felt—it is possible to form a nation, moving by one impulse, determined to one end; but it is only possible upon these conditions. It is only possible if, by Education, we can subdue those feelings in each man, which move him to assert a distinct, independent position for himself.

Now the thought may occur to us: surely these were not, as you said just now they were, favourable circumstances for making this experiment. Surely that body of slaves must have greatly interfered with the success of it. I answer, if you mean that the existence of such a body was in itself a monstrous anomaly and evil, I suppose there cannot be two opinions on the subject. But if you mean that it prevented the Spartan from

submitting to that discipline which the legislator imposed upon him, you are supporting an opinion to which reason gives no countenance, and which history directly negatives. The experiment was made, and was perfectly successful; and one great cause of its success was the existence of this very body of Helots. Without that continual specimen of the effects of a loose, disorderly manner of life; without the continual terror which the presence of such a mass struck into their masters, I do not see what chance there would have been of persuading any body of men to adopt these self-degrading regulations, far less to maintain them for so many centuries. And the fact stands good against all cavilling; this was done; a system of restraint, to which there has been no parallel, did establish itself in all the daily acts and proceedings of these Spartans; they did give up their individual tastes, and judgments, and impulses; they did submit themselves to a rigid, all-compelling law. The principle did work itself out into all the details of life. You cannot think of any occasion to which it could be applied to which it was not applied. You can point to a hundred regulations in the system, against which your feelings, and something higher than your feelings, may revolt. But can you point to one which was not directly and most admirably contrived for the accomplishment of this object?

Are we, then, to decide that the object was

a wrong one? I think we shall have great difficulty in doing that; I think our consciences will hardly let us do it. When we see a system getting such a footing as this did, not by appealing to the lower feelings and instincts of our nature, but by defying them; when we see it making its way, and holding its ground against all appearances and probabilities, I think it is very hard to say, "There was no truth in this, it was based upon a falsehood." Granting that local circumstances, and those of a dishonourable kind, may have helped to give this system a footing, and may have frightened those who had adopted it from abandoning it, yet can we believe that it derived more than such accidental support from these circumstances, as would have been totally unequal to sustain a principle which had not some strength and vitality of its own. I think we must admit, that when this doctrine was propounded to the Spartans—"Individual feelings, dispositions, habits, must be sacrificed, that you may be a free and united nation," there was something in their inmost being which responded—"This is true." And if this be the case, I cannot see what is to determine the application of this principle to one age or one meridian; there must be a meaning and a worth in it for us as there was for them; twenty-five hundred years cannot have made it obsolete or weak.

That this principle then was tried most perfectly, and that it proved itself to be good for something in Education, I think we have proof. And now the questions remain, Have we proof that it is *the* principle which we are to keep in sight in our Education? Did it avail for that ultimate end which the legislator proposed to himself, the formation of a great nation? There is one glaring event in Greek history upon which we inevitably fix as the illustration of the Spartan mind, and of the effects of Spartan discipline. Undoubtedly it was a marvellous illustration of both, for the three hundred Spartans died not from any principle of ambition or glory, or from any theory about what it was graceful or becoming to do, but simply in obedience to the laws. Such a fact is sufficient, I think, to prove that there was a strength and steadfastness in this principle; and therefore it should be spoken of; and the repetitions of so many centuries have not made the record of it less stirring or less pregnant with meaning. But I believe it must be allowed that nearly the whole interest of Spartan history is gathered up in the pass of Thermopylæ. Take away that one fact, and all their proceedings during the Persian war are poor, selfish, and contemptible. Before that time, though their polity must have lasted for some centuries, they had certainly not produced one great man. The

most conspicuous figure in their history, up to the Persian invasion, is Cleomenes, a madman, who, in all his conduct at home and abroad, seemed to show what a tremendous reaction the Spartan system must produce in any mind that was not wholly formed by it. A still more remarkable illustration of the same truth on another side is furnished by the history of the period immediately after the Persian war. During that time, when the other principal state of Greece was pouring forth remarkable men almost in multitudes, Sparta produced one of whom history has taken notice. This man, Pausanias, affords us an instance of a Spartan brought into contact with Oriental luxury. We find that it immediately turns his brain; he cannot the least resist the impression of splendid costume, and imperial dainties; he must attempt the most absurd and awkward imitation of them in his own Republic.

But a period comes in the history of Greece, which would seem likely to call forth all the greatness that was latent in Lacedæmon. The Dorian is brought into contact with the Ionian; every tribe feeling is alive; the Spartan has an opportunity of displaying himself in his own proper occupation of war. We have the best opportunity of knowing what he did, for we have a most impartial, observant, considerate historian of the whole transaction; he discovers one man

during the whole war, who exhibited the same kind of virtue and spirit, though on far less remarkable occasions, which distinguished the hero of Thermopylæ. All the other actors on the Spartan side are men of no mark or worth at all; mere generals, finding no occasion for the exhibition even of military virtues. If there had been any bright traits in the latter part of this period, the author who brings the history of the war to a conclusion, would certainly have discovered them, for he had the strongest prejudice in favour of Sparta and her institutions: it is a black picture of pride and cruelty with scarcely one redeeming feature. Whatever there was best among Spartans was probably called forth in the latest age of their commonwealth, when some men were stirred up, by the degeneracy of all around them, to strive and strive in vain for the recovery of the ancient discipline. These facts would seem to go a good way in proving that the restraining principle—if it be a grand element in Education, cannot be the governing law of it. And yet they are not all which show that the Lycurgan system, complete and circular as it was, failed to accomplish its own purpose of building up a nation. We have the testimony of the most acute observer of antiquity, a testimony which Mr. Mitford has endeavoured to special plead, by alleging that it referred only to a period

after the old institutions had decayed, whereas it is in fact a most elaborate criticism upon the principle of these institutions, and the natural result of them; — we have this testimony that the Spartan state became, through the measures of Lycurgus, utterly without wealth, while its individual members became inordinate lovers of wealth; so that the restraining system operated indeed to the extinction of individual character, but inflamed, instead of extinguishing, individual ambition and avarice.—(See NOTE A.)

We are in search then of some other Education containing this element within it, or capable of adopting this element into it, and we have now to inquire, whether the Athenian principle satisfies this condition, and whether, in other respects, it justifies itself to us, as an instrument for forming a nation? Before the idea, which gave all its peculiarity to the Athenian polity as well as to the Athenian Education, had put itself forth in a system, the Ionian tribe had already shown itself possessed of those wonderful powers which have made it illustrious in all generations since. The spirit of quick and subtle observation, of invention and contrivance, of earnest and patient inquiry, was beginning to find various methods of exercising itself in the colonies on the coast of Asia; there, no doubt, the Greek faculty was developed, and kept alive by the attempt to maintain a position

on a foreign soil, and to find some power which should be a counterpoise to the physical power of the empire in which they dwelt and traded. When an Athenian compared what he saw or heard of in those colonies, with the condition of his own tribe, in its mother city, in a period of weakness and disorganization, as great probably as that in which Sparta was found by Lycurgus, his reflections would naturally take some such direction as this: He would say, Why cannot this great and ancient city be as orderly and powerful as those new cities which are rising into such consequence on the other side of the *Ægean*? We belong to the same race as they, we are not in any natural qualities inferior, and we have this immense superiority, that we are upon our native soil. What can be the cause but this that our energies of thought and action are slumbering within us? nothing has been done to make us understand by effort and exertion what they are.

The condition of the body of slaves in Attica would suggest to him, as the condition of the Helots in Sparta did to Lycurgus, an argument in favour of the principle which was working itself out in his mind: How had these men become slaves originally, what kept them slaves now, but the absence of these faculties of insight and action which belonged to their conquerors? They had been, they were still, a mere lifeless mass,

powerful as a mass, each element of itself insignificant and worthless. This was, no doubt, the proper condition for slaves ; but the condition for citizens must be that each one feels and knows himself to be something — that he is conscious of powers within him, and knows how to put them forth. This is a very different train of thoughts, indeed, from that which we attributed to the Spartan, a difference occasioned by the different characters of the two tribes, and probably by the different circumstances of the two periods. Nay, it is possible that the state of Sparta itself, carrying, as it must have done, to an Ionian, a condemnation of the maxim upon which it was founded, may have had its effect in producing the change. Yet it will be observed that the occasion of these reflections was in some important particulars the same ; the object in both cases alike was to raise a disorganised society into a nation, in both cases alike the circumstances of the slaves helped to determine or strengthen the convictions of the legislator. And, therefore, the remark which I made before, applies also here. It must not be said that the existence of slavery in Attica renders the principle of cultivating the faculties inapplicable or impossible. On the contrary, as the sight of the disorganised mass of Helots, given up to self-indulgence and brutality, was a stimulus to the self-restraint and obedience

of the Lacedemonian, so, the sight of a body of slaves, degraded and uncultivated, was a stimulus to all the acts of self-cultivation in the Athenian. Slavery, in each case, did not take from the success of the experiment, but was an important condition of its success.

And we are bound to confess that this scheme for cultivating individual energies, like the Lacedemonian scheme for restraining them, was *perfectly* successful. Both that part of the system which may technically be called political—the democratic constitution of the state—the powers of voting and judging given to so large a portion of it, and that which is technically called its Education—the scheme for developing the bodily powers by gymnastics—the faculty of calculation and distinction by arithmetic—the faculty of arrangement and composition by grammar—the faculty of imagination by the fine arts, were devised with the most exquisite skill for this end, and they worked towards it with the most exquisite harmony.

The most vigorous employment for the faculties was provided by the one, the most direct means of eliciting them by the other. The result has surely proved that it was so. If ever a people really deserved to be called intellectual, *this* was that people. We must be convinced, when we look at what they have done, and at what

they were, that no additional machinery which we possess—no new store of facts or opinions with which twenty-five centuries may have endowed us, can accomplish this work, simply and nakedly considered, of educating the powers or faculties of man better than it was accomplished among them. If it be not so, show us in what single power or faculty the Athenians, as a people, were deficient ; in what single faculty or power they did not excel any nation that has ever been upon the earth.

Now, I think we must admit in this, as in the case of Lacedæmon, that the end which was thus so signally achieved is a worthy end. If it was impossible for our conscience not to recognise a truth in the idea of Lycurgus, which prescribed a violent restraint upon all those tempers and dispositions in us, which hinder us from acting together as members of society, I think the same conscience also finds it quite as impossible to say, there is not truth in this Athenian idea, that we are bound to give—not a partial expansion, but the very greatest expansion possible to every power and faculty which has been bestowed upon us. How these two witnesses of our conscience are to be reconciled, is another question ; but I am sure that it does give them both. I am sure when we read of what Athens did, the feeling which we shall have at the best moments of our life will not be this: “It would have been

more right, that the powers which were in the mind of this people, should not have been called forth,"—or even this, "It would have been better that they should have been called into less active exercise." Such thoughts will probably have occurred to all of us; at times we shall have yielded to them entirely. But I do not think it can be the conclusion, in which we at last rest, or the conclusion to which we have been led by the deepest sense of what is honest and true. That sense, I think, must force us to say, Whatever power God has given to a man, he ought to use it, and we should do all we can that he may be able to use it.

And, yet, however strange and incompatible with this faith it may seem, the conviction is forced upon us by Athenian history, that the qualities cultivated in this people, by their Education, did become a curse to them, and were the cause of their ruin. We are not permitted to suspect that possibly the want of Education in some, rather than the possession of it in others, may have caused Athens to decline. We are not permitted to attribute that decline to its slave system, or to any other cause, but to one which is directly connected with their intellectual discipline. It is the testimony not of one great Athenian writer of the age of Pericles, but of those whose opinions and feelings were in all respects the most opposite

to each other—that Sophists and Rhetoricians were the destroyers of the Athenian nation, and that they destroyed it by appealing to those powers, and that sense of power, which the Education of the nation had imparted to it. The great comedian of Athens saw this: he saw that the feeling of their own insight and profundity made his countrymen a prey to the vulgarest delusions. The great philosopher of Athens, whom that comedian ridiculed, saw still deeper into the meaning of the same fact—saw that the most clever and enlightened of the youth of Athens knew *about* all manner of things—could talk about all manner of things—but knew nothing whatever of themselves. He saw how the feeling of their own powers had made them believe the Sophists' lie, from which every other lie flows by necessary inference, that a man is his own standard—that nothing is but what he creates: he saw how by this means truth was confounded with opinion—how law became self-will, and morality, accident. He saw how all the crimes which his nation was committing in its public transactions, had their root in this want of faith in right and wrong; in this belief that nothing is, but all things seem—in this denial of what is immutable and eternal. All this he traced home to the Education of their youth, which had brought forth the faculties, indeed, into most wonderful activity, but had left the great

problems, Who is to rule these faculties? For what end are they given? On what objects are they to be exercised? utterly unsolved. He saw, as others, with not half his clearness of vision, could see, that Athens was full of energies, but had little life — abounded with intellect, but was without wisdom — possessed great power, but was not a nation. And, therefore, strange as it may seem, some of his disciples, though themselves profiting in the most eminent degree by Athenian cultivation, actually sighed after that Lacedemonian discipline which excluded it altogether. The thought of men who were not always talking, who uttered now and then a pregnant sentence, but for the most part did their work in silence; the thought of men who did know how to restrain themselves in the gratification of their tastes and instincts, who were able to practise self-government, and were not the victims of every wretch who had a new theory to hawk about, or a new scheme to try; the contemplation of such men as these was so delightful to these disciples of Socrates, wearied as they were with the infinite variety and endless chatter of the clever Athenians, with their conceit of their own sagacity, their readiness to receive every impostor who came provided with fine phrases, and a system of philosophy, that they would have been willing to exchange all they had heard and learned, for the rugged ignorance of the

Spartan. Some of the less wise among them, seem even to have fancied that it was possible to combine the Lacedemonian system with the Athenian character. But this appears to have been the idlest of dreams. The Athenian statesman who best understood the character of his countrymen, and who framed all his policy in accordance with it, perceived the utter impossibility of ever amalgamating the two nations or their institutions together.* In a speech, which develops his views, if it were not actually spoken by him, we have the clearest and liveliest picture of the utter and irreconcilable difference between the principles upon which their politics and their Educations were founded. The one, Pericles represents as doing everything by the force of law, the other by the influence of opinion; the one as austere denying every indulgence, the other giving the freest scope for all; the one cultivating a mere habit of acting and suffering, the other looking upon deliberation and discourse as the best preparation for both. No one, I think, can carefully read this speech of Pericles, or study the history, which is a comment upon it, without believing that he was right; and if so, we have found an answer to another of our questions: It still remained a doubt whether if there was something good in the Athenian principle, and something good in the Spartan principle, the good which we seek after

might not be obtained by combining them ; but from all we have learned at present, it seems as if they could not be combined, as if they were naturally antipathic. We are still, therefore, some way off our principle, though we must not despair, in due time, of reaching it.

And now I must ask for a far greater licence than that which is demanded by the Chorus in the "Winter's Tale," and carry you over, not twenty years, but twenty centuries, that I may place you at once among the opinions and controversies of modern Europe. I hope I shall be able to show you, before the end of this lecture, that I do not consider all that was transacted in the intermediate time quite unimportant, or believe that we can understand very thoroughly the changes of which I am about to speak, without some knowledge of it. But just at present I wish merely to compare the feelings which gave birth to the two systems we have been examining, with those which have most prevailed among ourselves, from the latter end of the seventeenth century till the present time. The difference which strikes us as most conspicuous, when we enter upon this new region, is that every one is speaking of things to be taught, or things to be learned, not of mental activities to be awakened or repressed. I am speaking, it must be remembered, especially of the last century. I have already intimated, that

another considerable change has of late taken place in our feelings and language, a change which I shall presently have occasion to account for : yet it was characteristic, and it has not ceased to be characteristic of modern times, that a notion of teaching, or telling certain things as in themselves good or advantageous to be known, has in a great measure superseded the Greek notion of teaching a man to use or control his own powers. Now, I think, if we consider this change well and earnestly, we shall feel that it is very significant. The world, one would think, must have got a new standing-ground, before it could be possible to think or speak in this new manner. That we should feel we have something to tell, which it is important for this child, or this man to learn, something good and true in itself, and not something good or true, merely for the influence it exerts—this is altogether novel and surprising. The Greek learns music, or geometry, or grammar, for these he perceives have certain relations with his own mind ; they are connected by certain strange and mysterious links with the exercise of his own powers ; there is a response to them in his affections and understanding. But that a man should believe — I have something to announce to you, I have facts and laws which I come with authority to apprise you of knowing them to be such as I say they are and no otherwise—this is

another kind of ground altogether for men to occupy. And yet men have felt that they occupied this ground. Strange as it may appear—in the present age, and in the age immediately preceding it—in these ages, which have been called the ages of scepticism, men have asserted for themselves the right to do this. They have said, “Thus and thus stands the case with the constitution of this world: I affirm, in perfect contempt of all sensible notions to the contrary, that the earth on which you are standing is in motion, and that the sun which you see moving is stationary. I affirm this to you as a fact, of which you shall hereafter understand the principle and the law—but cavil as you may, it is so. It is not the common opinion; the Emperor of China, and all his millions say ‘not content’ to it, nearly all Asia, quite all Africa—the largest portion of America—the most considerable portion of Europe (if it adheres to its own principles) goes along with him, and as we said before, your own senses all witness the same way, and in defiance of them all, I say it is a fact, and I expect you to believe me.” It is quite obvious that no Greek ever had, or dreamed of having the right to take such a tone as this. It is a new position to have won, and certainly it looks like a noble position. One would feel very sorry to abandon it, if it is in any way tenable. One would be sorry not to say, Here also is a

principle in Education which is most true and necessary, not less so than that Lacedemonian, and that Athenian principle, with neither of which we found that we could dispense.

But then as we adopted our former conclusions upon some evidence, it becomes necessary to inquire whether this principle has proved itself to be the sufficient principle of Education, and whether it is reconcilable with those others which we also admitted to be sound. There is somewhat more difficulty in determining how far this doctrine has succeeded or failed than there was in the former instances : for the Spartans and Athenians made us understand clearly what they were aiming at. There could be no doubt at all that they were endeavouring to build up a nation by means of their Education. It is not at once clear that this is the purpose of those who have talked and written of Education within the last century and a half ; it would seem as if some of them at least, and possibly the majority, had another theory about the objects of Education than this. They have spoken of this or that portion of knowledge being useful, and this or that portion being ornamental, or entertaining : the question of course presents itself immediately — Useful, for what ? If the answer were, useful for the education of the faculties, that would take the question out of our present inquiry, and make all that we have said of

the Athenians applicable to these moderns. But that this cannot be the meaning of at least the more profound and philosophical persons who make this distinction, I gather from a series of books lately put forth by a learned society in which it is adopted. Among the books to which that society has given the name "Entertaining," I find such a title as this, "A History of the Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties:" now as a means to the Education of the faculties or energies of the class for whom it is written, one would think that a book having this object, must be as *useful* as any which falls within the other more honoured series. I conceive, therefore, that we are obliged to reject this, as the sense given to the word *useful*, by such persons as these, and by those whose opinions they represent. Again, it would be doing them great injustice to suppose, that by "useful" they meant that which tended to secure for men some tangible, pecuniary advantages. They have repeatedly described the facts which they had to communicate as being valuable in, and for themselves, and they could obviously have no clear justification for any of their scientific writings, upon any ground but this. Neither do I believe that such men as these can have any purpose of perplexing the minds of their readers with the notion, that a certain abstraction called General Utility, is itself the object of their labours.

They are perfectly aware that the custom of every language under heaven, demands that the word *useful*, should point to some end out of, and beyond itself; that it is a contradiction to speak of anything being useful, and not useful for some end. To suppose that they look upon their books as useful for utility, is to offer them such an insult, as no man should ever offer to another. Equally impossible it is to fancy, that the end which they seek after can be expressed by such a phrase as this, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." Being anxious to clear the minds of their readers, and not to confound them, to give them not phrases, but the change for phrases, they must of course regard with deadly animosity any such weak imposture as this; they know well that happiness is a word, which has at least a thousand different significations, to the minds of different men; they know that the question, "What does happiness mean? What is it?" is precisely the question in which men feel most interested; and they know, therefore, that whoever uses such a phrase as this, secretly assumes his own notion of happiness, and resorts to one of those fallacies for which Mr. Bentham has provided the excellent name of "Question-begging appellatives." Seeing then that none of these can be the meaning attached to the word *useful knowledge*, we ought, I think, to believe that it means

the same thing to the persons who now employ it, which it would have meant to a Spartan or an Athenian ; it means knowledge which is useful to the end of building up a nation. The knowledge is supposed to be good for its own sake, the communication of it to be the purpose of Education ; but the end of Education itself, is as it has always been considered, to form a nation of living, orderly, men.

This being assumed, the question remains, Has this teaching or giving of information made out its title to be such an instrument of national edification ? We have had the experiment of its worth made in all the classes of which this country is composed. It has been contended that the Education which the higher classes received in the old grammar schools of the country was most imperfect on this ground ; that they were taught two ancient languages, and that a great quantity of information not contained in these languages, or to be attained through them, was thus withheld from the most influential part of the youth of our land. Hence an attempt has been made in many modern schools to substitute an Education for this, and possibly, many attempts also to accommodate the old schools to the new opinion. Still more zealously has the system been acted upon with reference to the middle class. In the commercial schools which they have set up for themselves, the

object of communicating this or that morsel of information about a number of subjects, has been the prevailing, I might say the exclusive one. Lastly, in the efforts that have been made during the last thirty years to educate the lower classes — the labours of most benevolent men have been directed to the work of contriving a machinery, by means of which the poor may learn to read and write, and so get whatever other information their circumstances admit of their receiving. What has been the effect? I think you must perceive, that the more this system is carried out, the more hopelessly divided these classes become. When our knowledge is parcelled out into a multitude of subjects, when it is the supposed business of our lives to acquire information about mathematics, and information about astronomy, and about geology and mineralogy and all the rest — when this becomes the *sense* that you put upon the word Education, you raise a barrier between one class of society and another, which all the talk in the world about respects for the rights of the poor, does not in the slightest degree diminish; for there must be a portion of the information which the higher class has leisure to receive, which the middle class has not leisure to receive, and a portion, which the middle class has leisure to receive, which the lower class has not leisure to receive; and that which is communicated to all,

the higher class will have leisure to receive well, the middle class indifferently, the poor class very ill. Here then, Education, which we want as the great bond to connect the classes together ; which we want as the means of building up a nation, becomes the very instrument of dividing us—of making one feel that his great possession is that of which those beneath him, have only the most miserable shadow and counterfeit. And what if all this distinction of classes were abolished ; what, if you secure the same amount of leisure to all—then, would come in the difference in powers of acquisition : A distinction not recognized any longer as part of an order of society, would soon establish itself again by the force of individual skill and prowess—intellectual powers would be worshipped, intellectual tyranny established, and as it was in the case of Athens, and as it will be in the like case all over the world, there will be needed a set of slaves, ignorant, disorganized, degraded—as a foil to the wisdom of their masters, and as a witness for the necessity of preserving it.

But this doctrine that the giving of information is the same thing with education, was rapidly leading to another result still more deplorable, still more fatal to the consistency and being of a nation, and would have led us straight to it if there had not been other powers at work to counteract the influence. As this principle requires men to

assume the authority of teachers, to feel they have a right, and to claim the right of announcing certain facts and laws — of announcing them before they demonstrate them — the question naturally arose: What kind of facts, what kind of laws are those which we shall in this peremptory manner pronounce to be ascertained? Owing to what circumstances I shall not now inquire, but the result towards which men's minds were hastening was this: The only facts and laws which we may dare thus to teach, are those which respect the physical universe — these are proved — these do not depend upon opinion: of these the teacher may speak boldly; on all others his voice must be so timid and tremulous that perhaps it might almost as well be silent altogether. That we were threatened with such a calamity as this, I think few will dispute. A writer in "The Westminster Review," about seven years ago, roundly charged "The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge" with a wish to confine their tracts for the people within these limits. They had neglected, he said, to instruct their readers in the doctrine of wages, and in the principles of political economy generally. He argued that in these the middle and lower classes were more interested than in all dogmas about the constitution of the universe. These, he said, would come home to their business and bosoms. And he exhibited

most righteous scorn of the notion that a society should be withheld from speaking out that which it believes to be true upon subjects affecting the life of men, from the fear of offending persons who did not agree with them. Yet in spite of the reviewer's most clear and honest judgment upon this matter, I believe that not perhaps this Society, yet a great number of those who endeavour to guide the feelings of the country respecting Education, would have acted upon the principle which he denounced, and would gradually have found themselves obliged to reduce all Education to a mere teaching of physics, because on these they suppose men, in this country, are in tolerable accordance,—if a strong and earnest protest against such a design had not been raised by persons who felt that there were other questions even more nearly concerning themselves and their country, than that respecting the relation between wages and population, to which it was fit that his rule should be applied. A feeling has been for some time at work in our land which may be interpreted thus—"all ages and nations have been wanting to be informed concerning the mysteries of their own being, wanting to have the riddle of this world solved to them, wanting to know what they are, and whence they came, and whither they are going." The cry has gone forth, If you can give

us this information you have no right to cheat us of it, if you cannot give it, we will seek it of those who can. We will not be put off with news about the stars, when there are thoughts chafing and tormenting our inmost being which we need to have explained to us." A cry has been raised, Give this information to us and to our children—refuse it to us if you dare. Refuse it to us if you are willing to try the might which there is in human nature, blind and ignorant of all the conditions under which it exists, ignorant of its misery, ignorant of its glory, yet possessed with a wild, strange consciousness of both, and ready to try if it cannot work out one through the most intolerable experience of the other.

Such a voice as this, uttered from the depths of a nation's being, and carrying with it the most fearful auguries for the future, may perhaps help us more in finding out that principle of which we have been so long in search, than many suggestions from ingenious and learned men. A mere education of restraint will not satisfy it, and yet it seems to indicate feelings which may well need much restraint; a mere Education of the faculties will not satisfy it, yet it seems to indicate the presence of faculties which must need to be called out; a mere Education of information about facts and opinions will not satisfy it, yet it seems to crave for information about the deepest facts.

This, I think, and nothing short of this, would satisfy it: if at any time during those years which we just now passed over, those years which we said had wrought a great change in men's feelings respecting the right they had to tell truths to their brethren—if, during these years a proclamation should have gone forth, that the Deliverer was come, whose office it is not to unpinion the arms of Prometheus, or to stifle his complaints, but to take him from his rock and to destroy the vulture that was feeding upon him—if it should have been declared, not that the faculties of men were loosed from their bondage, but that man himself was set free from it, that bondage being to an evil nature which was holding him down; and if this proclamation, in spite of all difficulties and oppositions from within and from without, should have been listened to and received, and society re-established upon the faith of it, then I think we might perceive that Education had a new ground to stand upon; that the meaning of it, the comprehensive, satisfactory meaning of it, was discovered. For then we should understand that information given to men about this great fact of his own position, was the true way of developing that humanity in him, which underlies, as Socrates saw, all our particular faculties and endowments, and the cultivation of which, he saw, must precede

their cultivation, if they were to be blessings instead of curses." And this development, instead of being hindered by the severest restraint upon the animal nature and propensities, would necessarily imply it; the Spartan system would be as true and practical as the Athenian, not apart from it but in conjunction with it. Possessed of this idea, that God himself is the great cultivator of this humanity in men, and that he has appointed men to co-operate with Him in the work, the idea of an order for carrying on this cultivation—of all peculiar faculties being given for promoting it—of all nature—of all the influences of society—above all, of that great bond of society, language, being instruments ordained by Providence to help us in it, would inevitably dawn upon us. It would be felt, that the sense of a common humanity, thus awakened in men, could in nowise be sustained but by the sense of a common object, to whom they might all look up, from whom they should own that all their power and life to think, and act, and feel, were derived—in the knowledge of whom they should realize the end of all their knowledge, and the perfection of their being. Now such an Education as this, of which I have faintly sketched the outline, I say, is in the highest sense of the word a National Education. It is not an Education which makes self-restraint the privilege of one class, for it makes the thing to

be restrained the same in all. It is not an Education which makes development the privilege of one class, for it makes the great thing to be developed the same in all. It is not an Education which limits all high information to one class, and gives to other classes only a poor parody of that information; for it makes the stupendous information which is the foundation of it, the same to all. And therefore we may confidently expect that we only want earnest reflection, to show us how the subordinate parts of it may also be accommodated to all, how we may give to *each* class that peculiar information which enables it best to fulfil its own peculiar position, and in that position to be the servant of the other classes, without making any one feel that we are giving him an unreal thing, a shadow instead of a substance. One difficulty remains, If this be indeed the idea of Education which Christianity has brought to light, can we suppose that it has lain for so many ages a fruitless seed in a barren soil? Can we suppose, that up to this time no scheme of Education should have been grounded upon it? This is the question which I am to consider in my next lecture.

LECTURE II.

BEFORE I enter upon the subject of my present lecture, I will notice an objection which may be made to my preliminary statement. It may seem strange that I should have described the highest Education as national, and yet that I should have defined the purpose of Education to be the development of that which is universal in man. Here it will be said there is a contradiction; your great wish is to form a body of Englishmen, or Frenchmen, or of Spaniards, then surely it should be your endeavour to cultivate the specific qualities which appear to you to constitute the specific character of that nation. If, on the other hand, you recognize something in man which is above all distinctions of class, and country, and race; and if the awakening of this be the aim of your Education, you have already proposed to yourself the highest possible object, and it is a folly to talk of this as a means to a further and much less noble end. Were this a merely metaphysical difficulty, I should scarcely take the pains

to remove it by a formal explanation. But as it may for a moment confuse the minds of some persons who are really desirous of studying this subject for a practical purpose, I will answer at once : The faith that there is something in man which is above all national distinctions is as remote from the notion that it is possible to construct a man who shall have no national distinction, as the most demonstrable principle of chemistry is from the wildest dream of alchemy. No two persons in the world can be such direct antipodes of each other, as he who has striven to cultivate in himself that which belongs to him as a man, and he who has aimed to turn himself into an abstraction. The first is the very best person to fulfil all particular duties as a citizen or a neighbour, a husband or a father ; the other has no duties at all, he does nothing at all, he is merely a universal man ; that is to say, he is no man at all. I own that it is no purpose of our Education to form such a monster as this, and that it is our object to induce a man to be just what God meant him to be, a Dutchman, a Frenchman, or Italian, and for that end to be primarily and chiefly a man. In this sense, then, the ultimate object of developing that which is universal in us is to make us members of a nation ; we are to be men, in order that we may be that particular class or kind of men which our position and circumstances show that we were

intended to be. You may say that this is a lower end, if you please; only admit that without it the other is not accomplished, and you have granted all that is necessary for our purpose.

But our clearest light respecting the relation between what is universal and what is national, is derived from the History of English Education itself. I am not laying down any theory of what is best; I am merely asserting a notorious fact when I say, that at the time when that history commences, we find two bodies existing in the country, one properly and formally national, represented in the person of the King; the other acknowledging a fellowship with men in other lands, in name and in character a universal society. Those who preside over this society admit, by degrees, all the members of the nation into it; they teach each man to look upon himself as something more than the subject of a particular king or the inhabitant of a particular country. This is a curious state of things, but this is not all; to these men belong a number of strange secret influences. The very groundwork of their existence and of their fellowship they affirm to be a revelation of the invisible world and of a union which had been established between it and this. And speedily men see growing up around them on their common earth a number of visible indications of something unseen and infinite. They see

buildings of curious art and workmanship which they can explain upon no ordinary notions of what is useful or necessary. Some of these are dedicated to solemn acts of worship in which the poorest of them are invited to realize their position as members of a family to which princes have thought it a glory to be admitted. Another portion of them is assigned to uses even less intelligible ; there men are said to meet for the purpose of studying the secret meanings of things, of acquainting themselves with what has been done in past days, of looking at what shall be in the future. Hence they come forth, armed, no doubt, with faculties and a power of which humble men can take no measure—a mystery waits upon all that they do and utter. That such thoughts should have been in the minds of poorer men, could not surprise the kings of the land, for they felt them in their own. The sense of a wisdom which is different from all outward power, a feeling of awe at that which swords could not deal with, would often take possession of their minds, though as they became conscious of their own brute strength it would again desert them. But by degrees, a new sense arose in the minds of these rulers, a sense which had been fostered by the very persons to whom it became dangerous. They began to feel “ We have a position of our own to maintain, we are the appointed lords of this

nation, we have received the consecrating oil from the holy man; no one has a right to interfere with this authority. But this corporation with its universal pretensions does interfere with it; in many cases it defies us and resists us." What fruits this feeling produced, in our own country especially, during the middle ages, and how it was resisted by a feeling as strong not in the minds of the most vulgar and ambitious, but of the most true and honest ecclesiastics, that they too had a position to maintain, and that all high wisdom and even all common enlightenment would perish out of the land if they failed to maintain it, I have no need to tell, for I am only noticing the political question so far as it is necessary to illustrate the history of our Education. With that, all the most important issues of the conflict, even in a political point of view, are connected; for it never would have terminated, or have terminated in a way that is most fearful to contemplate, if a new light had not broken in upon the minds of certain ecclesiastics who were studying in the halls which their fathers had consecrated to learning and devotion. As these men meditated upon the great powers with which they and their brethren had been entrusted, they began to lament not that these powers had been conferred, not that they had been asserted, but that they had been used to such low and ignoble

purposes. With all those mighty endowments, those vast spiritual influences for cultivating the mind of a nation, they had not cultivated it. They had begotten an impression of their own powers, they had not shown what those powers were; they had not proved that they were come into the world to emancipate the imprisoned spirit of humanity: on the contrary they had turned their spiritual powers to the account of keeping it in bondage to visible and sensual things. And because they had not educated the minds of men, ignorance was overtaking themselves—because they had not wrought deliverance for men, they had themselves sunk into bondage,—because they had not told men how they might shake off their corruptions, they had become corrupt. And now that a new class were starting into existence, that the old bonds of feudal society were becoming relaxed—that with the intercourse of towns and trading communities, new questions were springing up in the hearts of men, there were none to solve these questions, none to tell them what the doubts and difficulties which they felt in their consciences meant, or to call forth that humanity which was in them, as well as in the lords of the soil. When these discoveries had been made, another followed very quickly, that the notion of a universal society, which had been growing up within the last three or four hundred years, was a gross departure from

the old and genuine principle of it, that the bond which united them to the men in other nations and lands, was their common relation to an invisible and not to a visible person—that there was nothing in it, consequently, which interfered with their distinct and unqualified allegiance to the head of their own country, but everything which bound them to that allegiance—that in making each man understand his place in the universal society, they were adopting the best means for making each man fulfil his position as the member of a nation; and that on the other hand in keeping before them the belief, that they were appointed instruments for forming a great and orderly nation, they were laying themselves under the strongest obligations to claim their own powers and fulfil their own responsibilities as ecclesiastics.

Such thoughts as these went forth from Oxford and from Wittenberg, and they produced the Reformation. Those who say that this event gave us all the Education which we possess, speak no doubt very loosely and wildly. The Reformation was itself owing to the ecclesiastical Education which existed in the country previously. The principal of our colleges, the most important of our grammar-schools, had their origin in an earlier period. But there is a sense in which such an assertion is true. At the Reformation, the use and purpose of those institutions, which the piety

of an older time had bequeathed, and which the piety of that time would certainly not have been able to create, began to be understood. Then it was felt, (in England, I mean), that the majesty of churches and collegiate buildings was not valuable, because it created in men generally a blind impression of fear for what was transacted there, or for the persons who ministered there, and so kept them at a cowardly and dishonourable distance from all invisible realities, doing homage only to that which is apparent or tangible; but because it inspired a quiet, habitual faith in those invisible realities; because it told those who were conversing day by day with a world of shows, pictures, and images, in a language which they could understand, that there is a substantial world about them, in which they may dwell. Then it was felt, that learning is indeed a mystery; that every art and science which brings men into the contemplation of principles and laws, is a mystery; that the mystery of man's being is deeper than all these; and that there is a mystery upon which man's being rests, which is deeper than that; but that these mysteries are degraded and profaned when the profession or knowledge of them is used to advance the reputation or glory of those who are admitted to them, when they do not lead to humility, and to a desire that others should share the same initiation. Then it was

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felt, that all orders of men being entrusted with some function for the good of their brethren, no one order has a right to shrink from the assertion of its own peculiar powers, for those powers are not gifts but trusts, not for rule but for ministry. This being the case as to the whole intention of our system, it was natural that the particular parts of it should also become about this time better distinguished, and that without any formal alteration in the subjects taught, or in the method of teaching, the principles of both should become more precise and intelligible. For reasons which we shall perhaps understand better as we proceed, the Universities in earlier times seem to have too much usurped the whole Education of the country; the distinct object of the grammar-schools was not ascertained. Now their respective purposes became gradually more and more apparent. The two Universities of the country, through the operation of various circumstances, found out for themselves different provinces of thought. The relation between the general body of the University, and the particular colleges into which it was divided, became also more accurately defined. Other changes took place of scarcely less importance; but these are enough to prove that the Reformation gave, (not so much by sudden acts, as by its general influence upon the mind of the country), that form and consistency to our scheme

of Education, which enables us to understand it as a whole, and to see how the different portions of it are related.

It will assist us, perhaps, in understanding both, if we first take notice of two conspicuous omissions in this system. As the universities and grammar-schools make up what I have called our National Education, it is obvious that there is no provision for the instruction of females or of infants. Modern commentators will have no difficulty in explaining this deficiency; they will say, of course, that it arose from the low opinion which our barbarous ancestors formed of the female intellect, and from their believing that children, who were not yet able to study school-logic, or take part in martial exercises, had no souls which it was possible to cultivate. This solution is very easy and plausible; but I am afraid that facts show it to be untenable. It may be said, and with a certain truth, that the reverence for women which Chivalry fostered, had nothing whatever to do with respect for their understandings. Undoubtedly these were not the main objects of loyalty and devotion, though I should find it hard to believe that the old knights made such accurate and scientific distinctions between moral, intellectual, and external qualities, that no homage to wit and wisdom ever mingled with their admiration for goodness and beauty. But how does the remark apply to the

time of which we have just been speaking, the time immediately preceding and following the Reformation? Are there any indications of the alleged feeling in the history either of the Latin or the Teutonic countries of that period? Is the exquisite portrait of a princess of the house of D'Este, the friend and inspirer of Tasso, which a modern poet has drawn, solely the creation of his genius? Were not the materials for it supplied by authentic records of herself, and her mother, her sisters, and of many other ladies of the courts of Italy? And who will say that such instances were confined to the south? Did not the brave and humble-minded daughter of Sir Thomas More, who met her father in his way to the scaffold, assist Erasmus with her criticisms? And was not the noble lady, who herself died on the scaffold not many years after, a student of Plato? Surely at that time the Unas and Glorianas had become the mistresses of fairy tales—the highest intellectual accomplishments were believed to be compatible with the finest moral graces.

Equally unfortunate is the suggestion that either in the middle ages or in the period which followed them, infancy could have been regarded with contempt as only the shell of a substance hereafter to come into being. Every thing that we know about the opinions of those times, would lead to directly the opposite conclusion, that a more awful

recognition of a mysterious presence in the child than is at all common in these days, characterized them. But they had learned from the discipline of old Rome, which was surely not disposed to undervalue the authority of the state, or the hold which it had upon its citizens, that it is much safer for the interest of this very State that it should, in the first place, maintain the parental authority, and should not, for some years, claim any rights of its own distinct from that. It seemed to the wise men of this old republic, that great as was the risk of leaving children to the chance prudence of particular parents, it was a far greater and more terrible risk not to recognize the family principle, not to assert the parental responsibility. Now, whatever arguments determined them in favour of this course, must have seemed to our ancestors infinitely more strong in favour of the adoption of it by themselves; for their children could not be looked upon as merely left to parental authority; they had already been taken into another and a higher guardianship, not in the least interfering with that, but protecting and guiding it. The children were already adopted into that larger society from which all the Education of the country proceeded, and were already subjected to its general moral influences. Was it not well for awhile to be content with this, and to reckon it a better preparation for their becoming

afterwards members of a nation, than if they were assumed to be already in that capacity? They had a similar precedent and a similar argument in the other case. Rome felt herself more indebted, and was more indebted to her women for the firm and manly character of her citizens, than to any other cause whatsoever; but this tone they were able to impart to their sons, and husbands, and brothers, because, not their qualities, but others which corresponded to them, and were the reflection of them, appeared in their own lives. It seemed to the Romans that a nation, in order to be perfect, supposes something besides itself, and that in the domestic character of woman, continually brought into contact with those who, properly speaking, form the nation, it possesses this blessing. Here again our ancestors were able to try a principle, hazardously but successfully, attempted by this Pagan nation, under far happier circumstances. Their women grew up as the members of the great and universal society, under the influence of those principles which asserted the dignity of women, by asserting their distinctness, which made it treason against high mysteries to confound their duties or their powers with those of the other sex: while therefore there was nothing whatever to exclude their faculties from the very highest cultivation which their circumstances enabled them to obtain, while there was everything in the atmos-

phere of wonder and of study around them to tempt them to this cultivation, the condition of it was, (a condition perfectly realized in the cases I have named,) that their life should be domestic, that they should sustain the nation by standing in a manner apart from it, and therefore that they should not be included in the provisions for a National Education.

It thus becomes evident that the object of these schools and universities was to raise up citizens for the commonwealth, and now we are to consider the means by which this work is effected. The first distinction which is likely to strike us in the grammar-school, is that which is indicated by its name. Language has assumed a place in this Education, which it certainly did not hold in either of the ancient schemes which I spoke of in the last Lecture, and from which it has been deposed in all modern schemes. I am very far from saying that it ought to be invested with such importance by any systems pursuing the ends at which they aimed. The Athenian saw that grammar was an excellent instrument for cultivating certain faculties, but he was quite right that in *that* point of view it is only one of several instruments, all equally to be prized. To the person who aims at communicating information on a variety of subjects, language can be, of course, but one of those subjects, or at best the study of any particular language, a means of

attaining the particular information which is stored in the books that have been written in it. But suppose we were really and heartily to believe that there is something universal in man, and that to awaken this into power and life, is that end of Education to which every other is secondary, it seems to me that the thought at once presents itself, "there must be some one study more than any other which is destined to effect this end; some one way of appealing directly to the man within us, and of leading him to acknowledge himself." And after we have cast about far and wide in search of such a power as this, after we have sought for it in the heights above and in the depths beneath, does it not seem likely that we shall at last be brought to this conclusion—'The words which I speak and which I hear, those utterances by which I understand my fellow-creatures, and which enable them to understand me, surely there is a marvel and a mystery in these which must more assure me and assure the peasant that there is a bond between us than all the common sights and sounds of nature, or than light, or than whatever else in the world about us belongs not to one man, but to all. For all these stand aloof from us, this belongs to ourselves; it comes both from us and to us with the same witness of fellowship and sympathy.' Now, though we may

be long in working our way back to the opinion that the meditation of words, of their powers and their structure, their dependencies and connexions must be the most direct means of making the mind intelligently recognise that truth, which, by all other means and ways, we are seeking to put it in possession of, yet, I believe this is also a very simple opinion, and the one most likely to commend itself to simple men, and which being once received, would establish itself by daily experience. Nevertheless if you can find any mere accidents which determined our ancestors to this course, or which led them gradually into it after trials and failures in another, I shall not care. I am not the least anxious to prove that all which is done is the fruit of human foresight and deliberation; I leave that doctrine to modern philosophers to maintain as they can; and if in their prodigal generosity they will supply me with facts to upset their own conclusion to prove that "There's a Divinity which shapes men's ends, rough them how they will," I shall accept such presents with all thankfulness. This one fact will remain after all; the principle of making language the centre of all intellectual studies has by some means or other established itself. It has been laughed at by all manner of wits, great and small, for the last century and a half. It remains a

principle still, not damaged in the least degree by all that laughter; and now, in this year 1839, it is a question which can be boldly put with far less fear of contumely and contempt than ever before, whether the grand comprehensive practical truth be not contained in the old system, and certain partial, poor, shrivelled substitutes for it in the new.

If language be once admitted to the rank which I have claimed for it, we cannot require much proof that the principles of it should be learnt in some particular language, or languages. The fancy that general theories or notions about language are the ways to make any man feel what its purposes are, or to attain a deep practical sense of his own humanity, is one which scarcely any reasonable person will entertain for a moment. The gradual discovery and assurance of principles and laws through facts, is the course which modern as well as ancient wisdom would point out as the only safe and true one. But what is the reason for selecting those two languages which form the staple of Education in our grammar-schools? I am quite willing to allow that the choice of these languages is an accident of the system, and that it would be possible to teach the principles of language in an orderly and scientific manner, by means of our own or any other. When I come to speak of the Education of the middle class, I shall probably have occasion to

show how this may be done, without sacrificing the principle of our system, and why, from the particular circumstances of that class, it is more expedient that it should be done in their case than that the practice of our grammar-schools should be literally copied. But, at the same time, it seems to me equally certain that the most complete way of teaching language is, and must always be, through these particular languages; that the circumstances of the higher class, in this country, do now, more than ever, imperatively demand the continuance of this method; and that unless it be retained as the type and model of what the purely English Education should be, that will be conducted in a most unsatisfactory manner. I attribute no sagacity to our ancestors in the selection which they made; it was a matter of course that Latin should be the staple of teaching in the middle ages, and scarcely less natural that Greek should take its place by the side of it after the revival of letters. Nevertheless, the first of these languages does seem to be the one which sets forth most clearly all the formal arrangements and conditions of grammar, and the other all the living powers and properties of words, and that these should be offered to the study of boys who are hereafter to mix much in society, to see the phrases of their own language defaced by the fashions and usages of their time, and to converse

with foreigners in other languages, which also reflect present feelings and notions; this, it should seem, must be a most fortunate circumstance, if it be important to plant a sense of that which is permanent and universal deeply in the mind. I should scarcely think it needful to mention that as the principles of language are communicated through a particular language, so that language is made intelligible to the student through a particular literature, if it were not important to observe in what way information is communicated on this system. Here are no courses of history, no lectures on the principles of poetry, no physical or mathematical geography: but books of history, and books of poetry, are read, and the localities described in these books are examined. Evidently this part of the system is consistent with the rest; if it is an error it is a wilful error. The facts of a particular history are those which awaken the historical feeling, are those which make a boy feel that he is connected with acts and events which passed hundreds of years ago, thousands of miles away. The spirit of a particular poem, is that which awakens the poetical spirit in answer to it, and makes him feel that the thoughts and feelings of men who lived hundreds of years ago, and thousands of miles away are his thoughts and feelings. If you would desire him ever to enter into the laws and principles of history, ever to

understand the meaning and nature of poetry, you must first give him this living interest in both; this is the preparation, and, if he never goes further, he has something which will stay by him, something which has become part of his own being. In like manner if you want him to know anything about the laws of space and time, you must begin by connecting them with living facts; he must care about places and periods for what was done in them. It may be a humble process; the question which each man should ask himself, is, whether he does not know inwardly that it is the true one. These are two or three hints about our system of instruction, which I believe have only need to be followed out that we may thoroughly understand all its peculiarities and its purpose. I pass over one or two points to which I should wish to refer, such as the omission of gymnastics in our course of Education, because it is found by experience that these are pursued in a practical way, without any formal instruction, and because it is not our object to teach things professionally, but livingly, and because the free choice of sports seems an important element in an Education which is especially intended to call forth social feelings and sympathies; I pass over these, and such like subjects, that I may come to the *discipline*. On this point it seems to me that some mistakes are prevailing respecting the intention

and character of our system, which have, I fear, done very much to degrade it. I spoke of a severe Spartan kind of discipline as being an element in Education which it was most necessary, if it were possible, to connect with that free development at which we mainly aim; and I said that in the christian idea of Education, the possibility of such a union was manifested; there was something in us to be crushed, not by dainty, gentle, civil methods, but by plain, homely, straightforward severity, and this, that what was higher and nobler, what was truly human, might be the better awakened and called forth. That such was the idea of our ancestors, and that they expressed it in their Education, I think there can be no doubt. But now a new theory is come into vogue, and has wonderfully diffused itself through society. It is what is commonly called the theory of rewards and punishments. This doctrine entirely sets aside that idea of a higher and nobler humanity, and of an evil nature crushing and stifling it, entirely sets aside this idea which seems to lie at the roots of all Education, and substitutes for it the vague notion, “here is a creature who will not work without some excitement and stimulants.” Sometimes it may be a prize for good conduct, sometimes it may be a chastisement for evil conduct, each acting upon the same low and grovelling feelings; the punishment not recognized as right

by the conscience, while the flesh quails at it, the reward not panted for by the nobler and better spirit, but sought for and received by that very selfish and evil temper which needs most to be corrected and subdued within us. Of course this novel system puts on the pretence of being practical, and if the end of Education be to get certain things done, or certain things omitted, it is just possible, though I think not probable, that it may approve itself to experience. But we ought to know that though other persons may justify their systems, upon such grounds as these, we cannot justify ours; we must either defend it upon the highest principles, or abandon it at once. It is an absurd attempt, which has been made again and again, and which has failed again and again, to defend it upon the maxims of the age, for it is not built upon those maxims, and if they are true, it is false. Supposing, then, that this novelty has been admitted into our grammar-schools, in conformity with these maxims, we are bound to say it has nothing to do with the principle of the system. It is one of those anomalies which strike us most glaringly in institutions having a principle; in modern institutions they would not strike us at all, because they would be themselves the principle.

The confusion arising from this adoption of modern maxims into our ancient system is, I

believe, the main cause why another leading peculiarity of these institutions has become unintelligible. If this theory of rewards and punishments be true, if man is not a spiritual being with a nature struggling to degrade and destroy him, it becomes a strange absurdity to connect worship with Education. As a matter of course it will be represented one moment as a penal infliction, and the next (very consistently) as a cunning scheme for begetting an early prejudice in favour of a particular form of faith. If, on the other hand it be not a branch of Education, but the whole intent of Education to bring forth that in man which looks upward and to crush his downward tendencies; if no man ever believed that he had a humanity, however he might talk about it, who did not realize the conviction by looking out of himself and above himself; if every higher thought and aspiration has its ground in the belief of an actual established connexion between himself and his Creator, it would seem the most extravagant inconsistency to disconnect human cultivation with acts of habitual and united worship. On the other hand, and it would seem most accordant with the whole scheme, that all great and humanizing influences, the influences of music and architecture especially, which formed a separate head of culture among the Greeks, should be all connected with this and made dependent upon it :

that whatever acts most directly and powerfully upon the spirit within us, should from our earliest youth witness to us what we are and how we may attain the ends of our being, so that hereafter the world may not be a perplexed crowd of undistinguishable impressions, but that everything may be felt to proceed from one source and have one termination. Clearness of vision, to distinguish shadows from substances, simplicity of heart, to embrace the true and hate the false, strength of will to bear up against infinite complications of passions within and influences without, depend far more than we can conceive upon our being early imbued with the feelings of a unity in things and with our being taught to refer them all to one centre.

I have reserved for the last place a few words respecting the direct religious instruction that I suppose to be in keeping with the rest of this system, because this will be a good preparation for what I shall have afterwards to say respecting the Universities. It seems to me that according to the idea of this Education, such instruction will neither be general about that in which all people are agreed, nor special about that in which all people differ. Our old English Education is not occupied with inquiries either about agreements or differences. There are facts which it supposes a child wants to be acquainted with,

facts about its own position, what it is, and what it has to trust in, what it has to know, and what it is to do, and whence it is to get its power of trusting, and knowing, and doing. Believing that we know these facts, we announce them: then the living records in the books of Divine Revelation acquire a meaning, then the acts of the boy himself acquire a meaning, and one becomes the safe interpreter of the other. Here, then, as in all our previous studies, we seek for a living method; our object is not to give systematic indoctrination upon one subject or upon another, neither is it to give loose, irregular, unprincipled instruction; it is instruction adapted to the creature on whom we bestow it, intended to awaken him to the consciousness of what he is, and to prepare him for doing a work in the world.

The characteristic difference between the school and the university seems to be this: In the first, we are learning our own position, in the second we are learning how to act upon others; the first is intended to form men, the second is intended to form teachers. This distinction is tolerably well understood, and in the main is acted upon: Those who are intended for all active professions frequent the grammar-school; those who are meant for professions, which directly inform the mind of the country, frequent the university. But there is another distinction, consequent upon

this, which I think is often overlooked ; it is that the studies of the school are, as I have described them, purely living studies, in which the student is the main object ; the studies of the university are scientific, in which the study is the main object. What we said was not done at the grammar-school, the looking at history as history, at poetry as poetry, at language as language, it is intended to do here. But since our preliminary Education has been remarkable for the unity of its purpose, and since the teachers of the land, in all their different departments, are to make the one end of cultivating humanity their end, it would seem necessary to seek for some central study in these universities also, lest we should become confused in the multitudes of subjects, and not feel their common connexion, or to what point they are all bearing. Now we found, in the grammar-schools, that the highest direct instruction was that concerning our state and position as spiritual beings, that the great instrument of cultivation was language. That which answers in the scientific course to those general practical lessons respecting our position and duties, which form the Christian teaching of the school, is the science of Theology. This, therefore, is contemplated as the centre of direct instruction in our universities, as that which gives laws to the other studies and explains their connexion.

But what answers to language as the instrument of cultivation? It might be asked, why should not the study of the laws of language be to the university what the study of particular languages is to the school? Possibly, this is not far from being the case. But when we come to look into the laws of language, we find that they indicate two methods of thought, both of them appointed for us, each, for its own purpose, most necessary; we find that there is a certain method of thought which is determined by the conditions of our own understandings, and a certain method which is determined by the laws of Nature; one of these is the method with which we become acquainted through the study of logic, the other is that with which we become acquainted through the study of mathematics. Now these two studies are, I believe, meant to be respectively the central studies at our two universities. I know this is not the common opinion; it is a prevalent notion that classical studies are characteristic of one university, and mathematical of the other. But this notion is founded upon the way in which certain prizes and honours are distributed in these bodies, which prizes and honours are of modern invention, and afford no sort of help in investigating their principle. It is a notorious fact, that the most illustrious scholars of the last century, and certainly some of the most illus-

trious in the present century, have proceeded from that university which is supposed to have neglected scholarship. On the other hand, though Oxford for the last thirty years, (till very recently indeed), has done scarcely anything for the advancement of logical science, yet so deeply has the logical habit of mind rooted in those who have partaken of her Education, (chiefly perhaps through the influence of the ancient author whose works are on some most important subjects her text books) that it is found to pervade all their writings, and to constitute the great point of dissimilarity between them and those which issue from the mathematical university. I make this remark, partly that you may see how the principle which is intended to govern the movements of a body, makes itself manifest in spite of many laborious efforts to set it aside, and how important it is, therefore, to understand what the principles are upon which our National Education is constructed, that we may not frustrate all our best intentions by running counter to them—partly because foreigners, through mistaken information respecting its leading studies, are often unable to understand our system, and to compare it with their own, and sometimes fancy that our universities are mere grammar-schools for an older class—and partly because it seems to me very important that the difference between the two uni-

versities, of which I have spoken, should be present to the minds of those who belong to either. Each will then better know what work it is appointed to do, and we shall understand what we have to expect from each. In past times, certainly, we perceive that the investigation of laws and principles has proceeded most successfully, and the creative powers been exercised most freely at Cambridge. This we should expect from a university whose main study brings it into contact with the permanent laws of nature. On the other hand in moral and intellectual discipline, in the cultivation of habits, in the exercise of the practical faculties, I think there is no doubt that Oxford has always been foremost. This is what we should expect from a body primarily occupied with the contemplation of the limitations and conditions to which our minds are subject. And since neither of these tendencies can really flourish, when the other is checked or is idle; and since both may work most harmoniously together, it seems advisable that each university should feel, which it is its own especial vocation to foster and direct. Any excess or assumption in either of these habits of mind will then be repressed, not by the habit itself being weakened, but by another equally strong and necessary being brought out to sustain it.

Having one of these two formal sciences for the

moving spring of its intellectual discipline, and having that great practical and real science of Theology, for the centre of its positive instruction the university is then able to look upon all subjects which are interesting to man as part of a course of humanity studies. Those which belong to all men, such as history, poetry, ethics, belong to the first course ; those which belong to particular or professional men, as jurisprudence, medical science, divinity, (for it must be remembered, that in this point of view, there is a specific and a general theology ; the one intended for the professed theologian, the other for every student as a student,) are supposed to form part of another course ; besides these there is a free scope for the admission of any of those studies, which are as yet rather collections of important facts than organized sciences ; such I mean as botany, geology, or political economy. For a university, having recognized methods and rules of investigation, is bound to lend its aid in applying these to the consideration of all the observations which industrious, working men submit to it.

Thus far I have spoken of university studies. University life forms another, and quite as important a subject for reflection. It is obvious that this ought to be something different from school life. There must come a time when it is not safe to treat external controul as sufficient ; when we

must be taught by experience the value and the methods of self-controul. This truth has been universally recognised; our system certainly does not set it at nought; we have even been accused of admitting too sudden a transition from the state of the boy to the state of the youth. There is, however, as you know, one circumstance in which we are peculiar, nay, which may be said to be the most characteristic feature in our Education. The youth at the university is not, any more than the boy at the school, a solitary independent creature, attending the lectures of certain professors, paying them certain fees, in all other respects providing for himself. He finds when he goes to Oxford or Cambridge, that he is related to two bodies; he is the member of a university, bound by its general laws and statutes, and entitled to attend its different lectures. He is also the member of a particular college, constituting a society within itself; requiring his attendance at a common table and a common worship, providing him not merely with instruction, but with a dwelling; appointing for him a scheme of life. The history of the origin and growth of this college system would throw wonderful light upon English history generally, and especially upon the way in which particular neighbourhoods have become integral parts of the nation. Benevolent men felt that they could not better discharge themselves of the obli-

gation which wealth, inherited from their fathers, or obtained by their own hands imposed upon them, than by providing an Education for the places from whence that wealth was derived. Sometimes a local school might be the fruit of this impulse ; but just as often they desired to incorporate the particular gift with the general instruction of the country. Our ancestors did not hold themselves bound to reject such donations and bequests. They permitted the streams of charity to flow in their own channels, trusting that they would all fall into the common ocean. Their faith was, I think, a right one. Particular cities, villages, and schools, felt that they had a share in the learned corporations of the land. Youths whom they had seen growing up among them became naturalized in the university, and contributed to its fame ; others came among them with the new wisdom which they had gotten. I cannot conceive how any scheme, devised by the wit of man, could have so furthered the cultivation of the land, as this, which was the result of what would be called a series of accidents. By what steps, or through what confusions these different colleges came to understand their position in reference to each other and to the university, I leave antiquarians to explain ; but it seems as if this harmony could never have been produced, and as if the whole Education would have turned to

nothing, if, through the wisdom of some man, or the gradual working of events, that scheme of college life, to which I have alluded, had not been gradually adopted. That there may have been a time when no such scheme existed—that after it had been established it may frequently have been lost again, I can easily believe; but that the person who introduced it was not a benefactor to his country, and that those who restored it had not a very clear perception of the only kind of discipline which is suited to our character, I cannot believe. For hereby the idea which I have shown pervades our other Education, that the cultivation of humanity, is the great end of scholastic discipline, was wonderfully asserted; even in those bodies which have, as I said, the study, and not the student, for their end, it was declared that no study could proceed successfully where the student's spirit is not in harmony with it and with itself. It is a painful fact, but one which every day's experience establishes, that a student may go through a series of lectures upon the most momentous subjects, without realizing the conviction that his own being is connected with any of them. We are bound by all that is pure, and honest, and sacred, to see that this is not the case with the citizens of our land. I know that the college system cannot prevent it; but I know that it can do this—it can make the student

feel that there is a strife and contradiction within him, when his understanding is going one way and his heart another. It chafes and frets him, and makes him restless, and this is one great cause of the obloquy which the discipline, and especially the worship, has incurred. Can it be well, we are often asked, that the service of God should cause vexation and irritation? I believe it is well. I believe the conscience of every man who has had experience, if he lets it speak fairly, will say that it was well for him. There is something more necessary for a man than being comfortable. If he has not formed a habit of doing right, by all means let him have a continued witness that he is wrong. I allude to the worship, because it is intimately connected with the college life of which I am speaking. If we are merely to pursue a certain number of studies, and not to be a society of students, this provision is inexplicable; if we are, it is inevitable. The man who shall bring a set of youths together, and shall form them into a body, without teaching them, whether they like it or no, what the bond of their fellowship is, and in what way they are to feel that they are a fellowship, is little better than a madman. This is a mere doctrine of common-sense, it has nothing to do with one belief or another. The followers of Mr. Owen are associated, it is presumed, upon some principle; whatever that principle is must be

declared by certain intelligible acts done by them in common. We are associated on the principle of common relationship to a Divine Being ; our society expires the moment we refuse to unite in acts which embody it. Now the question, whether it would be better that the colleges should be less of societies, and more merely places for reading, is one which I may safely leave to the experience of those who have frequented them. I believe they will say, almost without exception, that the free interchange of thoughts and feelings among persons differently circumstanced in many respects, but living in the same age, and subject to the same general impressions with themselves, did more at the time to teach them what their studies really meant, and how they belonged to themselves, and has done more since to preserve their interest in those studies, and to bring them acquainted with their own ignorance and their own wants, than almost all other influences together. I do not say that the university should be nothing else than a collection of colleges. I think it is most important that there should be a set of professors, with considerable leisure, and incomes sufficient to give them the opportunity of marrying, who should advance the scientific knowledge of the university, and should exhibit it as a learned body to the rest of Europe. If our system is weaker in this respect than it ought to be, it is not the fault of our ori-

ginal constitution ; it is the fault, I believe, of the modern attempts to make prizes and distinctions the great end of study. Owing to this novelty, the halls of the professors, which do not directly prepare the student for that which he considers the object of his course, have become deserted. But I question whether the same cause has not affected the college system quite as injuriously, by leading the tutor to take more pains in preparing the under-graduates of his society for certain occasions of display, than in cultivating the deeper feelings, and in satisfying the deeper wants of their minds. It seems to me just as needful, that we should carry out the college system more perfectly, by introducing greater cordiality, and a more cheerful, hearty sympathy between the elders and the juniors, as that we should carry out the university system by giving greater weight to the professors. In that way we shall save our older men from being mere book-worms, while we double their interest in books ; our young men from being mere gossips, while we make their social life ten-fold more precious and interesting to them.

I have one word more to say respecting these universities. It is not a new thing in their history, that they should be looked upon as the abodes of every thing dull, morose, and antiquated. The wits of every age have given them that character. Now as these wits had such clear perceptions of things,

as old abuses were to them so ridiculous, as they represented so admirably the intellect and the advancement of their time, we want to express our gratitude to them, for the achievements which they wrought, for the evils and corruptions which they drove out of the earth. We wish to find their names, that we might enrol them among the benefactors of the universe. But alas! their names are gone! Not a vestige of all that they did remains. They laughed at other men, boasted of their own understandings, and died. This is all that can be said of them. But there have been some abuses in the world corrected, there have been some great movements in the depths of the national mind. How happened this? History makes answer and says, there were certain poor, toiling, suffering men living in those cloisters, from which nothing but ignorance and superstition ever came forth: in their hearts, as they mused upon the past, and wept over the present, were bred those thoughts which went forth scattering darkness before them, awakening hopes that had slumbered for ages, renewing the face of the earth, and after centuries of barrenness causing it to bud and blossom again. If you ask were such men popular in their day? Did the bodies, from which they came, cheer them on in their work? Perhaps I should be obliged to answer, No!—and what then? Do you expect *us* to maintain that the

spirit of the age, wherever it may be concentrated, is a spirit which patronizes great and noble undertakings, that it does not lazily worship the present, that it is not hateful of the past and indifferent to the future? Our complaint of you is that you would make that spirit omnipotent, that you would throw down every thing which resists and compels it to be something better than it would naturally be, that you would destroy every witness to that which is abiding and imperishable; and that thus under the names of advancement and improvement you are securing yourself against all improvement, you are determining that the modes and fashions, and opinions of this time shall be everlasting, you are declaring that you will only nourish and educate men who will bow down and worship every idol which it pleases folly and vanity to set up.

The system, which I have brought under your notice in this lecture, is, you perceive, essentially ecclesiastical; it was introduced into the country by ecclesiastics; it has been always conducted by ecclesiastics; it must be altered in all its principal characteristics, if it ceased to be under the controul of ecclesiastics. On these points there is no difference of opinion between the parties who are now contending respecting the right conditions of a National Education. No one pretends that our Universities directly, and our Grammar

schools implicitly, had not an ecclesiastical origin. Three-fourths, at least, of all those who complain of them, assume that position as the most advantageous one for their attack. No one says that they would have been, in any one of the points which I have described, what they are, if they had been under other than clerical superintendence. To this unhappy cause, their respect for the dead languages, their determination to have one central science, their preference of general to particular studies, above all, their system of collegiate discipline and life, are invariably traced. No one believes that they would be the same in their principles, and only different in their details, if they were placed under lay-government; the grand popular argument for that alteration is, that it would involve an entire subversion of the useless and absurd doctrines and practices which have been hitherto sanctioned amongst them. I am not acting unfairly, then, though some of you may think, rashly, when I say: This is Ecclesiastical Education; by this we are content to be judged; this we wish to be compared with any other which you like to produce. We say: Here is something in practice, corresponding to that idea of Education, which we obtained in our last lecture; here is information not of a limited, specific quality, but that which belongs to men; here is development, not of some particular

faculties, but of that which is universal in men ; here is a discipline, not for that which interferes with the power and happiness of some men, but with the power and happiness of all ; here is not a Spartan, not an Athenian, not a modern Education, but a Christian Education, which comprehends them and reconciles them all. If there has been such an Education in the country for a thousand years, Christianity has not been a fruitless seed in a barren soil : if its principles have been forgotten ; if they have been acknowledged in terms, but violated in practice ; if the application of them has been limited to one class, now is the time for understanding them, for acting upon them, for adapting and extending them to all.

LECTURE III.

I CONSIDERED, in my last lecture, what manner of thing Ecclesiastical Education is ; I am now to inquire what manner of thing State Education is.

I followed the course, which those who differ from me would have prescribed, by taking our English Education as a specimen of the first. I shall equally conform myself to their maxims, by taking Continental, and especially Prussian Education as a specimen of the second. But I must distinguish my opponents into two classes. Some of them are struck with the vast superiority of the German Universities to ours ; this they trace to the existence of a freer, more modern spirit in them, and that spirit they hope to see communicated to ours by state interference. With these persons I shall at once join issue. But there is another, and, I believe, a far more numerous party which will attend somewhat listlessly to any discussion of this kind. They have occupied themselves almost exclusively with the question, How

are the poorer classes in this country to be educated? A most true feeling, that this question is important beyond almost all others, or else a most natural feeling that we ought to arrive at our notion of a good National Education, by considering what is good for the majority of the people, has led them to think, that the truth of our doctrine, and of the continental doctrine is to be ascertained, simply, by comparing our respective methods of primary instruction. I shall explain, hereafter, why this is an unfair test; at present I must request of these opponents a little patience. If I fail to show, that the state system is wrong in principle, and, therefore, is not to be applied in one case more than another—if I fail to show, further, that its error in principle is precisely this, that it is not universal enough—that it cannot address itself to that which is equally in the poor man and the rich man—if I fail to show that the ecclesiastical system may be adapted to all ranks and conditions, I give up my cause—nothing that I can say in favour of the Education which is given to our upper classes will be a hinderance to their calling for state help on behalf of the lower. Were they to look only at Prussia, they would at once acquiesce in my method; for they must be aware that in that country the primary instruction is administered through many subordinate agents, whereas upon the universities

the government acts directly. Surely, therefore, this must be the best experiment of what it can do. But they look at England, they see popular ignorance manifesting itself in most fearful forms; and they exclaim, Anything must be better than this—let us, at once, resort to any remedy rather than endure this evil. I honour the feeling, though I know that it is very likely to make them the victims of rhetoricians and quacks, who have nothing answering to it in themselves. I would, therefore, remind them how they themselves have talked, or how they have heard others talk in two analogous cases. Is there anything which more directly appeals to our sympathies than actual living pauperism? Yet are we not constantly reminded, that it is a sin to take what seems the obvious and natural means of relieving pauperism, because thereby we do in fact increase it? Surely if we are not to make our feelings the judges in one case, we are not to make them the judges in the other. We are not to make the enormity of popular ignorance a plea for running headlong into schemes, which may, for ought we know, augment it a hundredfold. The second instance is one still more in point, for it is an instance not of individual, but of government interference. Governments have perceived that a number of different religious opinions existed about them, and that the dissensions which these opinions produced

were most destructive of peace and order. What was a more obvious duty than to arrest the progress of such a calamity? Upon whom did the duty so naturally devolve, as upon the State? Accordingly it did its best. It had arms in its hands, and it said, "these dissensions shall not be." You know the result—the dissensions multiplied, the attempt proved to be ridiculous, and none are so loud in their laughter at it, so furious in their condemnation of it, as those who would now urge the State not to use its proper earthly weapons in an improper direction; but, as we say, to grasp at spiritual weapons, with which it has never been entrusted. I think these considerations may induce you to pause, at least till you have looked at the history of the question, and used some endeavours impartially to consider the working of the rival systems.

It appears from the statement in my last lecture, that our ancestors did not give to a certain body what in modern vituperative phrase is called the monopoly of Education. In other words, they did not say to a body having certain functions, "In addition to these there shall be certain other functions which you alone shall have the privilege of discharging;" they did not say this, or anything like this. But they found by experience that there was a body exercising a power over the minds and spirits of men, just as real as that

which the ruler of the land exercised over their bodies and outward circumstances. And they said the function of these men is to educate the nation ; it is not this over and above something else, but it is expressly this ; just as much as it is the function of the bookseller to sell books, or of the linen-draper to sell linen. To this conclusion, we have seen, they were brought gradually by experience. The spiritual body had tried to exercise other functions which greatly interfered with the rights of the State. The State in finding out the real direction of its own powers, at the same time found out the real direction of this power. But three centuries have passed away since the Reformation, and strange things have been transacted within that time. In the continental nations, which remained subject to the Pope, the ecclesiastical power, and the state body, continued in most uncertain relations to each other. Even, however, in these, it is curious to observe how that portion of the ecclesiastical body which was directly connected with Education, comported itself in reference to the State. A well-informed writer, in the "Journal of Education," (a work published under the direction of the "Society for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge," and of course strongly opposed to ecclesiastical Education, in every form), speaking of the Spanish universities, has this remark : "Every

where, even in universities established in those towns where the Papal and monastic influence is most felt, the Canonists have always been found to resist the usurpation of the Court of Rome, in despite of the Inquisition, the hateful surveillance of which has been defeated by the strength of sound Catholic doctrine, understood according to reason, and sustained by courage and virtue. Will it be believed? in no Catholic country have the power and arrogance of the Sovereign of the Tiber been more resolutely braved than in Spain. No where has more zeal been manifested in support of the government and secular authority, when encroachments have been attempted by the Bishop of Rome, and we may assert, with confidence, that if the rulers of Spain had known how to apply the aid which has been lent them by the jurisconsults, the prelates, and the doctors of her universities, the ignominious joke had long been shaken off, and the sole obstacle removed, which opposes itself to the regeneration of the country.” — *Journal of Education*, vol. 3rd, page 31. The writer of this passage, would, perhaps, be altogether right in his remarks; the ecclesiastical spirit in the universities would have been the means abroad, as well as here, of working out that deliverance for the State which it could not work out for itself, if a disastrous circumstance had not interfered. I mean the establishment of

that anomalous body of which Ignatius Loyola was the founder. When this body by virtue of its admirable concentration, and the learning and subtlety of its individual members, had succeeded in mixing itself up in the Education, as well as in the government of every Papal country, there ceased to be any chance of distinction between these two great provinces; the ideas of state power and ecclesiastical power became hopelessly intermingled; the bodies in which the enlightenment of the country dwelt, could no more be looked to, either as protectors of the State, or as asserters of the true ecclesiastical principle; and last, and worst consequence of all, that enlightenment became utterly ineffective in cultivating the humanity of the people, among whom it dwelt. Stores of erudition were accumulated by the Jesuit teachers, at which one gazes with amazement and admiration; but what one living influence, what creative awakening energy ever went forth from any of their seminaries? A dead materialism, an unbelief in any strength that is not visible, in any truth that could not be turned to a wordly account; these were their characteristics. And, therefore, their true and lawful progeny were the French sceptics of the eighteenth century. In these schools were they nursed; here did they learn the unreality of everything that is not sensible and tangible; here were the

weapons forged and sharpened which were to execute such righteous vengeance upon the heads of their inventors. Jesuitism and scepticism might well be addressed as two other personages of the same family were on another occasion by one mysteriously related to both,

“ O father, what intends thy hand
Against thy only son ? What fury, O son,
Possesses thee to bend that mortal dart
Against thy father’s head ? ”

And well might the same friendly voice join admonition to entreaty, and say

“ But thou, oh father, I forewarn thee shun
His deadly arrow, neither vainly hope
To be invulnerable in those bright arms,
Though tempered heavenly, for that mortal dint,
Save who is clothed in truth, none may resist.”

But the new power which had thus started into existence, felt, that for the present, at least, it could do little against the ecclesiastical institutions of its own land. It could show that they had no ground to rest upon, it could teach the French population to laugh at that which they already disbelieved, it could make out with the greatest plausibility and the best evidence, that education and the people who conducted it were irreconcilable enemies ; it could demonstrate to the perfect satisfaction of a demoralized court and

metropolis that education which had been supposed to mean a deliverance of the spirit from material fetters, was, in fact, based upon materialism. But it could only look forward with hope and exultation to a future day, in which the blessed harvest of these seeds should be gathered in by other reapers. Meantime, the great sceptics of that period had a field ready for the more immediate exercise of their powers. In the Protestant states of Europe, in one especially, which had the most accomplished of military chieftains for its head, they found things far riper for practical experiments than in France. There they had not to propose the abolition of great ecclesiastical establishments; the greater part of them were already abolished, and their revenues confiscated; the religious spirit, or at least the religious wars which that spirit had fomented, had done this work. The state had no occasion, in the common sense of the word, to be arbitrary; at least it had been invited to be so by the very influence that had resisted its former invasions. This influence indeed (and here was another most promising circumstance) was itself weak and all but expiring; what there was of it had detached itself almost wholly from the learning which dwelt in schools and universities: that had become, for all practical purposes, as heartless and lifeless as the Jesuit learning. Here,

then, was the best opportunity for the suggestion of those reforms which were conducted with so much sagacity by Frederick ; and which, when the infection had been caught in the neighbouring popish country, were imitated with such wild and tyrannical absurdity by Joseph. The principle, understood probably by the one, blindly acted upon by the other, of modelling all institutions according to the emergencies of the time without the slightest reference to the idea upon which they were founded, led directly to the denial of any other power than that which dwells in the civil government. For, if once you admit the fact, and feel it, that there is a national mind which expresses itself from generation to generation in certain social forms, the dream of some power acting upon that mind from generation to generation and enabling it to express itself, will inevitably haunt you; you will feel that this power cannot be the mere governing decreeing power which you call the state ; what else it is you may not know, but you will feel that there must be such a power somewhere ; and I fancy you will not stop till you have made the facts answer what and where it is. But if all witness of a spirit living in institutions be taken away, if men see nothing around them which is not the reflection of their own tempers and habits, then indeed I do not know how, except in one way, the appre-

hension of a power beyond the state power is to reach them, I mean that way in which it was driven home to the minds of those who succeeded Frederick and Joseph, and by which it was able to penetrate even the ice-bound heart which, in a female garb, ruled the destinies of Russia. When the monarchs of Europe saw a whole people undertaking to conduct those reforms which had seemed to them so fit to be managed by royal philosophers, when they saw this people overturning, indeed, all institutions which had lasted for centuries, but not the least pausing when they came in contact with that which was called the state of the day; when they saw governments succeeding each other which represented not the feelings of a single generation, but the feelings of a single hour; when they saw none so utterly incompetent to guide the whirlwind, none made so completely the sport of it as that race of philosophers whom their fathers had worshipped as their gods; when they saw all military organization mocked and set at nought by popular energy and fury, then, indeed, the conviction did come slowly home to them that there was something more in heaven and earth than they had dreamt of, that what is invisible is not quite imaginary. But if they had learned this faith, it was not permitted them to show, except by the most abortive efforts, the influences of it upon

their actions. It was appointed that all the nations, Protestant or Romish, should behold the birth of that which the eighteenth century had conceived, should see national life extinguished, should feel what government without institutions means, should be taught by the most tremendous experience that a state power, without a spiritual power to sustain it, must have its consummation in a military despotism.

I make these remarks that we may be better able to judge of the position in which the inhabitants of the continent are now placed in respect to education and its connection with the state, before we begin to compare their system with our own. Mr. Wyse has observed in an article on Prussian education in the third volume of the Transactions of the Central Society, that it is most unfair to speak of the modern state system of education as Prussian, for that, in fact, it is the European system, that established in England being a solitary instance of departure from the rule. This remark is very just, and I have endeavoured to give effect to it by showing how we became possessed of our system, and by what steps the different nations of the continent have been led into theirs. If we look at their proceedings since the peace, we shall find not that they have been introducing a new maxim of conduct, but that they have been endeavouring with

more or less skill and success to make the only maxim upon which it has been possible for them to act, available. They found that which had been the ecclesiastical or Education power of the country crushed and stifled; if it pleased them to raise it again, the state must do this, the state must create an influence which was to be superior to its own; if it pleased them to keep this power in subjection, the state must undertake the functions which its rival had once fulfilled. The first attempt was made at the restoration of the Bourbons in France—with what success we all know. The ecclesiastical power during that period is said to have resumed its ascendancy, and so far as success in making itself and the government together odious, constitutes ascendancy, no doubt this notion is correct; but that it could do any thing else seems to be a mistake. “I can describe in two words,” says a French writer of the Ultramontane School, “the state of religion in France in the sixteen years which preceded the last revolution: it was oppressed by the government and hated by the majority of the nation. The royal government had confirmed all the laws of the empire relating to the church (including even the articles which were enacted in violation of the concordat made in 1801), and consequently the slavery of the church was legally the same as under a man who had excelled in the art of op-

pressing all whom he took under his protection. No more provincial councils, no more diocesan synods, no more ecclesiastical tribunals, but the council of state the only judge of all disputes relating to religion and to conscience. Education was committed to a lay body to the exclusion of the clergy, the spiritual direction of the seminaries was harassed and their instruction submitted, in all that was most essential, to the prescriptions of the civil authority." So that, in fact, the Education system was as much established upon a state basis in the time which is supposed to have been so fanatically ecclesiastical as it has ever been since. Most naturally, therefore, France herself has looked for her Education models since the revolution of 1830 to those countries in which the state doctrine had been honestly avowed and acted upon, with less obstruction from any body still fancying itself entitled to a distinct position. The Protestant countries of the continent were indeed in circumstances very different from theirs, and the rulers in some of them, at least, were exhibiting a disposition which might well create astonishment in French philosophers. So far from aiming, as the great Frederick aimed, to extinguish all the life and religion of the country, and to invent a State apparatus, which should be a substitute for them, it would seem to be the great object of some Protestant govern-

ments, and especially of the government in that country which he ruled, to counteract the effect of his measures, and so far as in them lies, to create a body of real spiritual influences.

Up to the year 1819, ecclesiastical affairs in Prussia were committed to the Minister of the Interior; they had a place, as M. Cousin expresses it, in the same department with manufactures and horse-breeding. Since that time they have been given up to a Minister of Instruction; the principle has been recognised, that the power which acts upon the mind of the country is distinct from that which directs its outward economy, Evidently this recognition involves the government in an inconsistency which will be felt more and more each day. The old method was the right one, according to the State doctrine—the new one is pregnant with this confession, that the State cannot exist safely, until it has found an adequate counterpoise to its own power—a concentrated moral force to prevent it from degenerating into a mere engine of material force. We cannot, then, feel the disposition of which Mr. Wyse accuses the admirers of English Education to disparage the Education system of Prussia, or indeed of any continental nation. We must regard them all as at a most interesting crisis of their history; all as striving to work out a problem, upon the practical solution of which, the

chance of their being firm and happy nations depends. We must look at them as now very much nearer in feeling and intention to the old English principle, than they have been for at least a century; and we must desire by a fair and candid exhibition of the real difference between us and them to assist them, (so far as their national circumstances will permit), in approximating still more closely to us. Our controversy is not with them, but with those who hold up the systems which they have adopted through the stress of circumstances, as rules for our guidance, with those, who though they are always talking of the juvenility of our fathers, because they wanted experience, and of our antiquity because we possess it, wish us to throw away the experience of the last century and a half, and carefully to go over all those steps, which our continental neighbours are endeavouring, with much painful effort, (but we trust with every hope of a good result) to retrace.

If I were occupied with the question of primary Education, it might be right to bring under review, all the principal systems which are at present existing on the continent; but as I am concerned at present, only with University Education, it would be a waste of time, and perhaps, an unfairness to our opponents to do this. They might say with great reason, Who ever pretended that the French universities just escaped, (if escaped), from

imperial and Jesuit thralldom—that the universities of Holland, a country so exclusively commercial—that the universities of Switzerland, a country so limited in all its views, so given up to religious controversies—that the universities of Sweden, where there are still some of those old cathedral establishments, which we think so pernicious, and which must so much interfere with the full operation of the state principle, would furnish the models that we seek for? If you would be fair, they may rightly say, do not bring together a heap of feeble examples, but take some one—the best and strongest you can find,—and compare that with our system. I wish to comply with these demands. From no desire (as I think I have shown) to fix upon Prussia, the stigma of being emphatically the representative of this policy; but, because I look upon her as the noblest and most enlightened nation which we can find on the continent; and therefore the one which supplies the most complete test of any maxims, which willingly or unwillingly it may have adopted; I take her universities, and those of Germany generally, as my specimens. Surely I can give no better proof of confidence in my principle than this; surely I cannot put it to greater hazard, than when I say, I am willing to receive the system in the Prussian universities, as a trial of what the State can do, by assuming a

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dominion over Education; and our own universities, as a trial of the benefit which it derives from putting that Education out of its own controul.

The following passage, from an article in the *Journal of Education*, written, as you will perceive, by an admirer of the German system, expresses very satisfactorily, the great point of difference between our scheme and theirs :—

“Beginning at the universities, we find them very different from those in England. In Prussia they are not looked upon as institutions in which general instruction only is given, which may be afterward applied by the student to whatever branch of business or knowledge he pleases. The principal object of the Prussian universities, is to teach those practical sciences, and to communicate that knowledge, which are necessary for the due performance of such functions as require a long and diligent study in order to be successfully fulfilled. Such knowledge is necessary for the future clergyman, for judges and magistrates, and for physicians. Instruction, the most complete that is practicable for such persons, is the principal object of the Prussian universities; and each university may, with the greatest propriety, be considered, as comprising a school of theology, of jurisprudence, and of medicine. The professors who teach the sciences and arts, which belong to these three great divisions or faculties, are even

now considered as constituting the university; and the professors of the philosophical faculty, are only looked upon as an appendage. By far the greater number of young men who attend the Prussian universities, apply themselves almost exclusively to the study of theology, of the laws, or of practical medical science, and give only a very small portion of their time to the study of philosophy, or the acquisition of general knowledge. Were a German scholar to give his opinion on our universities, he would say that they constitute only a philosophical faculty, with a small intermixture of theology; nor would he even in this point of view be willing to allow, that, limited as the object of our institutions is, they are judiciously arranged, because he would perceive a great difference between our course and that adopted in his country, which he would consider better organized and more complete than ours.”—*Journal of Education*, Vol. 10, page 69.

This statement is clear and precise, and it saves me the trouble of deducing the general character of German University Education, from a series of particular instances. The concluding paragraph of the article shows how thoroughly the author is imbued with the spirit of the system which he is advocating: he looks upon our universities as containing only two faculties, or studies, that of philosophy, and that of theology; the latter, and

of course the former also, most imperfectly taught. Now, supposing this were a true description of our Education, it seems quite impossible to understand how our nation exists, or has ever existed. If, for ten centuries this has been the fare upon which the principal men in the country have been nourished, how is it possible to account for our having produced one single eminent divine, or lawyer, or statesman? Above all, how is it possible to understand the preservation of a certain mind in the country for so many ages—a mind to which our German brethren have paid the most intelligent and graceful homage? A little spice of philosophy, and that of an almost antediluvian quality; a little theology, and that of the most meagre kind; this, it seems, is all that we have to set against that immense body of professional knowledge which is accumulated in these German store-houses. It is very well to say, You have had eminent statisticians, eminent poets, even eminent scholars, but these had nothing to do with your universities. I answer, the notion is ridiculous on the very face of it; bodies such as these, acting for good or for evil upon the leading portion of the youth of the country, contemplated (however falsely) as the centres of its illumination, connected by a thousand links, with every fibre of national society, must exercise an influence, which cannot the least be measured by the

persons who have directly come forth from them. Supposing then you are able to find out half a dozen of our most remarkable countrymen, who did not owe their training to them—suppose you should be able to say, Burke came from Ireland—Shakespeare had no school learning at all: you will still find it very hard indeed to show how these men could have been what they were, in a nation leavened by such an Education as that which you attribute to us. If this argument has no weight, if you are utterly unable to understand what I mean by these secret influences, circulating through the heart of a nation, and the necessary connection which they have with the acknowledged sources of its enlightenment, that is the very thing I want you to confess: I want to hear you say, We do not feel and understand, how university discipline pervades and fashions the being of a nation—we look at it as intended to form a set of learned men—we look upon it as fitting men to act in certain distinct spheres, to adorn certain peculiar positions,—we look upon it, as collecting a body of information upon all possible subjects; but what more than this you mean, we cannot tell; it seems to us all mystical vagueness and nonsense. I say, I am anxious that you should say this boldly, because then I can meet you, and show you how these systems do really differ in their whole intent and idea; be-

cause then, I think, I can make you perceive why you have thought this multitude of professorships so grand a thing; and why our whole system has shrivelled in your eyes into two faculties of indifferent philosophy and weak theology. Every thing you see, necessarily presents itself to persons of your temper, as a *faculty*, or particular branch of Education. The idea of Education itself; the idea of a power directly addressing itself to something universal in men, of a power which is to produce, not professional men, but *men*, this has escaped you altogether: the habits of your system have made it impossible for you to present this idea clearly and strongly to yourselves. And yet if there is any country in Europe, which testifies to the truth of the principle, that a nation, in order to be really great, in order that it should make its power felt and known among other nations, must have its humanity in some way called forth, I fancy Germany is that country. For how long a time did it possess eminent scholars, eminent books, students of all kinds, and yet remained a cipher in Europe, deriving all its notions, and tastes, and habits of feeling from France? A strong impulse came, a strong political impulse; the energies of the country were roused; the living literature of England began to be studied, instead of the formal literature of France; and there came forth a set of powerful

men, who were able to show that the language of their country was the same as when Luther used it to express the words of life. That race of men, we are told by persons who should know, is all but extinct ; for the impulse which produced them has ceased. They may have communicated a certain vitality to the scholars and philosophers of the country which they had not before—a vitality which the habit of regarding scholarship, literature, and philosophy, as professional, will rapidly destroy ; but they have formed, and will form no national mind ; for something more steady and habitual than the mere utterances of genius can ever be, is necessary to accomplish such a work as this.

I submit, then, that when we are accused in the extract just made, of substituting the one faculty of *philosophy* for a great many faculties, the meaning is, that we have endeavoured to find out one instrumental science explaining the processes of thought, which, with whatever subject they are occupied, take place in the minds of all men, and which govern their particular exercises of thought ; that when we are accused of substituting the faculty of *theology* for the other faculties, the true meaning is, that we have discovered one *real* science, round which the rest, each in its own orbit, are revolving. This is precisely what I affirmed in my last lecture. Our commentator

has only translated the same thought into the phraseology of his own school. Now the advantages from the first method, which I partly pointed out, are these—that hereby a student acquires the habit of understanding himself, and the laws of his own mind, so that, even if he should never pursue his studies far in any one direction, he is able to meet men in all the common affairs of life, and to deal sensibly and intelligently with them; the knowledge which he has received not rising to the surface, not expressing itself in outward pedantries, but giving a general tone to his understanding, and a coherency to his language. Or if, again, he is called to devote himself to a particular profession, he is obliged to feel that what is peculiar in that profession is not the whole of it; that there are certain general laws and principles which connect it with other professions, and give it a meaning beyond itself. By the other method, that of habituating him to consider theology as the primary and central science, a dignity is communicated to all the rest; the painful sense of isolation in his own particular pursuits is taken away from him; he sees a unity in all things, and his own mind acquires a unity corresponding to it; he is able to teach men whatever he is called to teach them, with the feeling that that peculiar knowledge or faculty which distinguishes him from them, has certain close rela-

tions and affinities with, and does homage to that in which all have a common interest. It is very possible, then, that particular studies may not have been pursued with the same devotion here as in Germany; but there is no reason in our system, why they should not be pursued with just as much earnestness; and I do not believe that, with our character, it is possible to pursue them earnestly, merely as studies, without reference to some direct commercial end, unless we do learn more and more to connect them one with another, and in that way to feel their real practical bearing upon the life of man. If we do not retain our system, if we do not endeavour to follow out the principle of it more zealously than we have ever done, I see no hope for any particular studies thriving long among us, but just so far as they can offer some prospects of tangible advantage. And if they could, we sacrifice all that unprofessional influence of which I spoke just now, all that power which we possess, so long, and so long only, as we do not let our thoughts run into separate, unconnected channels, of influencing the habits and character of the whole nation. We relinquish all hope of supplying a counteracting power to the dead-weight of commercial feelings, which are ever threatening to extinguish our national life; nay, we actually put ourselves into a position in which we shall be compelled to minis-

ter to those feelings, in which religion, learning, art, will all be contributing their aid to make them omnipotent, and of course to destroy themselves. This is an evil of which I am glad to think that our German neighbours cannot have the present experience. Their poverty makes it far safer for them to be exclusively professional, than it can ever be for us. They can be scientific jurists, even though they do not connect jurisprudence with a general humanity; if we try to be so, we shall soon sink into higglers and pettifoggers. They can look upon theology as a mere branch of study, to be taken up like any other, and yet retain a certain reverence for the pursuit. The moment we attempt such a course, we turn it into a trade, and a pernicious trade. They may indulge in all manner of political theories, not associating them with the actual position and real life of men. When we betake ourselves to that course, we end in becoming quacks and demagogues.

The Latin schools in Prussia probably differ less from our grammar-schools than the universities from our universities. But there is another class of higher schools to which Dr. Julius, in his examination before the House of Commons, gives the name of *Real Higher Schools*. He describes the difference in this way, "I would beg to direct the attention of the Committee to

one point. The Latin Higher Schools or Colleges are found in every country where the classical languages are made the foundation of everything; the sciences and arts are taught, as they are necessary for preparing their pupils for the university. The Real Higher Schools are an invention of modern times, not introduced into the whole Prussian State, but are gradually forming; so much of Latin is merely taught as is necessary to serve as a guide through the different sciences; but the principal foundation is there laid by a deep knowledge of all the phenomena of nature, that of natural history, natural philosophy, chemistry, and so on." — *Minutes of Evidence before the select Committee of Education*, 7th July, 1834, page 136.

The same witness is asked (Question 1808) "Will you have the goodness to state to the Committee any information you may have to communicate respecting the Middle Schools?" He answers, "The Middle Schools are formed entirely in towns, not in the country. The branches taught in the Middle Schools are the following: First, religion and morals. Secondly, the German language, reading, composition in style, and the German classics. Thirdly, foreign, modern languages. Fourthly, Latin, (as much as they want to exercise their faculties and judgment). Fifthly, the element of mathematics, and a com-

plete practical arithmetic. Sixthly, natural philosophy, to explain the phenomena of nature, chemistry, and natural history. Seventhly, geography, the globes, and its position among the other luminaries, history, especially Prussian. Eighthly, drawing. Ninthly, handsome writing or calligraphy. Tenthly, singing. Eleventhly, gymnastic exercises." He adds afterwards, "The law demands a Middle School already for a town of 1,500 inhabitants; but there is shown indulgence for these small places where a good elementary school is thought sufficient." From these statements you will see that the schools formed by the State, for whatever class or age, carry out the principle which governs the University Education; the principle, I mean, of making the communication of information the direct aim, and the fitting men for separate professions the highest aim. I think, therefore, I have a right to assume that this is the kind of Education which a State, supposing it to be the most wise and reasonable possible, (and I believe the Prussian State to be as wise and reasonable a one as ever did, or is ever likely to exist) must of necessity communicate. A statesman feels that he wants men for certain works and occupations, that he wants lawyers and physicians, and divines, or booksellers, and linen-drappers, or labourers and artizans. These are the articles which are needful for him; these must be

by some means or other produced. The largest and deepest view he can possibly take of his own function, is this, that by some means or other it may enable him to produce them. He has a horror—a most reasonable horror—of that notion of a universal man, a man who is no particular thing, but anything and everything, whom I said in my last lecture, that some brainless visionaries had dreamed of creating; and if the thought strikes him—as strike him it will, supposing he has meditated upon history and upon himself—that there is something wanted to make each man rightly fulfil his own sphere, beyond just the possession of the knowledge which belongs to that sphere, it will hover about him as a confused apprehension which he has no power to realize as he wishes, and which he can only realize in the faintest degree, by heaping all kinds of information together, and determining that his countrymen shall get as much of it into them as their circumstances permit. Facts and reason alike prove that this is the case. You may meet statesmen with the deepest views, (I know not where you are more likely to meet with them than in Prussia) you may hear them confess “there is something wanted to form a nation besides all this: nay, we see that all this never will form a nation.” But the moment they try their hands at a practical measure, the moment they try to embody their

conception in action, you feel at once that they cannot get out of the weary circle which their predecessors have marked out. They can do nothing but add new elements of information; they can but provide new facilities for professional training. The one power which they want is not given them; they cannot get the standing-place from which to move the world; they have no instruments for calling forth that humanity without which, nevertheless, every day's experience convinces them that national life is impossible.

It is painful that we should be driven by the necessities of any subject, and the duty of speaking the truth, to say anything which may even seem slighting of a people to whom we owe so much affection as the Germans, our own kinsmen, who, in many most important qualities of head and heart, surpass us. But the fact must be stated which these qualities only make the more wonderful, a fact not now proclaimed for the first time, but repeated with melancholy sympathy by those foreigners who respect them most, and with still more melancholy and earnest lamentations by themselves, that with all their gifts they have not the great gift of a national life. They know more about all the people of the earth, than those people know about themselves; they have studied political science most diligently; but they cannot be said to have a polity—they cannot be said to be a

nation. If State regulations could make them one; if State Education, directed by State wisdom, could make them one, those complaints could not be true—at any rate every hour would be diminishing their truth: but Germans do not feel that such a progress is making. Six universities may have their twenty professors a-piece; the schools may teach the different branches of religion and morals, Latin, as much as is wanted for the faculties and judgment, together with handsome writing or calligraphy, and the phenomena of nature generally; but all these have not availed to create that living atmosphere which Germans feel around them when they are in England—an atmosphere, of which we are in a great measure unconscious, till it becomes impregnated with some deadly elements, or till we see desperate efforts making to exhaust it altogether.

But you must not fancy that a State interference with the universities in England would merely involve the consequences which we see it has produced in Germany. A substitution of professional education for universal education would be the inevitable fruit of it; but this would be very far from being the only fruit of it. In Germany there is no national life, therefore there is very little public opinion; in Germany, therefore, a wise statesman is able to act upon his own wisdom; he is able to do the very utmost that a

statesman can do. In England, because there is a national life, there is a public opinion; a public opinion so much revered and idolized, that an ingenious speaker upon the conservative side in the House of Commons on June 21st, maintained that this is in fact the true counterpoise to the state power; that to this the Education of the country may safely be intrusted. Now, when I see smoke coming out of a chimney, it appears to me that there is a fire below. I am very glad that the smoke is able to escape; but I never could fancy for a moment that the smoke was a substitute for the fire, or that it was intended to do anything but to mingle with the general atmosphere and be lost. So far from looking upon this opinion as the effectual counterpoise to the State, it seems to me that the effect which this opinion produces upon the State, giving to that which should be fixed and rigid, a most unnatural flexibility, making that which should be stern and solemn, the sport of all temporary emotions and impulses, is that which we most want another free and living, yet permanent influence to counteract. What then would be the difference between the method in which the Prussian and English government would deal with University Education? The first would adapt it to the circumstances of the age, viewed as comprehensively as they can be viewed by any person

living in the age; they would deprive it of its human character; but they would give it a sound, masculine, professional character. The latter would adapt it to the circumstances of the age as those circumstances are viewed by men who exercise the greatest temporary influence over it—by those who reflect and are able to express its own notions about itself, and about all that went before it. In the long and able, and in many ways highly interesting evidence of Mr. Simpson, which is given in the Appendix to the Report of the Education Committee, 1835, I find some remarks which bear upon this subject.

Extract from page 129.—"Even in this enlightened age it is extremely doubtful if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to propose a grant of a sum of £200,000 for the support of Education in this realm, whether he would be able to carry the vote. Supposing the universities had been dependent upon annual votes, or such sources as you have observed, do you think it at all probable that they would have subsisted for several centuries? I should think that, starting from the period in which we now live, they would have a much better chance of the support of Parliament than in the remote ages through which they have hitherto passed; but their splendid endowments have rather subsisted as direct estates to the fortunate incumbents, than as the means of keeping

alive and diffusing the best Education. They have had too much of a monastic character for this; and it is well known that they have been the subject of reproach, according to Dr. A. Smith, as the asylums of errors hunted out from every other corner of society. Your answer does not mean that the universities, as supported by endowments, have been the means of retarding Education, instead of accelerating it? No, not altogether so; for those endowments and the monasteries were the only chance for education in the age in which they were established, and long afterwards, and if they had depended on the votes of the legislature, they would not have been established at all: Education so far as it has been aided by them, would not without them have been heard of. You think it was a matter of absolute necessity, and not a matter of choice, which directed the endowments in land for the support of schools, the legislature at that time not being in the habit of giving a sum of money for that purpose; quite a matter of necessity; there would have been no schools without it. You cannot draw any conclusion as to the advantages of their existence, from the advantages that might be derived from them in former periods? Certainly not. Do you consider it an additional evil, the existence of endowments, mixing up the duties of a teacher of a public school with the management of lands,

and other subjects independently of the purposes of Education? That is a great evil. And placing them out of the control of Parliament and public opinion? No doubt of it; and I should think that that is one cause of the great predominance of the dead languages as part of the Education of youth; there are such magnificent endowments to support them, which must fall to these incumbents if the dead languages did not continue to be the primary object of Education. Then you consider that any individual who in a spirit of beneficence and enlightened charity would form an endowment, and give an estate for the purpose of furnishing Education in a particular neighbourhood, would be conferring an evil, instead of a benefit on society? A relative evil, if there were a national system existing at the same time. And a more judicious arrangement on his part would be to place whatever funds he intended for Education at the disposal of such public system, to be applied in the most useful manner? Certainly.”

This is a very good statement of the advantages which persons who agree with Mr. Simpson suppose would follow from the subjection of the universities to parliamentary control. They would then present a fair image of the age; they would then pay less attention to the dead languages; they would not be asylums of error, hunted out of

every other part of society. Now, just imagine if, in the days of Adam Smith, from whom this last sentiment is borrowed, the universities had been reconstructed upon his maxims, what would have been the consequence? Do you think they would have been the least in accordance with the spirit of this age—the spirit, I mean, of this present year 1839? Is it not notorious, that since his day, the common, customary, fashionable opinions upon moral and metaphysical subjects, upon poetry, upon history, have undergone the most entire revolution? If Adam Smith had had his way—certainly, if the opinions of his contemporaries had been followed—logic would have been treated as one of the absurdities which had been hunted out (except in name) of all places but Oxford: not a book of Aristotle's would have been allowed to remain in the university. Within the last ten years, logic has been pronounced, upon the authority of Mr. Bentham and Mr. Mill, and other leaders of the 19th century, to be the most valuable of all studies; Aristotle has been held up as one of the greatest utilitarian writers. In Adam Smith's day, all poetical criticism not contained in Dr. Blair's Lectures or Lord Kaimes's Elements, would have been hunted out of reasonable society; now those books themselves, and the school which they represent, have sunk into the lowest estimation. Robertson and

Hume would of course have been Smith's standards of historical writing; now the world can listen with great complacency to Charles Lamb's assertion, that their books have the same title to the character of histories, as the chess-boards which we see inscribed in gilt letters with the same honourable name. But has it required fifty years to make such changes as these? By no means. A review started into existence in the northern part of Great Britain about the year 1801. It was most oracular in all its announcements; especially it took this subject of Education under its patronage; ridiculed the universities; longed that they might be forced into conformity with the spirit of the age. Men quailed before the utterances of these mighty seers; only a few poets, universally denounced as madmen, ventured to dispute their judgments and defy their laughter. I ask those who know, whether there is one canon of taste, one leading dogma, one practical position which these rulers of the age put forth, that would not now be scouted by the corresponding class to that which then admired them,—one which they have not been themselves compelled, by that fixed rule of adapting themselves to all changes of opinion and circumstances, quietly to retract or contradict? Yet more recently, another periodical publication was set on foot expressly to embody opinions still more emphatically belonging to the age. Who-

ever differed from these was called, in the pages of this work, not a fool, but a knave. I do not mean that there was not another count in the indictment, containing the first charge; but this was most pressed. He must have some sinister interest to misdirect his judgment, otherwise he would not reject doctrines so clearly and invincibly demonstrated. But alas! the knaves have been justified, for the honest men have themselves abandoned full one-half of these irresistible demonstrations, and now find it oftentimes very convenient to convict their opponents of holding them and acting upon them. Still, like their predecessors, they are enraged at the universities for not adapting themselves to the spirit of the age,—that is to say, of not shaping their Education according to the maxims of 1824, to be reformed again according to the altered, and often opposite maxims of 1839.

Now you see from Mr. Simpson's statement, that if the university did but depend upon annual parliamentary grants, it would have the blessing of being able to meet all these expectations. He does not, probably, mean, that the system would be changed every year; but he means, (and I think he is quite right in his prophecy), that such a general influence would be communicated to the government for the time being, by the force of these opinions acting upon them through various

channels, that some little change would be continually making, a very little change possibly,—indeed, to persons busied about the great matters connected with railroads and canals, almost too insignificant to be noticed,—but still great enough to alter the whole principle of the institution, and to affect the influence which it exercises over the national mind for generations.

Some, however, may think, that without substituting annual grants for endowments, the state may assert a very useful general control over the proceedings of the universities. The argument in favour of such measures is sufficiently well put in the following passage, written at the time when the controversy respecting the admission of dissenters to the universities was pending :—“ Much has been said on the subject of legislative interference with the university statutes. Nothing could exceed the exasperation of the heads of the University of Oxford at the introduction of those measures in the last Parliament, which they considered an unjust interference with their rights. They totally forgot, in their zeal for their statutes and the legislative power of the heads of houses, whence that authority was derived, and while maintaining the inviolability of the thirty-nine articles, they did not recollect the subscription to these articles, nay, the very existence of these articles themselves originated in the authority of

an act of Parliament which was a far more daring invasion of the so-called rights of their predecessors than anything contained in the measures now referred to. They denied the right of the legislature to admit dissenters into a church university, but shut their eyes to the question by what right Protestants had been admitted into a Catholic university. The right in either case was the same; it was in the first case, and would be in the second an act of the sovereign power of the state which excludes all considerations of the right, as the Oxford opponents of the dissenters' claim, understand the term. If they mean to discuss the question on intelligible ground, let them show how far interference with their statutes will be right in the sense of being *useful*; and in their consideration of the question of usefulness, let them not forget that other persons besides themselves are interested."—*Journal of Education*.

I could not wish for a better illustration than this passage furnishes of the effects which must necessarily follow from asserting the exclusive dominion of the state. We see here a thoughtful and intelligent person evidently utterly unable to take in the very notion of right. He does not merely reject it as every disciple of Hobbes must of course do, but he is not able to conceive what we mean by it, he has not that first requisite for a reasoner, the faculty of perceiving upon what

grounds his opponents stand. And the consequence is, that without intending to be unfair he has, besides misrepresenting his opponents, also misrepresented plain facts of history; those facts being obliged to pass through certain processes of transformation in his mind before he can present them to himself or to others. I will explain what I mean, because this statement is a fair specimen of those which we are constantly hearing, and involves the whole issue of the question which is now under discussion. The principle which I have laid down, and which I have endeavoured to illustrate from the circumstances of other countries as well as our own, is that there actually are two powers at work in our nation and in every organized nation which must hold some relation to each other. One of these powers acts directly upon the mind and spirit of the country; the other controls its outward circumstances. We say that the first of these powers violated its relation to the other, and tried to be exclusive; that mischief and confusion necessarily followed. We say that at a certain period the relations of these powers became adjusted, and that this was the cause and method of the adjustment: a certain set of persons in the spiritual body protested against the assumptions which that body had put forth, as inconsistent with its own stability and nature. The question as between these two

classes was this: are we, the protesting party, or you, the Romish party, the true and ancient Catholics of the land? The question as between the legislature and these parties was, "Shall we recognize those who interfere with our legislative power or those who assert it as the educators of the land?" The legislature decided, as might have been expected; to decide otherwise seemed to it a denial of its own existence. It then proceeded to exact a guarantee from the teaching or educating body that it would teach according to certain principles, the code embodying those principles, not being drawn up by the legislature, but by the educating body, and expressing the sentiments which it would have held, whether the legislature recognized it or no. These are the two facts which our historian describes when he says that the legislature ejected Catholics out of the universities and put Protestants in their place; and when he says that an act of Parliament imposed the thirty-nine articles upon the universities. These, he says, were two acts of mere sovereign power, perfectly reasonable because they were performed by the state, which is the sovereign power. Well! but a very little while before this, that state itself had done homage to another power; by spiritual terrors the church had held it down and trampled upon it. How dare you say it was wrong? How dare you complain of any

act done by Hildebrand or Innocent? They had the power to do the things which they did, for they did them. Why were they not as right as the legislature in the days of Henry VIII? Oh! because the legislature represents the state. Indeed! then the state is something else than a mere *power*. Some other idea, one knows not how, has intruded itself; your bare naked omnipotence has vanished into a mere empty phrase. The State, it seems, has a *right* to exercise power; then there is such a thing as right which is distinct from power. And if you would not fall into the very sin with which you are so fond of charging us, if you would not use mere abstractions to which you affix no meaning, you will look this word right in the face and ask it what it is? and why it troubles you? and then I think that you will discover that the right for which we plead, and which you say the state cannot recognize, is just that which it *did* recognize in the very acts you speak of, and must recognize in order to be a state at all. It must acknowledge certain relations as existing which it cannot violate; it can only make its own power felt, it can only distinguish between itself and the most unorganized savage despotism while it does this. And we say farther, that it has been impossible for our opponents to see this plain truth, so implied in the very existence of society, it has been necessary

for them to adopt all Hobbes's opinions, it has not been permitted them to do justice to their opponents or to understand them because they have started with denying that great primary relation between the state or governing, and the vital or educating power in a nation, on which all the rest are founded.

I cannot then give up that claim of right which the University of Oxford is so much blamed for having put forward. It is very well to say, you shall only rest the question upon the evil consequences which follow from disturbing the relation we have spoken of. That is to say, it is very well for our opponents to contend, that we shall as a preliminary to any argument with them, take all their principles for granted. If we admit that the consequences of a certain exercise of power alone determine it to be good or evil, we virtually deny the doctrine that there are established relations, which must not and cannot be violated—but this it is our business to assert. We virtually admit the doctrine of arbitrary power being the foundation of all things; but this it is our business to deny. We will, therefore, say plainly and boldly, that we believe the Education power in the country, and the governing power to be by their very nature distinct—that we hold any attempt to confound them a violation of the order of things, an invasion of the law upon which society rests. We

will say, that every particular act of outrage upon this distinction must necessarily contain in it the violation of a right, the commission of a wrong. We will say, that we believe the words Right and Wrong to be true, honest words, having a real meaning and not a fantastical one, and a meaning which will make itself manifest one day when it shall be owned that the notion of power existing in its own solitary essence, without right and order for its assessors, is the notion not of a State, but of an anarchy—not of a divine authority, but of a devilish one.

But, if our opponents suppose, because we are not willing to argue the question with them on the mere ground of consequences, without first trying the principle from which they proceed—that we, therefore, refuse to meet them on that ground also, and to show them why their doctrine is mischievous as well as evil, I hope even this lecture will prove, that they are mistaken. I have endeavoured to show, that the quality of Education which a nation receives must be most grievously affected by any attempt of the State to interfere with it, that all its influence in creating a permanent national mind is hereby weakened and destroyed, all chance of its counteracting the temporary notions and fashions of a particular age, and forming a deep under-current of thought, which shall flow on from generation to generation, utterly taken away, all hope of its cultivating a

humanity, which shall be deeper than professions, and shall sustain them all, absolutely cut off. These considerations, which, however weakly stated, I hope you will diligently weigh, I might easily have confirmed by others, at which I have only hinted. If I had liked to dwell more upon the condition of that country, which I have spoken of so often, and which is reasonably enough held up as offering the best existing model of State Education, I might have found another, and perhaps to some a more cogent argument. I might have reminded you, that though no ecclesiastical body is there recognized as the lawful educator of the people, though the State has taken all that function to itself, using whatever religious influences it can command as its servants—nevertheless Prussia has not been permitted to be at rest from ecclesiastical assumptions and usurpations. I might remind you how the great controversy of the middle ages is proved, by the example of that country to be as much alive as ever it was. I might, I think, have convinced you that there is even a dangerous sympathy in the minds of men, who would otherwise be least inclined to view any spiritual arrogance respectfully, or even tolerantly, with the insurgent movements of the ecclesiastics in that country; just because it is felt that they are asserting, though amidst innumerable contradictions, a principle which must be asserted some-

how, and which is not less necessary under the most mild and beneficent government, than under the most oppressive. And thence I might have argued for the necessity under which the government of Prussia is laid, if it would engage all our interest on its side—if it would make us, and its own subjects, regard the rebels against its authority with unmitigated hostility—to be inquiring diligently whether ecclesiastical power must inevitably be anti-national,—whether it may not be the very instrument of national cultivation—whether it can be so while it is the slave of the State—whether it must not work freely, in order that it may leave the State at peace. But if I had alluded to these events, it would not have been for the purpose of reading a lesson to another country, but to our own country and to ourselves. It would have been, that I might be able to say to English statesmen, In mercy to yourselves do not meddle with us, or depend upon it, unless history be a lie, we shall meddle with you. And do not lay the flattering unction to your souls, that we have not power to meddle with you now, as we once had—that intellect has marched so far in advance of us, that all spiritual terrors will now prove of no effect. If you are men of sense, you cannot delude yourselves with such a notion as this. You cannot open your eyes and see what is going on in Prussia, or indeed in every

nation under heaven, and not know that, for good or for evil, spiritual influences are as much at work now, as they ever were in any age of the world. The mere announcement of a spiritual principle, from whatever quarter it may proceed, creates a movement, and a ferment through society, which compel the attention of politicians, and make them wonder how it is that with all their magic they cannot produce the most faint imitation of them. Sensualize, or (if you like the name better) intellectualize the people as you will, you will not stop the inlets through which this influence finds its way. You will only cause that what can no longer reach the deep springs of life in human society, shall be continually ruffling and disturbing its surface. If then, being thus hindered in the exercise of those functions, which we feel are committed to us, we begin to claim authority in a province with which we have no concern, do not think that you will quell our arrogance by telling us, or telling the people, that we know less of state matters than any creatures who write or read. That is very true; whenever we do forsake our proper vocation, we display this pitiful ignorance. But see whether we shall not be able to answer you by saying, "These men display more ignorance in our province of Education than any creatures that write or read." See whether we shall not be

able to justify every act of madness of ours, by a parallel act of madness of yours. We call upon you then not to put us and yourselves into this peril, either merely for the sake of defying us and showing us what you can do, or under some vain notion that you can benefit your country by usurping functions which neither you nor your fathers were ever able to discharge. We ask you not to do anything; we only ask you to abstain from doing. We do not say "Give us predominance," but "Leave us alone." We do not say "Give us a machinery to work," for we have a much better one than you can provide; but "do not take away from us our machinery, do not distress and impede its operations." We say there is a power in the midst of you which the continental nations have not, which the wisest of them would rejoice to have. Do not determine that you will crush this power, only that you may imitate them by undergoing all the sufferings which they, through the same folly have undergone.

All these words, I feel, would be not only inefficient, but ought not to be spoken, if I were not ready, at the same time, to say to those in whose hands this power is vested: Now, if ever, is the moment for showing that we possess it; now, if ever, is the time for confessing past ignorance, and sluggishness, and repenting of it. Now is the time to show that the principles which were

true once, have not grown old, but are able to do more than they have ever done in any former age of the world. No cowardice, putting on the face of modesty, shall prevent us from declaring that we have a commission, and authority, and ability, to educate the whole mind of the country; a power of forming a nation, which those who would take upon themselves our duties do not, and cannot possess. No shame for past misuse of the trust which has been committed to us, shall tempt us to the further sin of denying that we retain it. But, at the same time, we are bound, by the most solemn obligations, to make our pretensions good, to prove that they are not put forth rashly or proudly for the sake of self-display, or that we may retain selfish honours, but in the firm belief that the tenure by which we hold our gifts is not one that makes them dependent upon our individual merits any more than upon state patronage, but one that ensures a continual renewal of the only strength in which we are able to exercise them for good to this age, or to posterity.

On both these grounds, then, that we may justify ourselves to the State, and that we may discharge ourselves of our own responsibility, it becomes most important to inquire into the circumstances of the period in which we are called to act. We are told, constantly, that even if the ecclesiastical power be actually the most fitted to conduct

Education, yet the present position of affairs practically disqualifies it for the work. I was anxious to keep this question entirely distinct from the one which I have considered in this lecture; for I have observed that the greatest confusion has resulted from the mixture of arguments, partly tending to prove that State Education is the most perfect which can be imagined, partly that it is inevitable. But having now said what I had to say upon one of these subjects, I shall not shrink in my next lecture from entering upon the other.

LECTURE IV.

I PROPOSE in my present lecture to inquire whether there are any peculiarities in the condition of the country at this time which make it impossible for the Clergy to conduct our Education, or which oblige the State to undertake the superintendence of it. Before I consider the specific reasons which are alleged in favour of these conclusions, I think it may be well to take notice of one objection, which is almost sure to be made to the doctrine I am supporting, and which will only produce the greater effect upon some minds, because it expresses itself in rather vague and general language. I shall be told, unless I am greatly mistaken, that each age has its own particular dress of notions and opinions; that some of the cast-off clothes were probably of finer material, nay, possibly of better construction than those which are now worn; that nevertheless there is an inevitable destiny ordaining that the old suit shall not be resumed, and that we should adapt ourselves as well as we can to that which has been

provided for us ; that in maintaining the old theories and maxims respecting Education, I am making a ridiculous effort to resist this destiny ; that it would be far wiser for each man to employ all the faculty he possesses in inquiring how the schemes which we must adopt, whether we will or no, may be made most useful or least mischievous to us.

To such observations as these, which I need not tell you may be varied and enforced by many amusing illustrations, all exposing the absurdity and fanaticism of my attempt, I answer : I do not the least wish to impose upon the objector the trouble of understanding the position which I have taken up ; but for the sake of showing exactly how far his argument applies to it, I will be at the pains of explaining what it is. I have endeavoured to show that the old Education of this country, that which is embodied in our grammar-schools and universities, and which is administered by the Clergy, has for its object the cultivation of that essential humanity which continues the same under all varieties of costume. I have endeavoured to show that the modern continental Education, that which is administered by the State, has for its object the cultivation of certain professional habits and abilities, and would have for its necessary effect in England, the formation of a character entirely moral and secular. So far

from showing any particular propensity for the fashions of one age above those of another, I have said that the mere fashionable, modal man of any age, the man who merely attempts to catch its features and imitate its expression, is not, properly speaking, a human being, and can do nothing to make other men human beings. I said that I regarded the fops of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with precisely the same reverence that I regard those of the nineteenth century ; I said that the men in any particular age who happened to direct our grammar-schools and universities might, it was very possible, have themselves caught the spirit of their times, and infused it most inconsistently into the institutions which they superintended ; but I said the advantage of those institutions consisted in this, that they are able to raise up a set of men who feel that there is something more in themselves or in their fellow-creatures than what belongs to this age, or that age, or any age, and are in virtue of that faith the best fitted to serve the particular age in which it has pleased God that they should be born. And I brought evidence to show that a State Education will never raise up such men ; that it has no models after which it can form them ; no permanence in itself to give then the sense of permanence. What I wish then to ask of those who charge me with a Hebrew propensity for obsolete vestments is, whether

they do admit the existence of this humanity, or whether they think the man and the dress identical? If they do, I am quite satisfied; and shall leave them to the undisturbed enjoyment of their opinion. If, on the contrary, they admit the existence of something which is universal and unchangeable, then let them explain how those who desire above all things the cultivation of this, and with no other end than that of fitting men more completely to discharge the duties and adapt themselves to the circumstances of their own time, are doing anything to dignify and perpetuate that, which is by its nature transitory. If they cannot afford this explanation, then let them manfully consider whether, according to the argument in my last lecture, a State Education be not open to the very objections which they would charge upon an ecclesiastical one, of giving fixedness to that which is meant to be fleeting, and let them join us in our present inquiry whether it is not on that account ill adapted to the circumstances of the only period for which it pretends to provide.

The first reason deduced from the peculiarities of our times, which is commonly offered for abandoning our old system, and substituting a state system in its place, has a considerable resemblance, in form at least, to the general objection of which I have just spoken. It is said, You are taking no account of the change that has happened in men's

notions, respecting the body, which assumes to itself the right of directing our instruction. At the time when our institutions for Education were established, the clergy were regarded with reverence, as possessing mysterious powers, and having a claim upon the most obsequious homage. Such a prestige was, no doubt, of advantage in an ignorant age, provided it was turned to an honest account. If the ecclesiastical body was fortunate enough to create an impression of its own authority, and then was virtuous enough, as might be the case with some individuals of it, to use this authority for the purpose of inducing men to become wiser than they would have been if left to themselves, we cannot but rejoice at the delusion. Still it was a delusion, and it has passed away. Men will not believe a thing the more because you tell it them. All fancy of your being magicians—you had better understand this well — has been scattered to the winds. Your Reformation, of which you cant so much, but which it is quite impossible that you can heartily respect, has done this work for you. You may have been permitted to linger on, since that time, in a kind of life-in-death condition, retaining a position in society of which the people were at first not strong enough to deprive you, and which they afterwards permitted you to keep, because you were tolerably quiet and innocent, but which you will find that

you hold by no safe tenure, if you attempt, in your weakness, to assume airs which were hardly endurable when you were strong. Whether you know it or not—and if you do not know it, we cannot do you a greater kindness than by telling it you—men are not what they were five or six centuries ago. You had then the whole physical world in a manner at your command. No one knew what was doing in it; how the different marvellous events that happened in it came to pass. You had the bodies of men, and all nature to conjure with. Now there is an acquaintance with the phenomena and laws of nature diffused through a great part of society. It is hardly possible—it certainly is not easy to excite fear and reverence by any miracles or portents. Here is an immense field actually wrested from your possession by modern science. And what an incredible difference this one circumstance has made in your position! What a whole universe of thoughts has been opened to men by physical discoveries with which you have nothing whatever to do! To be sure the clergy in the eighteenth century made some efforts to bring this subject under their influence, by what they called natural theology. But for this you have of late shown no preference. Chancellors can teach it as well as bishops. Then, again, there is the science of the human mind and its powers. That was once

your own province, but Locke conquered that from you too ; and though it may have passed out of his hands into others, each change of masters has only made your chance of recovering it more hopeless. Political economy comes next ; all the amazing questions by what laws the production, distribution, and consumption of a nation's wealth, are regulated ; here you cannot claim a foot of ground. Clergymen may, no doubt, have contributed their mites to the formation of the science. But you do not find their discoveries very helpful to the maintenance of your power ; perhaps the one which has a clerical name most conspicuously attached to it is the one which has done your influence most harm. Now these are the subjects upon which we are most craving to be enlightened at this time ; those upon which, by the nature of your opinions and prejudices as a body, you are least of all persons likely to give them assistance. But when these subjects are taken away from you—physical science in all its different relations—moral science, with all its innumerable bearings and applications—political economy, with all its great results—what remains to you ? what but simply your own specific science of theology, a science of which you cannot boast that you hold a very quiet or undisputed possession. Can any thing then be more monstrous than the impertinence of pretending that you are

to continue the instructors of any portion of our youth? Those whom you persuade to receive your wisdom in schools and colleges must despise you, for they must feel that you do not teach them the things that they want to know, in order that they may keep their relative position to the rest of society. You cannot have a word to say to the next class; the subjects that most deeply interest them, which belong directly to their sphere of life, you take no cognizance of; and you must find day by day that the lowest of all, over whose ignorance you might fancy that your name and title would still exert some influence, are beginning to despise you even more openly than the rest. No class has the instruction that it desires, but each one wants it, and feels that you must supply it. What then is the remedy? What is the use of talking about clerical Education being *in principle* the best, when *in fact* it can do nothing? What signifies it to say that state Education does not create a perfect ideal of Education where it is able to procure us this that we need; instruction in various subjects of which we cannot afford to be ignorant? The state can send men to teach us these things which you do not and cannot teach, and all your talk about humanity proves nothing to the contrary."

This, I believe, is a fair summary of arguments, which you meet with frequently in books, and

quite as often in society. They are all grounded, you perceive, upon the assertion, that clerical authority has no longer that foundation to support it, upon which it did rest securely in the middle ages. Now you may, perhaps remember, that in a former lecture, I endeavoured to show precisely in what manner this authority was affected by the reformation. I maintained that the ecclesiastics at that time, so far from taking a lower tone than they had done previously, actually took a much higher one. Instead of saying, We are not endowed with those great and mysterious powers, which men have attributed to us: they condemned and derided their predecessors for not understanding the nature and grandeur of these powers, and for using them to most paltry ends. The priest at the reformation did not deny the reality of spiritual endowments—did not say they were not bestowed upon him; but he had the most overwhelming sense of the greatness of his endowments, and of the responsibility which they entailed upon him: What he felt, as I said, was this, “My predecessors have not satisfied the doubts which are disturbing the consciences of men; I can satisfy them. They did not know that they had something to address to man, which would reach his inmost being; I feel that I have. They have not thought that they could cultivate the mind of a nation; I am sure that I can.” This was the difference; and it did not arise from

a sense of great gifts and powers belonging to him, as an individual : numbers of the schoolmen had been more conscious of individual gifts, and had tasked them more. The reformers felt emphatically, that their power of understanding men's hearts, and acting upon them, was a spiritual power, an ecclesiastical power ; that it belonged to them as members of a certain class ; that it was bestowed upon them for the good of the nation ; that all other members of the same class were to look upon themselves as endued with the same kind of powers, to be employed in their respective spheres for the same end. Supposing this to be the case, it would seem that we were not warranted by the analogy of past times, in concluding that the prestige attached to this particular class, in consequence of its being supposed that it could work wonders in the natural world, or that it could act upon men's bodies by strange charms, was the foundation of its authority, or, that when this was weakened, the authority disappeared. On the contrary, it would seem, that just when this feeling was most shaken, just when all such pretensions began to seem trivial to men, even if they were not false, just when they did become conscious of the deepest want in their own minds, and were possessed with the strongest determination, that those doubts should be satisfied ; just then, the ecclesiastical power in men

came forth, with the greatest witness of its reality, and laid men under the strongest compulsion to recognize it. It was not the influence of statesmen which broke down the fantastical superstitious dignity, that attached itself to the person of the ecclesiastic: the statesmen would have been willing to let this live, partly because they did not know how the reverence for themselves could thrive without it — partly because they had a secret pleasure in thinking, that the homage paid to the rival power was a delusion. It was the ecclesiastics themselves who broke down this dignity, by asserting that real dignity and power, which lay beneath it, and which it overshadowed. Nor was it only that they surrendered this physical world, as you say, into the hands of the men of science; for as long as the physical world was confounded with the spiritual, there could be no science in the proper sense of the word; there could be no courageous investigation of the laws, to which outward things were subjected. By asserting this distinction then, by declaring that the spirit of man can rise above material laws, and by proving that they had received power from heaven to give it the freedom for which it sighed, they made science possible. Nay, more than this, it was by teaching men that they had something which they could hold; something of which they could say, “This is mine,” in

the spiritual world; something which depended upon no contingencies of their opinions, but which actually was, and which they might assuredly believe—it was this that gave them first the dream, and then the hope of discovering some sure standing-place in nature, of getting there also, out of the region of notions and hypotheses, of finding that of which they could say, “This is a fact;” that of which they could say, “This is a law.” You delight yourselves with looking at the great superstructure of physical facts, and experiments, and inventions, which has been reared in our land: I ask you to have courage for one moment to look at the foundations; I ask you to consider how it was that men ever learned that such a thing as *knowledge* is possible? How it was that they ventured out on such distant and unpromising voyages in search of it? I ask you to consider what suggested to them the wonderful thought, that it is possible to find a method by which we may attain to the knowledge of things as they are in themselves, not judging them by the anticipations and preconceptions of our minds, not substituting for realities “the idols of the market,” or “the idols of the cave.” Reason will tell you, history will tell you, that neither this spirit of discovery could ever have existed, nor this method of discovery have ever been traced out, unless men had first explored another region,

which was beset with shapes and images still more delusive; and unless they had learned how it was possible, in the midst of all these, to behold and embrace the truth which they concealed. Till men felt, that a clear light had fallen upon the mysteries of their own being, till they felt that there was a way by which their spirits could ascend into the presence of the Infinite, and that the being after whom they sought, though incomprehensible, was not unknown; they had not leisure to look into the constitution of the world around them; or if they did look into it, they brought there all the doubts and misgivings of their own minds; they compared what they saw with what they felt; the world without only reflected to them the tumults and confusions of the world within. And now the question is, for us who prize so highly all physical knowledge, whether the like of this may not happen again? Do you think the results of science are safe, or that there is the least security for scientific progress, if the scientific principle be lost? Do you think that this scientific principle can be retained, when the notion is afloat, that knowledge and opinion are the same, that that is, which seems to each man; that truth is what every man troweth? Do you really fancy that when you have once established this to be so, as a principle and a law about the things in which man is most

interested, you can get him to make an exception from it in favour of the things about which he is least interested? Do you think if he believes there is one wild chaos of undistinguishable forms, in that region where his heart and conscience demands clearness and distinctness, that he will inwardly and heartily believe that everything is definite, and intelligible, and orderly, in the region with which he feels that he has comparatively nothing to do, only because you tell him, that you can demonstrate it to be so? Or, if you think, that charms and witcheries, notions of mysterious powers and attractions in nature affecting the body and the life of man, made it impossible for science to move steadily and calmly on, do you fancy you are safe from such impostures? Or, that if facts should offer themselves to our notice, suggesting the dream or the possibility of some such influences, they will not acquire a most ridiculous importance, and haunt, and terrify us, and hinder us from investigating the law of their occurrence, just because we do not know how little we are really interested in the discussion, because we do not understand that we are subject at every moment of our lives to a more wonderful magnetism, compared with which, any that can affect our bodily frames must be utterly paltry and insignificant? If then you ask me, What the clergy can do to meet that demand for physical instruction,

which the age is feeling, I answer, setting aside all that particular clergymen have done and are doing to cultivate physical science in all its departments, and to impart it to others—setting all this aside, we are able in our capacity as clergymen, even if we do not possess the slightest acquaintance with any part of the subject most wonderfully to help forward this Education—nay to provide the only security for its not being lost out of the land. We are able (I mean of course when I use such expressions as these, that you should keep constantly in mind the source and the nature of our ability) we are able to prevent you from losing, amidst the multitude of steam-boats and steam-carriages, the only energy and principle which caused you to become possessed of either. We are able to prevent you from losing the very idea of science, from losing the feeling, that it is possible to know at all. We are able to tell you the spiritual and moral dignity which belongs to you, and so to teach you that you are not part of these physical things—that you are meant to overlook them, and investigate them, and rule them. We are able to tell you in what relation you stand to a spiritual Being, and so hinder you from bestowing that worship and reverence upon material things which must make it impossible for you to search out their meaning and principles. We are able, at the same time, to

give you an impression of the dignity and majesty of that world with which you are thus freely and, as its Lords, to converse, by showing you that the creator of it has himself explained how every portion of it is pregnant with symbols of that which is higher and more divine. We are able to cultivate in you that reverence and humility, which have ever accompanied and sustained freedom of spirit in the true natural philosopher. And we have no right or reason to believe, that a State Education will ever be able to do any one of these things. I showed you in my last lecture, what from past experience—an experience obtained under the most favourable circumstances—we were warranted in expecting it to do. It would take up the physical sciences at the point which they have now reached—it would distribute them into departments, according to the most approved system of classification in the day—it would treat them simply as so many distinct branches of learning—it would especially rejoice to declare that this was secular learning, and secular learning merely—it would do nothing whatever to make us understand the ground upon which science stands, what science itself is. This subject will be thrown over to another branch or faculty called general philosophy, or by some such name, which will be pursued by another set of students, or by the same, without the least vital feeling of a

connection between that which is labelled "Moral," and that which is labelled "Physical," or of a connection between themselves and either. It would most carefully exclude the thought, that investigations of the physical world can bear the remotest relation to those investigations which belong to the branch religion, or the branch morals. Under such an arrangement you may believe, that physical science would flourish. My belief, for the reasons I have given already, is that it would utterly perish.

But we are told, that the whole dominion of moral science, also, has already been in fact taken from under clerical superintendence, and therefore that it is monstrous that clergymen should still assume to make the secrets of it known to others. I do not deny the fact, which our opponents take for granted, that just so far as the influence of Locke extends, the interest which clergymen, as such, are able to take in moral philosophy, must cease. As I have maintained throughout my Lectures, that their business is to teach the reality of a spiritual world, which is as much cognizable by man's spirit as the outward world is by the eye; as this assertion is the very ground upon which I have placed the necessity of Education, I should be very inconsistent if I did not allow that theory which represents men as destitute of any faculty, except one which converses with

sensible things, and one which deduces inferences from them, must make our function unmeaning and impossible. All through the 18th century, I admit, therefore, that clergymen were maintaining a position which they could perfectly justify to their consciences, and prove to be useful by its practical influence, but which received no support or justification from the metaphysical creed to which they, in common with the majority of their countrymen, did homage. If, indeed, the doctrine of Butler, that there is a conscience in man, could be maintained without abandoning the doctrine of Locke, which, I suppose, in terms he recognized, we might still be able to explain what it is that we address in man, and prove that our office is not obsolete. But I own that so long as this hypothesis is maintained, Butler's doctrine seems to me only a splendid contradiction, and Berkeley's a noble but desperate effort to maintain the best half of a truth of which one side or the other must necessarily be abandoned. I fully admit, then, all that our opponents say upon this subject. Moral philosophy was taken out of our hands by Locke, and Hume with the French philosophers did but complete the task which he, with the best intentions, commenced, of proving that there is nothing above humanity which it can converse with, because there is nothing in us to carry on such intercourse — that we are of the

earth, earthy, and are destined soon to disperse and mingle with the other atoms of which the earth is composed. But I must say also that, without any effort of ours, when we were far too ready all of us to acquiesce in our loss, and to think that we could be consistent Christian theologians while we acknowledged almost any degree of materialism in philosophy, this doctrine, with all its consequences, has been effectually subverted in the schools, and what we see of it are just as much the crumbling remains of a departed and antiquated system as any of those middle age notions upon which your nineteenth century enlightenment tramples so proudly. For a whole century the faith that there is something in man which can take cognizance of the infinite and the eternal, hidden in our institutions, expressed itself silently in our acts of worship, was recognized implicitly by the women and children of our land, but was denied by our schoolmen, lingering only amid the old philosophy of Oxford, that asylum of opinions which had been hunted from the rest of society. But before the end of the last age men, not here but on the continent, were driven by the sheer necessities of their intellect to reassert and maintain upon new grounds the old principle. Other men felt they wanted it for their hearts as well as their understandings, and now it is acknowledged by the schools of that

Prussia from which you would borrow your notions of Education; nay, the French philosopher from whom you derive your chief knowledge of this Education, himself proclaims aloud the same principle, and denounces the old school of his country for rejecting it. Now then, this truth being asserted upon such unexceptionable authority, we say we *have* something to do with this part of Education also. It being admitted that there is such a faculty in man, we say we have the power which will call it forth, we have the nourishment which will sustain it. The philosophers of the continent tell you there is that in man which stretches after the infinite, which will be content with nothing less than the knowledge of that which is subject to no accidents, defined by no human conditions. We say this stretching out has not been in vain, this longing has been met, we say we can tell you those realities which correspond to this demand of the human spirit, we can introduce you into a region as exactly answering to all the capacities of your inward being as this outward world to your capacities of seeing and hearing. And we say again, that a State Education never has done this, and never will do it. In the Education of Germany (the country in which this principle is most habitually and formally acknowledged) we found nothing whatever built upon it. Theology is a branch of Education

at the universities, philosophy another, jurisprudence another. In the schools religion and morals are one, natural philosophy another, calligraphy a third; nothing whatever in either to remind a student that he himself is primarily and above all things a human, a rational being, and that to whatsoever profession he may addict himself, this is the end of his life that he should know the truth, and that the truth should make him free. The Prussian state has not been able to bring this faith to bear upon its Education; what earthly chance is there that the English state will? And yet if what we have said be true, it is not moral philosophy, it is not one branch or faculty, for the sake of which this ought to be done, but for the sake of the whole nation, and of every man who belongs to it.

But the new science of political economy, we are told, must above all others be taught to our countrymen, and with this clergymen can have nothing whatever to do. I have not rested my case, in either of the two former instances, upon the actual labours of clergymen in the particular department from which they are supposed to be excluded, and I shall not in this: otherwise it would be rather curious to look at the list of persons who have lectured and written upon this subject. Besides Mr. Malthus, we should find the Archbishop of Dublin, the Bishop of

Landaff, Mr. Davison, Mr. Whewell, Mr. Brereton, Mr. Jones, and a number of others whose names I cannot recollect — nearly all those I have mentioned being at the time they wrote their books, directly connected with our universities. But this is not the point; I ought to inquire how clerical feelings and habits, as such, will bear upon this study. The first thought would probably be that a clergyman must feel himself bound to introduce a great deal of morality into his observations upon what ought to be viewed as questions of mere science. I wish you to understand exactly how far I conceive this would be the case, and how far directly the reverse of this would happen. That a clergyman has certain moral principles from which on no occasion he can honestly depart, and that these principles are so demonstrably true in his judgment, that he cannot possibly believe anything to be true which contradicts them, this I willingly allow. But I rather apprehend that the maxims in the writings of political economists which are most likely to startle him are not parts of the science at all; neither facts of experience nor laws which have been discovered to be the foundation of those facts. I imagine that they will be found to be for the most part hasty inferences which have been drawn by persons who fancy that a truth is good for nothing till it can be applied to practice. In showing how

this is to be done they have taken to themselves another office than that which was assigned them ; they have become teachers of conduct and regulators of human life. Their delusion is precisely the same as that of the astrologers and alchemists ; they are eager to find out the results and uses of their science, before they know what it is. Hence a host of strange and grotesque notions, not very novel indeed most of them, but coming forth with mighty pretensions as the undoubted results of scientific inquiry, and as completely overthrowing our ancient and traditional morality. Now I rather fancy that the person who should do most to weed the study of these different dogmas about conduct and practice, would be the person who would help us most to understand what are the ascertained positions in political economy, from which we may start in future inquiries, would do most to vindicate the discoveries of those who, with real industry and genius, have devoted themselves to the subject—most to convert Political Economy from the raw material of a science, into an actual science. So far then a clergyman's feelings and habits would rather lead him to separate the study from its moral appendages, than to draw moral conclusions from it. He would show, for instance, that there may be a certain fixed rule determining the relation between wages and population ; but instead of drawing an inference from

this as to human conduct, he will say to his disciples: I have been showing you what the natural tendency of things is, supposing *no* moral influences whatsoever to interfere. It is important that I should do this, as it is important for a surgeon to examine all the parts of a dead body. This knowledge will greatly affect his treatment of the living subject, although, if he argues from the phenomena of death to the phenomena of life, he will go strangely and monstrosly wrong. You, he will say, are not chained down by these tendencies; you have a moral freedom to act entirely independent of them. Your duty is prescribed by quite another code than this; you are not bound to act so and so, because it is the course of things to go so and so. The labourer is not to cry against you into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth, because there is a tendency in wages to sink as population increases. The doctrine that rent is determined by the inferior soils which are taken into cultivation, is not to govern the duty which you owe to your tenants. You are to seek and find occasions for your charity to flow forth upon men at your own cost, and not to let the notion that you will do the whole of society equal good by indulging yourself, cramp you in the fulfilment of that command. In acting this way he will not be moralizing upon political economy; that is the very thing which has been done so perniciously

for morals and political economy both; he will be separating between the provinces; he will be showing the use and value of each; he will be denying no fact; he will be quarrelling with no law; he will only be fighting against those vulgar and fantastic applications of facts and laws which have prevented us from seeing what they mean, and attaining to new discoveries. Now this work, I say, we are able to do for this age. We are able, by proclaiming the great truths, which are not of time and circumstance, but of eternal meaning and validity, by bringing these to bear upon all the particular events and circumstances of this age, to reconcile the facts of God's providence with the obligations which he has laid upon his rational creatures. We are able to do this; without this, political economy cannot be taught, nay, cannot long exist. Men's consciences will witness that it is a lie, though their understandings may not be able to show how it can be otherwise than true. And the conscience is too mighty a thing for all the professors and analysts in the universe; therefore they had better make peace with it in good time. We can do it for them; the State Education cannot do it. The State will appoint its lecturers on political economy; it will teach the mass of doctrines going under that name, part of them statements of undoubted facts; part of them useful or curious observations about facts; part of them

more or less successful attempts to eliminate laws from facts part of them crude heartless apophthegms of morality. This mass of good and evil it will deliver to its pupils as that branch of knowledge which is called political economy; for the State has no faculty of distinction. This mass it will give the pupil no means of connecting and comparing with the wisdom which is imparted to him by other professors; for the State has no faculty of connecting and harmonizing.

Thus far I have been examining two features of the present age, for which it most admires itself—its rejection of authority, and its mass of information upon physics, upon morals, and upon political economy. I have endeavoured to show, that if we study these features well, they will not seem to us a reason for throwing off the old system, but most important reasons for retaining it. I have now to look at another of its characteristics, of which I scarcely know whether it is wont to feel proud or ashamed; but which, at all events, seems to some to afford the most powerful evidence that clerical education must be inefficient, and state education our only resource. The argument is stated in this way:—"Clerical education might have been tolerable, or even desirable, in the time when one sect had the exclusive right to call itself the church. Then, as a matter of course, the teachers of that sect were looked up to by the

nation as its teachers. Now we have a multitude of sects, each assuming to itself the same magnificent name, or if it has not quite attained that arrogance of the mother sect, yet, considering itself the best existing part of the church, and bound, on certain grounds, to separate from the rest. Under such circumstances, what possible right can the state have to determine that one, and only one of them shall be its authorised teacher? Is not this a gross insult to the rest? But is it not more than an insult, an injury, to treat them as if they were not parts of the nation, to rob them of an Education which was meant for the whole of it? Suppose they have committed an offence against your dignity, what crime have they committed against the state to deserve this exclusion? They pay their money to the state, they are willing, in all reasonable ways, to be its servants. And even supposing they were any of them bad or inefficient subjects, is that a reason for denying them the only chance of becoming better? But how can this be managed, except the State takes Education into its own hands; unless, beginning with the highest Education, it determines to administer the funds of the universities for the benefit, not of an exclusive class, but of the whole population; unless it carries the same principle into the grammar-schools, by appointing masters who are not clergymen, or even church-

men, and altering the old provisions about worship; unless it goes down to the next class, and appoints model-schools, and schools for teachers; unless, finally, it provides a general elementary education for the poor? In these all sects may associate; provisions may be devised hereafter for the satisfaction of the consciences of those who are anxious that their children should be acquainted with their particular tenets; a general Christianity may be communicated to the whole school; and thus, in time, a liberal and united feeling will diffuse itself through the country; at all events, in this particular field of Education, hostilities will be laid aside."

The difficulty which, I think, we most of us feel in considering these arguments, and in bringing them into connection with those which have been already under our review, arises from our not thoroughly understanding the end which, by one or other course, we propose to accomplish. The words Education, Conciliation, Mutual charity, Adaptation of conduct to circumstances, float about in our mind, and make us feel that there is something very important to aim at, but also rather uncertain what that something is. Now we settled in the first lecture, that the final end which Education must propose to itself, is the building up a consistent and orderly nation. It is quite impossible, at all events, that a state can

contemplate any higher end than this. Well, then, to this all our labours are to be bent. No plan, however plausible and reasonable, is worth anything to us, unless it can show how it is working to this object; and any plan which can show that it is working to this, carries with it a test of being the one that we want.

What then has been the plan, upon which our clerical Education has been proceeding? It has been this, We assume men to be members of one family, we declare to them that they are so. The first step in our Education is that of adopting them into this family; the second, is that of telling them, in what right they are members of it; the third, is that of giving them the seal in manhood, that they are in the same fellowship to which they were admitted in childhood; the fourth, is giving them the full initiation into all the privileges and mysteries of it. This family we declare to be universal, limited by no conditions of time or country; to belong to it is our great human privilege. This principle underlies all our Education, and is the very meaning of it. How is this proclamation affected by the existence of a number of bodies differing from us? We answer, Not the least. The fact, that the ground has been laid for such a universal human family, remains just as sure to us, though nineteen twentieths of men should dispute it, or refuse to belong

to it; the Christian Church believed it, when it had a few persecuted members in one city, belonging to a poor Syrian tribe. They expected then, that men would come into this family out of every nation and kindred; but whether they ever came or no, that small body who met in Judæa, on the day of Pentecost, had in it the principle of an universal federation. I repeat it then, our Education is based upon this assertion, which we make, not in words only, but in acts,—acts of united fellowship and worship. We take to ourselves this name of an universal body; we refuse any other; we claim fellowship with all men, who will not decline fellowship with us. We are able to show, that we have never refused fellowship with any, unless they asserted some principle which narrowed the circle, and made our position more exclusive, and less human. We cannot have fellowship, for instance, with those who are determined that they will own a mortal and visible head, because this immediately takes us off the human ground; brings the universal body under conditions of time and space; renders its existence a contradiction. Our fellowship is grounded on the confession of a direct relationship to an invisible being, because we know on higher grounds, and we see from experience, that every fellowship, not resting on this confession, has come to nought, and has given rise to the most fearful strife.

Now we affirm, that this proclamation of an universal brotherhood, is not less necessary to our time than to former times, but more necessary. We say, it may be very well for you to call us a sect, or by any other name you please, but it is most necessary for your sakes, that we should not call ourselves so. If you ever are to have a united nation, we are certain it will come to pass in this way, by men feeling that there is a foundation for them to unite upon, and that there being such a foundation, separation from each other is wrong: this is our exclusive doctrine—this is that which you wish us to abandon for the sake of comprehending sects; we are determined not to abandon it—we are more convinced than ever that it is true—we are ashamed of not having understood the principle, and put it more prominently forward; every step in the history of separation—every awkward attempt at making men amalgamate, without uniting them, brings to our minds a fresh witness in its favour; and we see men in all directions seeking for such a fellowship as this; every new impulse which the age has felt, has been moving it in this direction; all its most blind and restless cravings have been after this object. We see each of the sects recognizing this truth, and confessing itself unable to realize it. We see the state confessing it, and determining that it will realize it, by forcing men to

be at peace. We have no such wild and fanatical imaginations—we have no notion that people can be compelled to agree with us, or that a fictitious agreement, grounded upon their not choosing to say what they think, is worth any thing. Our faith is, that if we seek to understand thoroughly the ground of that universal fellowship for which we are witnesses; if we seek to testify more and more by our lives that we do understand it; if we endeavour to show men calmly and gently that which has kept them apart from it; if we do homage to every real conviction which they have, making them perceive that it is not this, but their dislike of some other strong conviction, which hinders them from communion with us; if we do this, our firm assurance is that we are taking the only course that is possible to unite men. If this fail, none other can succeed. The question for the statesman to decide, is simply this, Is it safe for you, desiring a united and orderly nation, to make such a proclamation as this of none effect? Is it wise that you should compel all persons to consider themselves sects, when the existence of sects is that which you wish to get rid of? Is it wise, if there be a body holding forth the idea that men are not intended to live in sects, that they are intended to be one, to stifle so far as you can this voice, when the very thing you want for your own ends, the very thing you are striving to

compass by your own contrivances, is that they should be at one? You have always a vague notion that we want you to do something for us—in some way or other to help us against the sects. We ask no such thing—we merely ask you to do what is best for your own security—we ask you, when you find things in a certain state in the country, not to try in your rude, wild way to set them in order, the fact being that you know nothing whatever about the real causes of the confusion, or the real feelings that are at work in the men, with whom you are to deal. If you have profited at all by the experience of history, you must be aware that religious controversies are not to be settled just when it is convenient for you to settle them, that you can neither put them down with your words, nor charm them to peace with your flatteries. And if it were possible for you to do the last, which it is not, and was never less possible than in this country and in this age, we believe that you would be doing a great mischief. To bring men at one, by making them feel and understand that they are at one, is to give them the greatest blessing which it is possible for men to receive. To bring them at one, by merely telling them to stifle some of the deepest thoughts in their minds, is to rob them of something which they cannot afford to part with, and to make them dishonest men. If these

are the subjects you mean to create by your Education—men who have not courage to think and speak, we can only say, the country does not want such subjects, they are not good citizens, they will never do it the least service.

There is one point connected with this subject upon which I should wish to make an observation, suggested to me by reading the minutes of evidence before the Select Committee of Education in 1834 and 35. Many of the questions addressed by the committee to the witnesses referred, of course, to religious instruction, and the possibility of communicating it to all indiscriminately. The great obstacle which the witnesses in general discover to the attainment of this object is the habit, in our schools, of using a catechism. This they say immediately brings in questions of disputable doctrine; general Education in religious practice may be communicated without this. Now, the notion which those witnesses have formed of a catechism is evidently this, that it is a manual which communicates information respecting certain deep questions in the science of theology. I do not wonder that they should have formed this opinion, for I observe, that those whom the committee most questioned on this subject were Scotch gentlemen, Professor Pillans and Mr. Dorsey, for instance. The catechism generally used in their country does most strictly answer to the descrip-

tion which they give of catechisms generally. But I must take leave to say, that the one which we use in this country, and which we make the beginning of all our Education, differs from this not merely in particular statements, but in its whole form and intention. Our catechism has nothing to do with what is scientific. It does not belong to the region of theology, as such, at all. It simply announces to the child what its own position is, what the relation is in which it stands to God and to its fellow-creatures. Now, we should like to know what less than this we are expected to teach? Professor Pillans says, teach brotherly love; then we must teach them how they come to be brothers, and what it means to be brothers. We are to teach them their duties to God, Mr. Dorsey says; but all duties are grounded on some relation between the person owing them, and the person to whom they are owed. What this is we must, therefore, also declare. This we must do plainly and simply, avoiding all technicalities and formalities, making all our words living and personal. But as to asking myself when I am giving information, which I believe to be necessary for the very life and being of a child, in order that he may be able to fulfil any duty which is appointed him to do in the world, whether every body living within ten miles of me acknowledges the facts of which I am speaking—to be troubled

with such thoughts and questionings as these, must utterly destroy all honesty and simplicity of feeling in me, and hinder me from communicating an honest and simple feeling to the pupil. The following extract, from the evidence of Professor Pillans, seems to me a specimen of the embarrassment into which very clear-headed and able men often fall, when they have received a vague impression, that there is a way of teaching Christianity which is not dogmatical, and have never seriously considered what the nature of that method must be. “You stated in your last examination, that there were various difficulties in the way of introducing a system of Education, similar to the Prussian and the French system, in England, and among others you mentioned expense. Will you state what, in your opinion, are the other difficulties, besides the mere expense, which you consider to lie in the way of the introduction of such a system?” “The first that presents itself to my mind, is the difficulty of settling the point, as to the religious instruction of the children. The utmost caution and prudence will be obviously required to avoid bringing into hostile collision the two great parties, the church and the dissenters, in any arrangement that may be attempted. The desirable thing would be, if it were possible, to frame such a system, as should unite both in cordial co-operation, without compromising the in-

terests of the country, or of the youth." "Do you not suppose, that a sufficient religious Education could be conveyed without the conveyance at the same time of any peculiar religious doctrine?" "I am disposed to think so, as regards children, both because I think that the doctrines of our religion, as far as they have a tendency to influence the habits and practice of the young, may be separated and kept distinct from the peculiar opinions of any one sect, and because such opinions, embodied in any school-books, I should consider as nearly ineffectual for any purpose at all, turning, as they generally do, upon points which are altogether beyond the comprehension of the young mind. And therefore it is, that I think it most of all desirable to have a system of religious instruction for schools, founded upon the Scriptures, but directed to those parts only of the Sacred Volume which have a moral tendency, and which are likely to influence the conduct, cherish the best affections, and regulate the behaviour of the young. I am fortified in that opinion by the example of the German states, where the school instruction is founded on this principle, as well as of France, where the law on that head is very nearly a transcript of the German." "Has it ever suggested itself to you, in the matter of teaching religion, that teaching theology is one thing, and inculcating religious habits is

another?" "Yes; I think that is very obvious, though certainly not sufficiently attended to in practice." "In the creation of religious habits, do not all sects of Christians agree, as far as you have had an opportunity of considering the subject of teaching?" "I think so." "Supposing that we wanted to teach theology to pupils, the teaching of theology would be like the teaching of any other science." "It certainly requires a matured understanding to deal with subjects so deep and difficult, nor can it be a very profitable employment for the mind of a child to be turned to points of doctrine, upon which, from its very nature, it cannot be informed." "So that, in fact, the business of a teacher of the people, considering the matter of National Education, would be to form religious habits, and those might be formed in a National School, which did not impose any dogmata upon the minds of the pupil?" "I should say so, certainly; at the same time I wish it to be understood, that by dogmata I mean the peculiar tenets of any particular sect. The leading and distinctive doctrines of Christianity ought not to be omitted. It is these, these only, I conceive, that are within the province of the schoolmaster, his vocation being more of a literary than of an ecclesiastical character." "Assuming that there is a general coincidence among the Christian sects, those truths might be taught in a National School, without trenching upon

any religious differences that might exist between them?" "I think they might." "And, therefore, if there were a spirit of forbearance among the Christian sects, at this time subsisting in England, there would in reality be no objection on this score to the institution of a National Education?" "Not the least, I should think. There is in the present day, as far as I have observed, less of excitement and mutual hostility between the different sects in Germany and France than in England; and accordingly, in the Ministerial and official instructions sent out, to the Prefect of the circle or department, as well as to the teachers themselves, they are strongly enjoined to encourage mixed schools, where the children may practically learn the principle of toleration and mutual forbearance; and where that cannot be done, the authorities are invited to take every means to provide such religious instruction apart, as shall be thought necessary, or even to form separate schools. The last, however, they consider as a resource not to be resorted to unless all means of uniting the two persuasions shall be found unavailing." "Do you not suppose, that the teaching of various sects in one school, under that system of Catholic faith, if it may be so called, would very much tend to promote general kindliness amongst the whole population?" "I think so desirable an object most likely to be attained by

such a joint and mixed system. Judging both from reason and experience, I should say it is a result that could scarcely fail to take place.” “Do you not think a true Christian feeling would be created by such a system of National Education?” “I do.” “Do you consider that in any way the interests of religion would be injured by such a system?” “On the contrary, it appears to me that the amount of religious feeling and true Christianity would be increased very considerably by such an arrangement, inasmuch as we are all taught to believe, and cannot help believing, who are familiar with the Scriptures and the New Testament, that brotherly love is one of the first of Christian virtues.”

Any one reading this evidence of Professor Pillans must feel, I think, how impossible it would be to establish a practical system upon the principles laid down in it. All these distinctions between the dogmas of particular sects and the leading and distinctive doctrines of Christianity—who has not heard them a thousand times? Who does not feel that there is a truth implied in them? Who does not know that they vanish into the merest vapour, when ingenious and benevolent men have tried to embody them in act? And when one hears a grave professor speaking to a grave committee about what would happen if sects would exercise

a mutual forbearance, without suggesting any means to make them exercise it except that of putting them into a position in which they have the greatest temptation not to exercise it ; one really wonders what world it is for which they were conspiring to legislate.

The one thing, we must tell the committee plainly, which we want is mutual forbearance, and it is the one thing which men never had and never will have who do not entertain a deep and solemn reverence for truth, and therefore a desire that it should not be mangled by partial statements and one-sided views.

The indifferent man is never a charitable man. He can tolerate all negations, all disbelief ; but whatever is earnest, whatever is positive he hates with a perfect hatred. The man who has truth to tell, is ashamed of himself when he does not forbear with his brother, because he feels how important it is that he should possess that truth, and how much the want of forbearance is likely to hinder him from possessing it. It is this forbearance which it is our function to inculcate and diffuse. If we have failed in doing this work, it is not because we have loved truth too well, but because we have loved it too weakly ; not because we have refused to look upon all truth as mere opinion, but because we have yielded to that great and deep delusion. We have learned by expe-

rience that it is this which has the power to unite men, and not all schemes which begin in a dishonest suppression of what we believe, and end in leading us to believe nothing. We have learned, therefore, to reverence our own function more, because it is the function of proclaiming truth to men: and we have come to think less and less of your state machinery, because it carries with it no such power. We feel that we are not born into the world an age too late, but just in the very age which is most fitted to prove what that strength which has been committed to us is good for—an age in which men are trying to find a bond of union for themselves, and cannot find it—in which they are abusing one another for not being conciliatory, and ready to tear one another in pieces for the sake of establishing charity. We are born into an age of parties—it is God's will that it should be so; we cannot make it otherwise by not believing it. We have an Education which assumes men to be members of one family—of one nation. If any persons like to be educated on that ground, we will educate them; if they do not like it, they must educate themselves upon what other principle they may, for we know of no other, and will admit no other. The State rushes in and says, “But we can! we will make you members of one family, whether you like it or no. You shall love by act of parliament and embrace by an

order in council. You have paid for our protection ; of course, therefore, we are bound in honour to make you wise and charitable." This is their scheme ; I believe that it will work in this way. It will teach those who are indifferent to be more indifferent ; and because indifferent, more intolerant of all who are not like themselves. It will teach those who feel their differences strongly, to feel them far more strongly, and to lose all sense of there being any fundamental agreement, those points which are set before them as the points of agreement being mere vague and hollow generalities. Their Education will not reach the heart of the people, for there will be nothing in it with which the heart can feel sympathy. You will find the nation growing not more united but more divided and broken ; and all that you will have gained will be that you will have hidden from men's eyes the great witness that this miserable and disorganized condition is not the one for which they were created.

The question which we have just been considering is closely connected with that of the classes into which English society is distributed. Herein is found another powerful argument to prove the impracticability of clerical Education in our present circumstances. "At the time (it is said) when the universities and public schools were established, society was strictly feudal in its con-

stitution ; the baron, and his dependents, down through all degrees, kept up the idea of a family life in the nation : the serfs were of course of no account at all ; but even they might by some extension of the Roman principle be still recognized as parts of the family. To that state of things, a church constituting a great family, and in the persons of its ministers exercising a kind of patriarchal discipline over the whole of it, was very appropriate. But the moment the towns begin to appear, we find a disinclination to this uniformity. Then straightway a set of teachers arises expressly for the new class ; the Wickliffites are a body, to say the least, very loosely connected with the church at large. At the reformation, the sense of a common hostility to Rome may have kept the Protestant party in the higher and middling class from falling into separate bodies ; but even then we see the principle at work, for the great aristocratical families generally retained their attachment to popery, and it was the new class which gave the great impulse to reformation. Accordingly as soon as things began to be settled in the reign of Elizabeth, we observe the commencement of puritanism, still in connection chiefly with the middle class, though patronized by some of the higher. Then in the following reigns puritanism gains ground, and establishes itself ; the city being always its head quarters, the country opposed to it. At

the restoration the new principle is shown to have triumphed even when it seemed discomfited; feudal tenures are abolished, the commercial classes rise in dignity and importance, society becomes in a manner reconstructed, and though the national church resumes its former position, it is evident that a large section of the middle class is becoming hopelessly estranged from it. Puritanism, though it has lost its dominion in the State, retains its dominion over them; a great body of dissenting teachers is formed in the land, and by degrees becomes recognized by the State, the towns being (as from the first) the great seats of their influence. So things went on till the middle of the last century, the church retaining a certain influence with the higher classes, though these were considerably separated from it by infidelity, giving up one large section of the middle class to the dissenters, and keeping a sort of traditional authority over the lowest. But then came Methodism, which took these also from under your control, and formed an organized community of them, constantly separating itself more and more widely from your Church. Such, it is agreed, is the present state of things; one not desirable, certainly, because hereby the three classes are kept in marked separation from each other; not merely having distinct positions but distinct habits and feelings. Some remedy

must be found, some means of bringing them to act and work together. We shall effect this by treating them as subjects of a common Education, one which will not perhaps bring them into the same rooms or give them the same lessons ; but will be conducted under the same auspices, making them understand that they are cared for by the ruling power in the nation. Such an Education must of course be managed by the State ; circumstances (not we) have taken it out of the hands of the clergy.” These are the arguments which we generally hear urged on this third point. The first question which strikes one in reference to them is : supposing the State should establish such an Education ; through what agency does it propose to act upon the classes thus divided from each other ? We ought to give it the advantage of supposing its plans in the greatest possible completeness. Let us imagine then a Minister of Public Instruction—one exercising a direct control over the universities, appointing of course the professors and tutors, who are supported by fixed salaries, which he pays them. All the other schools in the land are also under his control, and they are divided exactly in the Prussian method into higher, and middle, and elementary. We will leave out the question whether the children are forced to attend or not, though, I think, no reflecting person can doubt, that if a State be the proper manager of Educa-

tion, this is necessary in order to make the scheme consistent; for the notion of a *State* persuading, and not ordering, is surely most strange. But after all these provisions are made, I want to know from what class you are to get the professors and tutors of the universities, and the masters of the different schools. You say you will have training schools for them; you will establish the school-masters into a separate caste. Be it so. This then is your object. To get a class who shall be distinct from the different classes in the community, that it may act upon all; a tribe, as it were, among the tribes. You must either do this, or you must still continue to work the old machinery, employing those who now teach the different classes independently, to teach them under your direction. Your great wish, if I am not mistaken, would be this; that the priests of religion should teach that subject to those whom circumstances have brought under their direction. Your education on all other subjects being under the control of a set of men specially prepared for the purpose. Now, how this is to effect the purpose of uniting the different classes, I confess I do not see. Those who address the people on the matters most directly concerning their lives, those who teach them the bonds by which they associate together, are still separate, acting as before upon the different classes.

And your schoolmasters, your separate caste, are not acting upon the classes together; some are acting upon the lower classes in the elementary schools; some upon the middle, in the middle schools; some upon the higher, in the universities. And remember this. Those separate teachers are all discoursing upon the same subject, according to their different notions, are all making their particular disciples understand how they differ from one another upon this subject. Your schoolmasters are not supplying some other common subject as a counterpoise to this; you cannot so far delude yourselves with the use of a word, as to suppose that because they are giving all the people *Education*, they are giving them some point of common interest; for the Education given to the different classes, is, in most important respects, different. In what one way then are you providing against the evil of this division in society? What one thing are you doing to bring the classes into harmony? Do you really fancy that the people, divided by circumstances, by difference of opinion on the subjects most interesting to them, divided by this very Education, are to acquire a common soul, just because those who give them the portion of their knowledge, which is most external to themselves, are appointed and superintended by the same Minister of Instruction, or are paid out of the same treasury?

Do we then contend, that this state of things is no evil; that the existence of a middle class, feeling less and less sympathy with the higher; of a lower class, feeling less and less sympathy with the middle, is not an alarming fact, implying that something is rotten at the core, and threatening most fearful results hereafter? Or do we say, that the remedy for this evil is to change the existing state of society, and re-establish the feudal family state? Or if we are not mad enough for this, do we think that the mischief is absolutely irremediable? No, I do not believe that this can be the feeling of any churchman—I am sure it cannot be the feeling of any clergyman who earnestly and solemnly reflects, first, upon his own position, and then upon the position of his country. He must feel, I think, “The function with which God has been pleased to endow me, is precisely that which these modern reformers are seeking to create. I belong to a tribe among tribes; I am a member of a class which stands out from all the classes, which has no right to identify itself with the feelings or interests of any one, which is bound to consider itself the minister of all.” We may come out of all classes. There may be patrician members of our class, who feel keenly the insults which are offered to the aristocracy of the land in some of the writings that are favourites with the people at large. I may smart exceedingly under the

contempt which it pleases the manufacturers of your fashionable literature, to pour upon my brethren of the middle class. There may be others who are groaning deeply over the miseries of that working class with which they had their earliest sympathies. But all these several feelings, when connected with the ordination vows by which we are removed into another relation, and into a larger circle of affections, can only so far act upon us as to make us realise the obligations under which we are all laid, to heal these heart-burnings and animosities, to let each member of the classes know that he has a position of his own to maintain, an honourable and glorious position, and that while fulfilling it, and only then, he really enters into the highest privilege of being the member of a nation. We know that we acquired the dignity which we occupy as teachers of this nation in feudal times, in a state of society altogether different from the present. But we say, that the first-fruits of the seed that were then deposited in the soil are yet to be gathered in. We have been permitted to do something for the nation during those feudal times, something for it in the years that followed after. But it is only through the experience of those circumstances which, according to some, have made our office obsolete, that we are beginning to learn its purpose and its ne-

cessity. These statesmen are teaching us, and we are bound to thank them for it, if for nothing else, that we have not been half bold enough in avouching our authority, and in making you feel that we possess it. We have been far too content to imbibe the habits and feelings of particular sections of the community; far too ready to catch the tone of the circle in which we were moving, when we ought to have given it its tone. Therefore it is, that the middle class and the lower class have been in some great measure alienated from us; for though many of us much more properly belong to them than to the higher, yet we have been considered by them as persons eagerly climbing into a worldly position better than that which was naturally given us, rather than as those who are appointed to be servants. Nevertheless, we have had proof, even in the history of these separations, by which the influence of the church over the nation has been apparently so much weakened, of the power with which we are invested. The teachers of puritanism, those who first produced any great moral influence upon the middle classes, those who imparted to them any moral life, were bred in our own universities, and for the most part received their orders from our bishops. Those who succeeded them may have organized the separation, to which they only gave the first impulse; but the real living power went forth from the

first men. The same is the case still more strikingly with Methodism. The whole of that great movement upon the humblest classes in the community began with men who had spent their lives as fellows of colleges, and who, according to modern notions, ought not to have been able to produce more than a very trifling effect upon any class, and not the slightest upon any which had not received a school training. It must be a marvel to the Methodist body, if they ever consider it, that all their diligence in keeping their preachers upon a level with the class which they are to address, has never availed to produce one man who could find his way to the hearts of the poor, as those did who came invested with an Episcopal ordination and human scholarship. There seems, then, no reason for us to despair, because we exert only an imperfect influence over the middle and lower classes. As we have not found that the rejection of old opinions, and the spread of new information, leave us without the power of teaching, or with nothing to teach ; as we have not found that the growth and the restlessness of sects make our assertion of the principle of universal Christian communion less necessary or less hopeful ; so neither shall we find that we are without language in which to address those whom dissent and Methodism now claim as their subjects, or that larger and more unhappy body, over which neither they

nor any religious society exercises any authority. What the wants of each are, and what satisfaction we can provide for them, I hope to show you in my two next lectures. I shall be quite content if, in this, I have been able to give you some reasons for believing that the principles of our old English Education are as applicable to this age as to any former one, and that the principle of State Education can never be applicable to any age.

LECTURE V.

IN some of my lectures I may seem to have spoken disparagingly of professional Education. I represented it as the great distinction of clerical Education that it aimed at the cultivation of humanity; and of State Education that it aimed at the cultivation of professional habits. But I must repeat the remark which I made on a former occasion that the attempt to dispense with a specific object for the sake of forming something universal, seems to me just as dangerous as the attempt to compass a specific object without grounding it upon something universal. I discover no such tendency in our English Education. Our universities were undoubtedly established in the first place for the sake of forming a race of clergymen. The characteristic of a clergyman being that he possessed the secret of acting upon the hearts and reason of men, others came to believe that his lore must be useful to them, seeing that with the same human beings they also were

to deal. The lawyer felt that a mystery attached to his subject too, that he also was speaking, though in another manner, to the human conscience. As the statesman became aware that he had men and not brutes to govern, the same truth is brought home to his mind; he then must have the ecclesiastical culture. When the circulation of the blood, and the different living processes in the human body revealed themselves to the physician, he rose in his own estimation; he felt that he was studying not contrivances, but principles; he had a right to a similar discipline. The lords of the soil found that there were relations existing between them and their tenants, and their fellow-creatures generally, and certain duties appertaining to them in consequence of those relations; they might be magistrates, if not legislators; they were obliged to seek the like initiation. Lastly came in the commercial men who had risen into importance by their wealth. They came confessing that their wealth was not of itself sufficient to make them citizens. They begged to be reckoned among those whose business it is not to deal with things, but with men. Here undoubtedly is a professional Education; yet it is essentially a human Education; an Education of men to do particular services; but, firstly and chiefly, of men. And hence it has come to pass that the word *Profession* in our country has acquired this

signification. It is expressly that kind of business which deals primarily with men as men, and is thus distinguished from a *Trade* which provides for the external wants or occasions of men.

Now when I hinted that the universities and grammar schools were not available for all classes of our community, what I meant was this, that they fit men to be in this sense professional men and not to be tradesmen. They do not bring up those whose vocation it will be to supply the outward animal wants of men; it never was the intention of their founders (I refer now to all the colleges and most of the grammar schools) that they should do this. It *was* most distinctly their intention that they should educate poor youths; for one benefactor who limits his bounty to the well-born and the well-dressed, ten consider a humble estate and rags a recommendation. But if from this fact you draw the inference that these bodies were meant to supply the land with useful manufacturers or artisans, and that the Chancery court would be acting out the intention of the donors if it applied the funds which they bequeathed to such a purpose, you would be reasoning very wrongly. The objects of their charity were to be poor *scholars*; scholarship was to be their distinction. They were to have a spiritual, and not a material vocation, from whatever part of society it might chance that they came. And if you

think that though the law courts could not make this disposition in favour of tradesmen, it would be convenient, supposing it were honest, that the legislature should, I think you err equally : for this distinction between professions and trades is not, as some maintain, a cruel, hard-hearted distinction ; I suspect you will find that it saves us from much cruelty and hard-heartedness. If there were no such distinction, if it were not kept up along with the distinctions of family, of wealth, of talent, those would be found most intolerable. The sense of it serves to humanize a nation, to give it a feeling of the difference between what is permanently and what is accidentally important, to prevent it from worshipping money as its God. I conceive no part of the nation can afford to dispense with it, and perhaps least of all that part which it seems, and only *seems*, to dishonour. For while it is upheld, we must reverence every man because he is a man. Be he tradesman, labourer, what he will, to his conscience the clergyman speaks ; for his security the statesman legislates ; for the cure of his diseases the physician meditates. That we may pay more honour to that which is properly himself, we comparatively undervalue his function. That rich and haughty men may not look upon him merely as a tool for ministering to their wants or luxuries, therefore do we permit them in a sort to contemn his ministry,

knowing that in this way they do but pour more abundant ridicule upon themselves, if they make that with which he furnishes them the occasion for their self-glorying. Those democratical advisers, therefore, who tell tradesmen that it would be a great blessing for them if the feeling of this distinction could be obliterated, manifestly entertain no respect for them at all, and wish to see them brought into a position in which they will lose all self-respect. This distinction witnesses against that pride of wealth which tries to separate us, witnesses for that common humanity whereby we are united; therefore, every man in the country is interested in preserving it.

This being the case, one cannot surely regret that the universities do not provide any Education for tradesmen as such. One wishes to see the utmost possible effect given to the intentions of their founders and benefactors; One wishes to see an opportunity offered for the poorest artisan, or labourer, if he has a decided vocation of the kind, to become the member of a profession; but I think we cannot, and ought not to wish that any lower end than that of fitting persons for what are called liberal, or as our ancestors would have said, humane pursuits, ought ever to be proposed in them. No doubt there are grammar-school foundations, which do appear to aim at another object. At the time of the reformation,

when the new class was rising into importance, it was impossible for enlightened individuals, and enlightened governors, not to feel that a provision was necessary for them. Wherever an intention of training tradesmen as such, can distinctly be proved, of course the law courts will interfere to prevent the endowment from being appropriated to any other use. But the notion, I imagine, was so strong in the minds of men at this time, that every one to be educated was to be in some sense a scholar, that even when the provision was directly for the sons of tradesmen, or citizens, there will have been no very precise words to show, how they were to be differently trained from those of their countrymen, who were meant for professions. Hence, the bias of our Education has been towards this one point, and the particular exceptions have gradually conformed themselves to the general rule. Nay, the degree of vagueness and uncertainty, which has been attached to the objects of some grammar-schools, seems to have operated unfavourably upon our Education. It would have been better (to all appearance), if they had been more strictly limited at first to the objects whereto they have ultimately become devoted. For the cause of the confusion not being understood, the distinction has been changed from the objects to the persons; it has been the question, not what kind of knowledge shall be com-

municated, but what kind of persons were to receive it. Old provisions, that were intended for the advantage of humbler students, seeking to attain the same ends as the rest, with less means, have been regarded as contributing to their degradation; class feelings have risen up in the school, and the distinction between trades and professions, which tends to keep up a free, generous habit of mind, has been lost in the distinction between wealth and poverty, which tends to destroy it. Be that as it may, the result has been thus, that few tradesmen or yeomen, who wish their sons to follow their own walk of life, would think of sending them to a university, or even to a grammar-school. The risk would be very great, (too great for any prudent parent to incur) of the son acquiring a taste for some professional pursuit, and if he had not ability or means to pursue it, of his becoming idle and restless.

If we look at the question in this way, it seems to me, that there is less cause for discouragement, and perhaps, more cause for shame in our present position, than we might at first fancy. It was not a low, narrow feeling, which made our Education exclusive. It did not become so through a wish to pamper the prejudices, or sooth the vanity of any persons who thought it beneath them to associate with their inferiors, or who wished to keep knowledge as a power or privilege

for themselves. There is nothing the least answering to that feeling which we noticed in both the states of Greece, that there must be one body kept down in degradation and brutality, in order that the rest might feel and understand their dignity as men. There is a feeling exactly the reverse of this, to be discovered in every page of our school history ; no difference of rank is felt to exclude a man from the chance of filling the station, in which he may confer the very highest blessings on his fellow-creatures. In the deepest heart of society, a noble spiritual equality asserts itself ; and where this is felt, the distinctions which make themselves manifest in the outward frame-work of society, are acquiesced in, as if they resembled the beautiful unevennesses of nature, rather than the artificial mounds which man raises up. It is for the very purpose of preserving that equality, by preventing men from sinking into the materialism which must always destroy it, that our instruction became confined to one object. And whatever corruptions have intruded themselves into our system may, I think, be traced most directly to our losing sight of that object. A commercial habit of mind has arisen in the country, the notions of a trade and of a profession have become confounded ; a profession has been supposed to be a trade, carried on by men of respectability ; and a trade, a profession

conducted by inferior men; the schools have caught the infection: trade rewards, and trade motives have been proposed for professional culture, and while our minds have thus become more and more vulgarised and mercantile, by a strange inconsistency, as it might seem, but I believe by a necessary consequence, contempt in the more esteemed class of society, restlessness, and loss of self-respect in the less esteemed, have increased equally. Such an evil has grown upon us, and will grow upon us more, unless some remedy be found for it. We have considered some of the remedies, which have been proposed, especially that great specific, a State Education; it has seemed to us that this would aggravate the disease tenfold. It would confirm all our present floating notions into rules of action—it would wholly take away the idea that a profession is anything more than a superior trade. It would fortify the habits of each particular class, without reforming the feelings of any one—it would utterly fail to cultivate the humanity of the nation. Still, what other resource is there, if it be true, as I have just said, that the whole body of our tradesmen and yeomen, as well as all beneath them, are excluded from our schools and universities, except upon the condition of their becoming something else than tradesmen or yeomen. The remedy is to take a course exactly the opposite of that which

we seem inclined to take. We are inclined to look upon possessions as if they could only be pursued from trade motives. Let us teach our tradesmen that they may pursue their trades under the same impulses, with the same feelings and sympathies, with the same great hopes as those which ought to actuate and encourage men who are engaged in professions. We are disposed to separate our different professions, and no longer to regard the cultivation of a general humanity as essential to them. Let us show the tradesman that the cultivation of a general humanity is essential to him in order that he may do his work faithfully and worthily. We are disposed to abandon our own position, let us on the contrary show him that he has one and a most honourable one to maintain. We are disposed to think lightly of the very highest vocations, if they do not bring in advantages in the shape of wealth or respect from our fellow-creatures. Let us show him that the very humblest vocation has higher and grander aims than these. We are disposed to look upon those as the privileged orders which have the means of commanding greater influence for their own purposes. Let us show him that every order is a privileged order which can exert an influence on behalf of the rest, which can help to build up a nation.

The doctrine then which I maintain is this:—

that for the most important ends in which the whole community is interested, the Education of men who are to be engaged in professions should be kept separate from the Education of those who are to be engaged in trades; that the grounds upon which this separation is made involve the acknowledgment that the tradesman requires a large human cultivation, agreeing in its essentials, differing in its accidents, from that which is given to the professional man; that the circumstances of the country at this time impose on us the necessity of providing such an Education for him without delay; that our negligence in offering it to him has brought a severe judgment upon us, inasmuch as the habits of mind which we have not endeavoured to correct in him have crept over ourselves; that the right understanding of our duty in this respect, and the fixed resolution to perform it, offer the best hopes of restoring a right state of feeling in the rest of society. I think farther that as our chance of discovering what is wanted for this trading class depends upon first knowing what is wanted for the professional class; so our chance of discovering what is wanted for the labouring class, depends upon our first knowing what is wanted for this middle class. By following the opposite order, as I hinted before, we have fallen into great confusion; the obvious wants of the country have been thought a suffi-

cient help to determine the principles upon which those wants should be supplied, and not unfrequently the blind wishes of particular bodies have been identified with their wants. And yet I am very far from thinking that even these wishes have been studied with half the attention that they deserve. We have sometimes magnified them into rules for our guidance; then finding how little they serve this purpose, we have been ready to accept any theory about the right way of proceeding even if there were nothing corresponding to it in the feelings of the persons for whom we were arranging our plans. These tendencies, most slavishly to make the people's will our law, and most insolently and heartlessly to set it at nought, we may see continually alternating in the same individual: and most naturally, for the experience of the mischief of each course will be perpetually driving him upon the opposite. Only the person who is acting upon principles, principles ascertained by practice and made more intelligible by the deviations from them, can afford to look steadily and sympathizingly on all the fluctuations of opinion and feeling to which each portion of society at each particular time is subject. He is not enraged with them because they offer obstacles to the accomplishment of his purpose, for his purpose is a human purpose; it is not for other creatures he is plotting, but for men,

and therefore all their varieties and caprices are interesting to him as lessons in behaviour, though not as determining his object. With this feeling, it is very desirable, I think, to get what light we can respecting the present tempers and dispositions of the middle class, before we show what Education for them would be most in conformity with the system already established among us. If the results of the two inquiries should correspond; if we should find that what they are groping after themselves, or what evident peculiarities in their position show that they need, is what we are able to provide, we shall have a test that our scheme is a true one which must be very consolatory in any attempts to apply it.

If we look at the two different divisions of which the middle class consists, the yeomanry in the country, and the tradesmen in towns, we shall be struck, no doubt, with many great and almost fundamental differences between them. We shall see very commonly a nervous dislike of innovation in the farmer, as great a fondness for it in the shopkeeper; we shall find the one slothful and stagnant, the other full of briskness and self-importance; the one liking to be thought to act according to his own notions of things, the other wishing to have the credit of having the best and newest opinion of his circle; one, with a sort of Spartan shrewdness, expressing itself in

slow, pithy, moral sentences, which show that something has been working in him, without much consciousness on his part of what it is, the other having an opinion upon every subject, one which has not come to him by silent, unknown influences, but which he has adopted for himself.

But beneath these differences you observe a resemblance; both are occupied in providing for the animal wants of men, both are apt to regard this as the business of men's lives; neither is without respect for his spiritual teacher, but the respect will depend mainly upon the degree in which the teacher shows himself able to enter into his concerns; neither is without respect for intellectual endowments, but each conceives that these endowments are chiefly valuable, as enabling men to make their way in the world. Both are in their own ways politicians; they may belong to different schools in politics, but the feeling that they are meant, in some important way, to act upon the destinies of the nation, is given to them alike. Candidates at elections tell them so, and they believe it. Hence, both are liable to become the victims of quackeries and impostures, though of different kinds; both wish to have a position of their own, and yet are at a loss to understand what to aim at, if not at being like richer men; both are apt to struggle after this for their children, if not for themselves, with con-

siderable awkwardness, and by methods which they are half-conscious can never be successful.

A sensible, shrewd parent, whether yeoman or tradesman, sends his children to a commercial school; but he evidently regards the education which they receive there with secret contempt; he will tell you that he is not able to see from any part of their conduct, or any increased wisdom they display in their business, what good their learning does them. At the same time he allows them to receive it as a matter of necessity, because he has a notion that, in this day, people cannot get on without it. He understands that his children are learning the same things that richer people learn, and this is so far good; if they are fools he must be content to be a fool also. Meantime his children grow up with a feeling that Education is a very wonderful power; that it is a great advantage to know a multitude of those things which soften the manners and make the world respectable and refined. But what precisely they have gained; what it is which gives them their superiority to their fathers, they do not well know. Something they have got certainly, a sense of acquisition, a feeling that their class has a right to do what another class does, a feeling of having less concern with the labourers and artisans, and more with those who are at ease. But they are not so quiet as their fathers were;

they do not feel as much at home in common affairs, they are aiming at higher things. They are conscious of this difference; and are proud of it. It is the effect of their Education. They cannot sit still, under the sense of inferiority to people above them by the mere accident of birth or position, as their fathers did. They are kept from something to which they have a right: what that is, they cannot exactly tell. They do not like to call it instruction, for that they have; and yet this too they want in a higher degree. With greater ease, and in a different state of political circumstances, they should be able to know many things which they do not now know, as well as to possess many things which they do not now possess. Such thoughts adapt themselves to the different habits of town and country, for those habits still preserve their relative distance from each other; the new element which has been added to each, does not bring them in any important sense nearer. Neither, it appears, has gained from the Education which it has received a greater power of detecting the impositions of quacks, medical, political, or religious. In that respect the children are not superior to their fathers; in another respect, I think, they must be pronounced inferior. The language of their fathers was rude, idiomatic, and expressive. They spoke a native tongue, though it was perhaps a provincial tongue. Theirs

has acquired a number of new phrases, but it does not utter so many living thoughts—it is far less their own, in the best sense it is far less English.

This view of what the middle class is, and of the improvements which have taken place in it, may seem dismal. I could easily have made it less so, by alluding to the noble specimens we meet with of virtue and wisdom both among tradesmen and yeomen; but I have purposely set before you the gloomy side of the picture, that we may understand exactly what the difficulties are which we have to combat, and how they are to be met. By looking at the uneasy, turbulent members of a class, you may often ascertain what the whole class is in need of, whereas the satisfaction of the calmer members might mislead us. I think it evident then that there is a craving in them, first after a political position, secondly after a teaching as true and substantial as that which the professional class possess. They expect, in some way, that Education is to confer upon them both these benefits—that it is both to make them wise, and to give them an influence in the nation which they had not before. You must see that an Education, which strives to communicate information to them upon the same subjects which more leisurely people understand, only of an inferior kind, excites these cravings, but does not satisfy them. And in connection with the wishes of this class, we are

able to discover a few of their wants. We see that they want to be set above the influence of mere talking men, to be gifted with the power of understanding hollow phrases and empty generalities—to have the faculty of trying words as the palate trieth meats. We see, that they have corrupted the language of their simpler forefathers, and that they want, in some way, to be taught to use their native tongue, so that it shall really be a vehicle for thoughts, and not merely a collection of sounds. The evidence of these necessities lies upon the surface; but if you think more you will perhaps perceive, that another deeper want is implied in these—the want of something which shall not only give this class a position of its own—not only make its members feel that their knowledge is sound, but which shall actually unite them to the other classes, causing them to understand, that they form one body with those whom they have been tempted to look down upon, as well as with those whose level they have been striving to attain. An Education not fulfilling these conditions cannot meet the wants and the wishes of the middle class, or be a substitute for the miserable Education which they have hitherto received.

Now what you would think it is most out of the province of Education to supply is, perhaps, that political position of which we see that the

member of the middle class is so covetous. This (you may be inclined to say) can only be given him by a change in the order of society. If he is able to unsettle the commonwealth he may get it, but this is not an object in which we desire to assist him; if he resort to any other means, he will of course be disappointed. I believe you are mistaken, and I should be very glad to convince you that you are mistaken; for it is a point concerning you as much as any tradesman or yeoman. It is not the sense of being superior to other men, I am sure, which makes the most high-minded members of the aristocracy value their position. I am not speaking now of that which is the highest of all reasons for gratitude, the power which their station confers upon them of being useful to their fellow creatures; this may belong to them in common with many others; but I mean that that which is properly the aristocratical feeling as it exists in the mind of the best man, (in whom of course it ought to be tested, because in worse men it is compounded with worse feelings) is not the sense of superiority, but the sense of connection with a family which has preserved its honour through many generations. This feeling which seems to me so precious, that I know not how to call that a nation which is not leavened with it, is then something distinct from any particular personal privileges; they

belong to it, not it to them. How then is it communicated? It is communicated through Education. It comes to you through family records, through family pictures, through ancient halls and chapels, through venerable trees, through names traditionally hallowed. By these means men become endowed with that feeling which is the part that in their best moments they really prize of their civil position, which redeems the accidents of it from the dominion of vulgar pride, which gives even them a sanctity. But if this be so, the sense of a position may possibly be communicated to another class also through Education. It may be the want of that Education, and not the want of some external change, which has prevented them from realizing it. I know it is fancied that the only recollections of any deep interest are those which have a feudal and chivalrous character. The romance writer, who has had most effect upon the mind of this generation, has done much to impress this opinion upon us. But it must be remembered that he belonged to a country which was differently circumstanced from our own, and indeed from most countries in Europe — a country never subjected to those impulses from the rise of towns and the formation of a second class, which, for good or for evil, so powerfully affected us and Germany, and, though in a different way, Italy and France. A Scotch-

man can know nothing, experimentally, of any feelings but those which belong to feudalism or to the religious movement after the reformation. But there is, I conceive, a very solemn interest (whether it may properly be called a romantic interest I know not) in the history of these movements in England, seeing that with them is connected the formation of our language, the establishment of our literature, the very awakening of the sense of a distinct national life. There is surely a dignity and a sublimity of its own, connected with the sight of an old town with some commercial hall recording its early franchises and the deeds of its municipal government, which, if it is very different from the sublimity of a baronial castle, may yet claim a place in our minds beside it. One cannot help feeling that precisely the difference, be it what it may, between a mere family and a nation has been produced by the addition of one of these elements to the other. Take away the family life, and I cheerfully allow that you reduce the nation into a set of restless warring atoms; but take away the other element, and you lose all personal distinctness; you have a continuous race, but you have not a set of distinct human beings. Doubtless, if you are determined to look at the town spirit as merely that which is setting itself in opposition to the other, it will present itself to you as a very mean, beg-

garly thing, living only in the moment, unconnected with the past and the future. But the moment you bring it in contact with historical recollections, the moment you bring the townsman of one age to feel himself connected with the townsman of another, by different links indeed from those which bind you to the former members of your own family, but still by most real links which the heart and the imagination are able to recognize, that moment this meanness and narrowness disappear. The busy member of the particular corporation, the fidgetty partizan in the particular borough controversy, belongs to burghers of another day, his corporation takes its place in the history of corporations, and bears upon the life of the nation. And when he himself feels this, without losing his activity he obtains quietness; he has a more solemn impression of the duty which he has to perform, but his mere self-importance is quelled; he rises from the state of a laborious pettifogger to the dignity of an English citizen.

I have spoken first of the tradesman, because I do not anticipate any difficulty in persuading you that the other member of the middle class, the yeoman, may be acted upon by very stirring historical associations. The connection of his fathers with the soil, with the old military achievements of England, with some of the most loyal and

conspicuous deeds of the aristocracy has given him a kind of hereditary position which even the romancers have been willing to recognize. It is surely well, in the same class, among men whose relative position to the rest of the community marks them out as intended to mix in a school, to find the two habits of mind which, being fused together give permanency to a nation, so well embodied. The tradesman may be considered as emphatically the representative of the middle order, the yeoman as infusing into that character something of the spirit which belongs to the higher class. It will be the effect of our Education, if rightly conducted, to make these two elements really combine, and so to prevent either from being lost to the country.

But what must the nature of this Education be? We have seen that the middle class has or ought to have a peculiarly national character. Without it, as I said just now, we should not have become definitely English. Our knights connected us with the whole of Christendom: as warriors of the Cross, as bound by freemasonry to all the knights of every country, they had a Catholic, much more than a specifically national character. That character, for the sake of the nation, we would wish to see them retain; and for this end we would give them a large Catholic cultivation, training them along with professional men in the two

most Catholic languages. But the member of the middle class gave us the feeling of our distinct English position, that we were to be something within ourselves, not using a common Christendom language, but speaking a homely native tongue, —Saxons not Latins, islanders not Europeans. It seems to me, then, that the first object we should aim at is to give the middle class of this day a thorough, hearty understanding of that language which their fathers did so much to secure for us. The central point in their intellectual cultivation should be the study of their own tongue in its vigour and purity. Herein I distinguish the education of tradesmen from the education of professional men. The end is to call forth the humanity in each; but the humanity of those who have the one vocation, is best appealed to by languages which connect them with other nations as well as with their own—the humanity of the other, by a language which they can feel to be truly and actually their own. There have been great misunderstandings on this point, I think, from want of attention to the different position of the classes, and from transferring the experience of the one to the other. Scholars have said we cannot understand the English language, unless we understand the principles of language itself, through more comprehensive and fundamental languages. What, I think, they should have said, was, We cannot

understand how the principles of language govern the usage of the English language, unless we have this previous culture. This assertion would have been most true. The relation between their own and other languages, was made comprehensible to them by the study of Latin and Greek; and without the feeling of that relation, it seemed to them as if they were only using the words of their own language at hazard. This is the experience of men who are marked out by Providence for the business of keeping up an intercourse with men of all countries, those who are to be strictly men of letters. But there were some who have been able to answer them. “We can speak English and write English, and even be sure that we write and speak correctly, without this scholarship of yours; nay, we think that we speak more freely and simply for the want of it. It seems to us that we love it more than we should, if our minds were imbued with another language first, and if we looked upon this as only growing out of it.” This is the experience of men, whose business it is especially to work on their own soil, with the men of their own soil; to uphold the national exclusive spirit, which is in its own way as needful as the Catholic spirit. And I think the assertions in each case have been justified, only not as universal propositions. The scholars have showed a mastery over English, which has not been damaged, but actually con-

ferred on them, by their classical knowledge. The other men have showed, that they could talk English clearly and beautifully, without any Latin or Greek. I do not believe the life of the English language would be preserved without either; by scholars only, or by mere Englishmen, and English women (to whom it is far more indebted for its preservation than to the men) only. They must act and react upon each other. I conceive then, that there would be no difficulty in giving a sound instruction in English, without communicating any other scholarship, provided only the person who gave it had himself been bred a scholar. I do not know whether there is such a thing as a tolerable English grammar, but I suppose it is not impossible that one may be written by a person who knows what grammar is, and what English is, who will profit by his experience of the classical languages, and will take care to assist himself with Cobbett and other men of native sense. But even if this is a dream, I believe that oral instructions in grammar, by a sound-headed man, who had himself studied diligently, would very much supply the want. In studying a foreign language, it may be impossible to dispense with formal rules involving a multitude of exceptions. But these are at best only temporary standing-places, by help of which, one is to rise gradually into the perception of grammatical laws and prin-

ciples, which admit of no exceptions, or at least which explain to us any exceptions which caprice, a desire of euphony, or the circumstances of a particular age may have occasioned. In teaching our own language, it would seem that a judicious master might be able, by a series of well-chosen and orderly experiments, to lead his pupils into the perception of these principles without needing so much assistance from definitions and rules. Some valuable hints, respecting a method of this kind, may be seen in the Chapter on Language, in Biber's "Life of Pestalozzi." I am not sure that we ought to follow strictly this very able author's recommendations, or that there may not be a merit in the old rule system which he does not acknowledge. I am inclined to believe, that on many accounts, a set of authoritative announcements of even imperfect truths, or mere generalizations from experience, may be necessary as a preparation for our own discoveries, and that the obedient reception of them may be a good discipline for the mind. But the use of the one plan does not involve the rejection of the other. Exceedingly irksome as the mere learning of rules about a language, which we are actually speaking is, that very irksomeness may be useful if it is made a step to the very delightful exercise (I should think there were very few more delightful) of ascertaining what the laws are which we do actually

follow, and must follow when we speak so as to make ourselves intelligible to others. This is one part of the study of language, but the mind of the pupil will become very cold and formal, though possibly very acute and ingenious, if it is made the only one. The consideration of words, of their connections with each other, of their origin and history, and of the new meanings they contracted as they came in contact with new subjects, is the other and vital part of it. How deep an interest boys at a very early age may take in this pursuit; what clearness, liveliness, honesty it gives to their minds; at the same time what a sense of awfulness and mystery in themselves, and in that language which they are every day using; consequently what a serious meditative habit it cultivates in them, without in the least destroying the gaiety of their spirits, I think we may all have observed. I can conceive scarcely any pursuit a teacher can engage in, which would bring him in so many rewards of increased acquaintance with his pupil's mind, and with his own, or one therefore for which it would be more his duty to train himself diligently and systematically. Of course he will perceive at once that the study of English words is connected with the study of English books, and can only proceed successfully when those books are of the best kind, and of a kind most especially to interest the pupil. He will

therefore be able to save the funds of the school from the expense of nearly all the books which have been written to assist Education during the last half century. For he can by no means sanction the principle of using volumes composed by worthy men with good intentions, merely for the purpose of illustrating all possible abuses of language and confusions of thought. As a reward for this economy, he will request to be supplied with our old English chronicles, our principal poets, especially the earlier ones, because these tend so much to illustrate the growth of our language—in short, whatever of our native writings answer most nearly in spirit and clearness to those which the master of a Latin and Greek school would put into the hands of his scholars. These the teacher will read with his pupils formally and directly, with a view to give them a knowledge of the language. But as the history of the language and the history of the nation are inseparable, he will so arrange these studies as to communicate a living interest respecting them both together. And as it will be the English language in which he mainly instructs them, so it will be English history with which, by all possible contrivances, he seeks to impregnate their minds—speaking of the history of other nations only as it bears upon this, giving no sort of course of history, but bringing before them particular transactions or series

of transactions, illustrating them by the poetry of the period in which they occurred, and attaching them so far as he can to localities with which they are themselves familiar. The hint of this last method is given and followed out with admirable skill in the history of the Anglo-Saxons, published in Murray's Family Library, a book, which, I conceive, should be introduced into every middle school, and might serve as a model for any writer attempting to provide a literature expressly for them. I do not imagine, however, that much new literature will be wanted for them. The best that any one could do would be to provide cheap school editions of our old authors, especially the chroniclers and the poets.

If you suppose that I am recommending this study because it is more entertaining than any other that could be chosen, you greatly mistake my intention. I think this might be made a very severe course of study; very much more severe than that which is pursued in our ordinary English commercial schools, or even in the Prussian schools, where so much seems to be taught. As I remarked, when speaking of the English grammar schools, many of the studies which enter into their apparently comprehensive course are really pursued among us; only they came in accidentally, as it were, to illustrate the books which the pupil is reading

for another purpose, not as separate subjects which, without any feeling of their relation to each other or to him, he is at a certain hour to take up. The boy who is reading English history will, as a matter of course be exercised in English geography, and will be obliged to notice the geography of any other country with which England is brought into connection. This, I should suppose, would prepare him to think about the relations of places to each other much better than if you gave him lectures upon that distinct topic: and if there be in him a faculty for studying geography scientifically, it will in this way be awakened. You might give him many discourses upon natural philosophy, but I should fancy that the questions which he would ask, when he read in his history of the compass being discovered, or of a great change in men's opinions about the relation of the sun to the earth, might give rise to answers which would lead him just as far as he was able at that time to go, and open his way to further knowledge if he had the capacity for it. Another branch of the Prussian course involves a more difficult inquiry: I allude to composition. This, as you know, is no peculiarity of theirs; it forms a regular part of our grammar-school exercises, and rises naturally out of the study of language. It is, I conceive, nearly the hardest problem in practical Education to know

how far this practice ought to be enforced or encouraged ; and, if to any extent, by what means. On the one hand it seems almost impossible to enter into the spirit of a language unless you write in it ; on the other there is immense peril of introducing dishonesty into a pupil's mind, of teaching him to utter phrases, which answer to nothing that is actually within him, and do not describe any thing that he has actually seen or imagined. I do not in the least know how the good is to be compassed or the evil avoided, but I wish that persons who have thoughts and experience on the subject would produce them, and would steadily apply their minds to the consideration of all the puzzling questions which it involves. It seems as if it were almost a necessary part of a man's freedom that he should be able to express himself. It seems also as if it were necessary with our English habit of reserve, that we, above all others, should be taught and encouraged to express ourselves. And if the habit could be acquired without our looking upon it as a knack to *compose* or put certain words together, it would certainly be most desirable. At all events, the kind of Education I have described, an Education in the good English authors, seems to be that which would best cultivate the faculty of expression, and be most likely to preserve it from degenerating into what is artificial and insincere.

This is the course that I would propose as the general one for all boys in a middle school, supposing them not to stay longer than their fourteenth year. I think, however, that even in that case, they should have facilities for learning arithmetic; nay, that all who had spent three or four years in the general grammatical discipline, should be compelled to study it. By teaching this, we should show that the human culture, which the pupils had received, was not meant to unfit them for being tradesmen, but to make them better and worthier tradesmen. At the same time, we should use this very study of arithmetic, as an antidote to the trade spirit. It may certainly be taught in such a way, that while the pupil acquires great practical facility in calculation, he learns to see a meaning in numbers, and not to connect them with mere mercantile results. I am not conscious of speaking from any prejudice, when I say that the system of teaching numbers in the Borough-road school, which excites so much admiration among visitors, though very ingenious and clever, is not the kind of system to which I refer. In some of the books, which have issued from the school of Pestalozzi, a method seems to be indicated, which might lead to much sounder knowledge, without giving occasion to the same remarkable feats. These, I hope, may by all means be avoided in any middle schools, established

upon the principles I am recommending. Not only should we be anxious to keep the pupil from attaching any particular importance to calculation as such, but if we would preserve or create in him that simple English character, which each class should wish to possess, but which is above all necessary to the middle class, display of every kind must be treated as utterly abominable. For the same reason, I hope and trust, that no prizes for diligence or good conduct, nor any practice deduced from that theory of rewards and punishments which has been so destructive to our higher class Education, may ever intrude itself here. All chance of counteracting the trade spirit, all hope of making our tradesmen *men*, is at an end, if we use our Education to foster the habits, which it is meant to subvert.

When the pupil has passed through his English course he will have perceived how much a knowledge of other languages would assist him in thoroughly mastering his own. Now then, I think, he should have the means (if his parents will allow him the time) of studying Latin. He will enter upon it in quite a different spirit from that in which he would have undertaken it at the beginning of his school career; he would then have had a notion that Latin was a fine accomplishment, to be desired because the squire's sons possessed it; he would have gone into it with no

heart, it would not have had anything to do with what he was thinking or feeling; by this time he has discovered that it is worth something. He will set about the study with real earnestness; and though he may not become a scholar, the knowledge he acquires of it will be sound and sincere: otherwise all that he learns will be shop-Latin, worth very little while he has it, and soon to be forgotten, leaving behind it only a hollow sense of his consequence because he had once made such an acquisition. But to prove that no jealousy lest the trading class should rise to the same level with the professional class actuates us in giving this different direction to their pursuits, we might, I think, very well introduce here another study which forms no part of our grammar-school course. For the same reason that we give the pupil of the middle school, who can afford to stay longer than the ordinary period, the advantage of learning Latin, we might also, perhaps, contrive that he should have the means of learning Anglo-Saxon. It would be a good to all classes that this study should be more cultivated than it is; it would be a pleasant thing to think that the members of the middle class had some study which they could call their own, and it seems peculiarly consistent with the character I have given them, as expressly the English class, that this should be their accomplishment. Their previous practice in the English

language would have led them to feel the use of this as well as of Latin, and hence they will pursue both with relish and enthusiasm.

It is not the actual amount of knowledge communicated in this Education to which I look as satisfying the wants, and in some degree fulfilling the wishes of our yeomen and farmers. It is in the reality and the security of the knowledge, in its penetrating and leavening quality, in its tendency to excite a thirst for fresh knowledge, and yet to prevent that thirst from being feverish, that its virtue will consist. Our student will have learned nothing to make him proud of himself, but he will have learned to understand himself; nothing to make him despise the place in society which he is appointed to fill, but much to make him know that he has a dignity which the highest place in society could not give him. That sense of having a country, which is wrought into him thus early, by the study of his country's language and his country's history, will not forsake him through life. Political agitators may tell him that it is a dream; they may ask him what this fine phrase, "having a country," is? when his neighbour rides in a carriage, and he walks on foot—when his neighbour makes laws, and he sells yarn;—he knows it is a reality for all that they say; he feels it to be so in his inmost being; and he knows, moreover, that what they call realities are

dreams ; that they want him to forfeit his position as a member of a nation, in order to assert his position as the member of a class. Moreover, he knows what words signify ; large sounding phrases do not terrify him, or cause him to admire ; he has a calm, solemn, patient, earnest spirit, the spirit of a man who is not living in the present moment, but feels himself bound up with the past and with the future ; who has learned that every man is sent into the world to do something ; and that it is not well for a man to wish he had something else to do than what is given him, but to do that and be still.

What, you will say, is all this to be the effect of a boy's learning English grammar and history ? Not precisely. But I am obliged to tell you what part of his Education bears upon each portion of his life, although it is not one part, but the whole of it which really makes even that portion of his life consistent and true. It is the study of his own language and his own history, which directly connects itself with his *political* feelings, and delivers them from their bondage to what is material and worldly. But this instruction would be a monstrous inconsistency, it would be utterly ineffective and unmeaning if it stood alone. If we looked at history or language as secular studies, if we did not consider them as instruments given to us for the very purpose of destroying secularity,

it would be extravagant to speak of them as producing any sobering, deepening effect upon the character. We regard them as such instruments, whenever we connect them with a higher discipline; whenever we ground our teaching upon the truth, that our pupils are spiritual beings, and make the first step of it an announcement of this truth to them. But then this announcement, with all the facts which establish it in the hearts and consciences of those whom we instruct, with the personal experience which makes it intelligible, and with the body of living influences which convert the first, distant, amazed apprehension of it into a steadfast and practical belief, must evidently be itself the great working power to which all other instruments are subordinate, and must, besides, lead to other results, which they may strengthen, but could in no degree produce. And here we find the satisfaction of that other want, which we could discover in the minds of the members of the middle class, at the root of their desire for a sounder knowledge and a more ascertained political position. We saw that they wanted some bond of fellowship with the other classes, something which should make them feel that neither the possession of hereditary feelings and honours, nor the necessity of daily toil, established such a radical difference between their countrymen and them, that a common sympathy was impossible.

It is evident from what we have said already, how the gratification of the other desire necessarily involves the gratification of this ; for, that contentment with their own position, and willingness that other men should occupy theirs, can never find place in any men's hearts who have not learned that each has an interest in the condition of all. It is evident, also, that before this feeling could grow up, they must have learned how much deeper the grounds of union are than the grounds of distinction ; that the latter have something of a local, temporary character in them ; that the first are universal and eternal. But how can they learn this, unless they are actually taken into a universal fellowship, unless that Catholic cultivation, which we refused to their intellects in order that they might be more truly and strictly national, be in some other and higher way imparted to them—unless everything be done to make them feel and know that those historical associations which bind them to the citizens and burghers of past days, and so give them a place in an enduring national body, are but the feeble types of other and older associations, by which they are united to a church existing in all countries and in all ages, comprehending all lords, and citizens, and labourers as equals, within its bosom. This truth has never been livingly brought home to the heart of the members of the middle class. The

farmer has often a very sincere affection for his own church, the church in which his fathers worshipped, and round which their tombs lie. But what this church has to do with other churches, or what links unite him to other men, beyond the bounds of his own family, he apprehends but little. The tradesman has heard more and thought more upon the subject. His sympathies are not confined within the limits of a parish. But, then, they are for the most part confined within the limits of a sect. He excommunicates the rest of his countrymen, not from ignorance, but upon principle. And now both are brought into a wide political association; both feel that they are connected with the whole country, inasmuch as they take part in sending members to Parliament. Thus, what spiritual feelings they have are wholly limited and narrow; what comprehensive feelings they have are almost wholly secular.* Such a state of mind is found to be no basis for an Education, and no basis for a safe political position. It has made the intellectual cultivation narrow and sordid, the political feelings party and selfish. We must then, before all things, aim at imparting this feeling, to the defect of which all their other defects may be traced. If we cannot convince them that they are members of a universal church, we shall do nothing else for them, and therefore, at all hazards, and under all obloquy, let us try to do this. It is

nothing to be called bigots and sectarians, when we know in our hearts that we are laying the axe to the roots of bigotry and sectarianism. The more we hear of such charges, the better : it will prove that we are doing something. The demon of division and hatred will utter some cries of fury, if it think that it is about to be cast out. Let us be sure that we cannot grieve it and torment it so much as by doing those very things which it affirms that we do in obedience to its authority. Let us be sure, that if we surround our middle schools with an ecclesiastical atmosphere; if we call the pupils in them to acts of united worship; if we connect the whole machinery by which they are managed and organized, not merely with the parishes which present the church in a distinct, local character, but with its dioceses, which present it in a comprehensive, united character, we shall do the best that we can to counteract the narrowness of this class; to raise it above low, party objects; to give it moral freedom; and so to make the rest of our discipline not a name, but a reality.

Thus far I have pointed out in what respects I think the education of the middle school ought to differ, and in what respects to agree with that of the grammar-school. In all particulars, besides those I have named, there seems no reason why they should differ at all: the discipline proper for

one would be proper for the other ; if games and bodily exercises are left free in either case they should be free in both ; the method of intercourse and association among the boys, their meetings at a common table, in a common school-room, and in a common chapel, will be regulated in the same way : finally, the same care must be taken to connect the humanizing influences of music, architecture, and perhaps of painting, with their places of Education, and specially with their worship. These last seem even more necessary for the middle class than for the higher. They have more directly hardening, material influences to struggle against, and, therefore the more pains should be taken to give them these softening, mellowing influences as a counteraction. Many of them have heard that worship is a spiritual act, and, therefore, that it should have no sensible accompaniments ; hence, the word spiritual has become identical in their minds with what is most dry, cold, and unsympathizing ; let them see from the first that worship is spiritual, and, *therefore*, that every influence which acts upon the spirit of man, whether through the senses or otherwise, has a legitimate connection with it. You will not, in this way, cultivate any drivelling, sentimental habits of mind in them ; you will not make them think that Christianity belongs to cloisters, and not to market-places. You will do just the reverse of

this, you will terminate that unnatural divorce which has so long taken place in their minds between all common things and invisible things, you will give them the impression from their infancy that they are dwelling amidst invisible things with which their communion need not be interrupted by the presence of what is visible. In this way you will do very much practically to inculcate the faith, which you enforce in words, that all the minutest and most mundane transactions should be carried on from the same principles, and under the sense of the same presence, as the formal acts of devotion. And I need scarcely remind you how much that habit of connecting themselves with the past, which all our Education aims to cultivate, will be nourished by this means. There is probably no town in England, of any size, which has not some church or building that is pregnant with historical recollections, for those whose minds are awakened to look at them: through want of a discipline to give them an interest in such objects, the present has become all in all to them; and thus they have lost their national privilege, and their human dignity, even when they have been aspiring most after both.

I have not alluded to the Education of females and infants in this class, because I imagine that most of what I said on these points, when speaking of our higher instruction, applies here. The

plea for infant schools is the want of time in the mothers to care for their children. Some persons — it would appear from his evidence, that Mr. Simpson is one of them — think it is better for mothers generally to relinquish the Education of the children to school-masters, because they understand so little about it: but this is not the common faith; we generally hold, that if this unfitness exists in mothers, our state is very deplorable, for that none others can be equally fit. The argument about time I should imagine was not of more weight in this than in the former case. Women, in the middle class, I am afraid do, and therefore of course can, often find more leisure for watching over their children than those in the higher. With respect to capacity, I conceive that if once the Education I have recommended for the men, were adopted, this would be increased a hundred-fold. A taste for reading is already, it would seem, very widely diffused among the wives and daughters of tradesmen, if not of yeomen. It is the quality of the books that one has most to deplore; but when once the sons and husbands and brothers have become acquainted with the noblest literature of their land, there is no fear of the wives and sisters not turning their studies in the same direction. Something must be done in that case to provide for the vested interests of those who keep circulating libraries,

and of those who write for them, both I fear will be in great jeopardy.

But I have as yet only attempted to find a parallel for one half of our higher system, that which is contained in the grammar-schools. Should not the middle class have also something answering to our universities? Sensible men always feel a suspicion, and on most reasonable grounds, of any person who proposes a practical measure, merely that his scheme may look smooth and round. I have been aware of this throughout my present lecture, and I have endeavoured to show you that the project of adapting the grammar-school system to middle schools, has not merely a theoretical propriety, but that it is the only scheme really adapted to the circumstances of the class for which these schools are intended. I shall be equally cautious in the other case. You feel that you want schools to train teachers for the middle schools; you feel that if the Education for tradesmen is to be different from the Education of professional men, there should be persons expressly raised and fitted for the work. Now if my account of the universities was true, they are the training schools for the teachers of the whole land. Thither the clergyman, who is emphatically the teacher of the country, is obliged to go; thither, of their own accord, others go who feel that they also are in their own spheres to assist in forming,

or preserving the mind of the country. It seems to me then, that these training schools for middle schools may very fairly be considered as middle class universities. There can be no reason why the same should not happen in them as has happened in the elder bodies ; why the teacher of the school being *obliged* to avail himself of this higher Education, tradesmen and farmers who desire it, and have time for it, and are marked out by their greater wealth as intended to occupy a leading position in their own body, should not afterwards of themselves come and avail themselves of it. Hereby the teacher will acquire more knowledge of the body with whose younger members he will afterwards have to deal ; he will be delivered from some formalities and pedantries, and will acquire what is so essential to him for his work, the feelings of a man. But such a result as this can only be looked for after many years. The object at present must be to place this institution on such a sound basis, that when it enlarges itself to comprehend new objects, it may really impart instruction which it is worth their while to receive. That this may be the case, the studies of the training school must, I think, be not merely a continuation of the studies in the middle school. They must be generically distinguished from them as those of the university are from those of the grammar-

school. The process of learning to teach is something essentially different from the mere process of learning. The one, as I said, should be as living a process as possible, the other as scientific as possible. In one there should be great order but no system, in the other system should be the great object. The transition, however, will be by no means violent: A young man, who has been brought up in the middle school, who has passed through the English grammatical and historical course—who has also availed himself of the Latin instruction, and if that be feasible, of the Anglo-Saxon—who has faithfully profited by the religious instruction, and has entered into the religious spirit of the place, will, when he reaches a certain age, unless his circumstances compel him to leave the school and enter into trade, feel an extreme desire to compare the different parts of his knowledge together, to see how they bear upon each other, to look upon them no longer merely in reference to his own wants, but as forming an organized whole. Such a desire is a sign that this young man is not meant merely to acquire knowledge, but directly to communicate it. He has the faculties for a teacher. Possibly he may be called to the work of teaching the nation generally; in that case he will go to one of the existing universities. But if his views are more limited, (and that there will be persons adapted to

each vocation, of which the country has need, is a faith which every true man will entertain, not building it the least upon any doctrine of supply and demand) he may then go to the training school to be fitted for the task of ministering to the class in which he feels most direct interest. Here that desire, which he has conceived for organizing his knowledge, should be gratified. But both the desire and satisfaction will have reference to his previous Education. The boy who has studied the two general languages of Latin and Greek, has already understood the principles of grammar as such. What he wants to understand is the laws of human thought; he is, therefore, instructed in logic or mathematics. What he wants, who has been trained in an English school, and has studied Latin only in reference to English and for the sake of English, is chiefly to harmonize his ideas on language—to be taught comprehensively what he has learned in detail and experimentally, its laws and principles, and the relation of one language to another. With this, as his central subject, will be immediately connected the history of the nations which have spoken these languages. The religious instruction he has received, and the pains which have been taken to impress upon him his position as the member of a universal family, will have prepared him to expect that the destinies of particular nations will best

unfold themselves to him, while he contemplates them in relation to the general scheme of Providence exhibited in church history. This will be a link between human life and systematic theology, which he will then perceive has a direct government over all the other provinces of human thought. In his second year this may be connected with a regular course of ethics, and he may be invited to study the laws of the physical world. Opportunities for attending to particular professional subjects should be afforded him here as at the other universities; and I would add, the very best opportunities of studying Greek and Hebrew, if he should desire it, as I am quite sure many teachers will: and in his third year, it would seem desirable, that he should be formally instructed in the method of communicating the knowledge he has received. Whatever discipline is best for the other universities will be best also in these, with the difference, of course, that luxurious and expensive habits should be more rigorously discountenanced, and so far as the scheme of the college goes, rendered more impossible here than there. All collegiate habits, one would think, should be fostered, all outward appliances for cultivating a grave, historical, meditative spirit, even more carefully resorted to here, than in the schools or in the older universities. Hence the great importance and excellence of that scheme which has been suggested of connecting

these schools with the old cathedral establishments; thereby surrounding the institutions of the day with the grandeur and antiquity which belong to those that have been established among us for centuries.

When such hints are offered, and when there is any hope of seeing them acted upon, every person, I think, should be ready to contribute his mite of information or reflection, which, if it goes but little way, may tempt others to contribute more. In this feeling I have put together these remarks respecting middle schools, and training schools, and their connexion with each other; the way in which they may improve the condition of our farmers and yeomen, and the way in which they may co-operate with the other institutions of our country. Many things may have been said very crudely, and many more omitted, which ought to have been said: the first, I trust, will be too weak to do any harm—what is wanting, will be supplied by wiser heads. If I have helped at all to make you feel wherein the importance of the subject consists, or to give you an impression of its difficulty, or to awaken in you the hope, that this difficulty may not be insurmountable, I shall be quite content; Nay, I should be satisfied with a far less reward than this. To diminish in any degree the feeling of alienation and estrangement in the different classes of which our country is com-

posed—to make any single person feel that it is his duty, not to widen the breach between them, but to labour, that it may be closed ; this is an object worth speaking for, and living for. This middle class, which should be the link to unite the other two, has appeared like an impassible chasm between them. Some attempts must be made to fill up this gulph, or to bridge it over, before you can hope to do any thing successfully for the wants of the poor. But when you have honestly applied yourself to such attempts, you will have removed, as I hope to show hereafter, some of the greatest difficulties from the other question—you will be able to contemplate with deep interest and alarm, but without despair, the state of our labourers—you will think it not too sanguine a belief, that we may some day possess, in the fullest and truest sense of the words, a National Education.

LECTURE VI.

I ALLUDED in a former lecture to the arguments in favour of a State Education, which had been derived from the miserable condition and pressing wants of the working classes. Benevolent men look round upon our manufacturing districts; they find them (as Cousin says in his report on Holland) “half barbarous;” they observe periodical returns of distress among the agricultural poor; they saw an old law for relieving the wants of both these classes proving partly ineffectual, partly mischievous; they have seen a new one producing discontent and fearful combinations; and it is natural enough that they should conclude—‘ The system hitherto at work in this country has been tried and found wanting; the body which exists as you say to educate and humanize the nation has either utterly failed in its duty, or has proved that it has no powers adequate to the work. It is time that its functions should be superseded, for they are in practice superseded already; and that they should devolve upon some body which,

whether originally destined for the purpose or not, has at least the means of arresting a present evil which threatens to destroy us.’

I foresee that such arguments will be repeated again and again, and that nothing which has hitherto been said in answer to them, though it may have referred both to the principle and to the practical efficiency of the state scheme, will be felt as sufficient unless it is brought directly and formally to bear upon them. The ablest speakers in both houses of Parliament in the late debates rested their case on this ground: “The English poor are in a state of wretched ignorance, you have not cured it—we must.” These words, I believe, contain a summary of all that was said in support of government interference. Now as far as these charges affect the character of those to whom the Education of the country has been committed either in present or past generations, I shall say nothing concerning them. If the members of the legislature call upon us to confess the evils which we witness around us as national sins for which all are responsible who have had any influence to avert them, and for which we, above all others, are responsible—I rejoice that they have estimated our condition so truly. I shall not complain that such acknowledgments have come first from our statesmen. I shall not say that they are at all departing from their office

in uttering them. Every man who feels himself a member of the nation has a right to utter them ; and it would be a delightful change from the cold, heartless spirit which has characterized us so long, if we began, one and all of us, to feel bitter shame for our past misdoings, not trying to shift the disgrace of them upon our fathers ; not wishing to represent them as the effect of inevitable circumstances ; but frankly, and from our inmost hearts, owning that we, our priests, our kings, our nobles, every man among us, have failed of our duty, and are suffering, and must suffer the appointed punishment. Nor shall I make any complaint because our members of Parliament allude so directly to us, and do not seem to dwell with quite the same sorrow on their own share in the transgression. I will hope that they feel so one with us, that in speaking of us, they feel they are speaking of themselves ; that they merely put us forward as being—which we are and should feel ourselves to be—representatives of the whole nation, guilty, in a most especial degree of its crimes, and therefore most justly, as has been proved to be the case in every great revolution, the largest sharers in its miseries. If we ever speak with displeasure respecting the acts of the legislature, or the acts of any class in the community, we are bound to feel much bitter self-reproach mixing with this displeasure. For whatever they do ill, we feel that we have ourselves in

great part to blame; and we feel it so much the more in proportion as we underrate their powers and magnify our own, in proportion as we feel that the utmost they can do is to superintend the movements of a machine, and that from us is to proceed the living power which enables it to act, and them to direct it. Just according to our estimate of what we are appointed to do, must be our judgment of our deficiencies. It is impossible, therefore, that any of our critics or accusers, who make nothing of these powers, can regard our conduct with half the severity with which we must regard it ourselves. As to this charge, then, I shall let judgment go by default. Our supporters in the House of Commons may say what they like in our behalf; but we are not responsible for their apologies, and I believe the less we comfort ourselves with them the better.

Seeing, however, that our opponents are practical men, and that they desire to look at every question in its practical bearings, I think we may as well for the present dismiss both charges and recriminations, and apply ourselves steadily to this one question. The state of our working population being such as you describe it, what is the best way of meeting the evil? There has been a heavy sin somewhere—granted, let us not attempt to hide it. The clergy have had the heaviest share in that evil. Let this be confessed too both

secretly and publicly. But there is a great present mischief to be dealt with—all alike say this. Can you deal with it? Can we? If you can, assuredly you ought. Not a word that I have said of the relations of the state power to the ecclesiastical power will in the least affect your duty in that case; what good lies within your ability you are bound to accomplish. The same rule and no other we would apply to ourselves. If we can contend with this great and amazing evil, we are to contend with it; and it is your business and your interest to assist us, not to thwart us, in contending with it. This then is the issue to which, if you are sensible, practical men, you will bring the controversy. Let young gentlemen in their clubs talk about the church as they like, care about it yourselves as little as you like, rail at it and call it names when you have leisure, but just now here is some business pressing; the state is in peril; here are some geese who may save the capitol. We say that they can; we say that the state of these labouring classes is altogether out of your reach. You may describe the disease for yourselves, and then we will defy you to apply or invent a remedy. The remedy is, we believe, in our hands, we are ready to use it; and if the disease has become too deep and vital for even this to reach it, the country is lost; for there is none other that will.

One fact will unquestionably be communicated to us with great solemnity at the commencement of this inquiry, which we shall be told that we in particular are liable to forget. We shall be informed that these labourers and artisans have bodies as well as souls; and that whatever we may imagine to the contrary, they regard a provision for these bodies as of some importance. The inference from this fact is, that the labouring classes demand an instruction in those subjects especially which appertain to their physical wants; and that those who fail to give them this, show that they have no sympathy with their sufferings, no sense of their real wants. The charge has been preferred again and again. It bears, you perceive, especially upon our practical character; it proves to a demonstration that a spiritual man is by the very nature of his office unfit for any thing real and human. And it shows, if not quite demonstrably, yet clearly enough to satisfy all reasonable persons, that a body not consisting of spiritual men, but of those who have a material occupation, are those who can enter into real human necessities, and provide for them. I wish to look a little into this notion, for though demonstration has no doubt much to do with it, there are some, and I believe a majority, who receive it as a self-evident truth not to be argued or proved at all, but to be assumed as the foun-

dation of all subsequent proofs and arguments. In this way I imagine it would be generally produced before the crowds at an election. The candidate will say to his audience, "My friends, of course it is of great importance that you should have spiritual teachers, men who will see after your going to heaven, and all things of that kind. We wish you to have them. We in the House of Commons, are taking great pains that you shall not be obliged to have one teacher, more than another, but the one that you like best, and who, you think, will manage those particular affairs for you most comfortably. But then, we cannot quite persuade ourselves to forget, (as these excellent persons do, and no doubt it is very proper that they should, we respect them for it, it is their line), that you are sometimes hungry and thirsty, and that you must be provided with somewhat to eat and to drink. These things, I say, never occur to them, they are living, you know, in the clouds; not that they don't find, even in that region, the comfort of a little earthly nourishment for themselves, or that they do not require you to furnish it them. But what I mean is, that they never think that you can require such provisions, and therefore it is needful that we should look after this portion of your wants; of course it is a very insignificant portion in the opinion of these gentlemen, one

would think then, they need not interfere with us when we take care of it. And yet, you see, when we bring in a bill for providing you with a secular Education, (you know what secular means, it means what has to do with the body, with eating and drinking, and so forth); when we do this, not wishing the least to hinder these persons, of whatever opinions they may be, from doing what is advisable for your souls, they raise a clamour, and say, ‘we are irreligious, and wish to make you irreligious.’ Now, my friends, what I request you to do; and what you will do if you return me, is to say, ‘we have got bodies, and we wish to have these bodies taken care of, and we will not let these persons, whose business is with our souls, hinder us from receiving the benefit, which our representatives in the House of Commons design for us in this respect. For, whatever doctors of divinity may say, food and raiment are needful for us as well as for them.’” This is the way in which you will hear the argument stated when it is meant to produce an effect upon poor men; and undoubtedly in this form it will produce an effect upon them. The candidate who is dependent upon their votes or desires the help of their bludgeons, may reasonably calculate by this means upon getting his objects accomplished; and he will have the additional satisfaction of feeling that he has not only maintained a proposition in words,

but has illustrated it in act, that he has proved how the material consideration of getting into Parliament transcends in his mind all the spiritual considerations of conscience and honesty. For he cannot but be aware that throughout such a speech as this, as well as in all arguments founded upon the same data, he has been paltering with words in a double sense. He has been inducing the people to believe that he and the House of Commons were wishing to provide for their bodily wants, when they were contemplating no such thing; when they were merely contriving a scheme for *teaching* the people something, and that very remotely, about those wants. This particular teaching (as he is perfectly well aware) is of a kind that would be particularly offensive and odious to the very people whom he is labouring to conciliate. He knows, that if instead of talking about their hunger and thirst, and eating and drinking, he had said, ‘these parsons wish to teach you religion, but we wish to teach you hydrostatics and astronomy,’ his audience would have laughed at him and possibly hissed him; and that if he had said, ‘these parsons wish to teach you religion, but we wish to teach you political economy,’ they would certainly have hissed him, and probably have pelted him out of the neighbourhood. So far then it would appear that we are upon a level; teaching physics or political economy is no more

in the direct sense of the word (the only sense which is intelligible to the people) caring for their physical wants than teaching religion. You cannot make a popular argument by setting up one against the other, you can only invent one by resorting to the most gross and shameful fallacies.

But this is only looking at one side, and not the most important side of the question. I affirm that we have the power, and that you have not the power of directly relieving the physical sufferings of the people. I affirm that we are able to connect this relief with our Education, and that you are not able to connect it with your Education. I affirm lastly, that by your recent legislation, you have confessed your want of us for this very purpose, and your inability to perform those functions properly belonging to us, which your forefathers fancied they might undertake. I think no one can deny that the celebrated act of Queen Elizabeth, the maxims of which governed all the provisions for the poor till the late Act was passed, intended to provide for the pauperism which the dissolution of the monasteries had thrown upon the country. What those ecclesiastical bodies could no longer do, the State strove in some measure to do. You, not I, have said that it was wrong ; you have said, we tried to be charitable, and we had no business to be charitable : we are to see that the people do not starve ; if we try to

do more than this, we do mischief. And though there may be many who think that in the transition from one kind of practice to another, great tenderness and caution should have been exercised, everything being done to prepare the people for understanding the new maxim upon which they were to be governed, it is probable that a majority, even of these, in the higher and middle classes, acquiesce in the principle of the measure as a sound one. There are others who as strongly contend that the original notion was so vicious, and yet had so wrought itself into the mind of the nation, that it has need to be wrenched out decisively, suddenly, and violently. Take it either way and the conclusion is the same. The legislature says we must adhere to a rigid rule ; we cannot enter into your hovels and deal with particular cases of sorrow and oppression ; we cannot help those who are struggling to be industrious, enabling them against great difficulties to accomplish their intention ; we cannot allow for all the accidents and aggravations of poverty ; we cannot recognize the miseries of those who have a nominal subsistence, and in whose case that is continually intruded upon by unexpected calamities ; we wish to see you independent ; if you cannot be so you may come to us, and we will provide for you ; but if you can, if by any hard contrivances you can keep your heads above

water, then we have nothing more to do with you. You have your privilege, and you must pay for it. This is the State language. I do not say that it is wrong language ; I do not think that it is ; but it is language that people from one end of the country to the other, answer with the cry, Whether you ought to help us or no we know not ; but there are some who ought to help us. We were not sent into the world to be called independent labourers, and to starve for the sake of that honour. We have a demand upon those who are living comfortably in the world. If Parliament will not provide for us, these should ; and if they will not, it must become a question between the power of wealth, and the power of multitude. It must become a trial whether they shall have the power of assisting us any longer, seeing that that power is no longer stretched out on our behalf. I need not pursue the train of their thoughts any further ; you all know what they mean and whither they are leading. And if our hearts and feelings be palsied with the thought, we are mere State agents ; we can do no more than the State does ; because it is mischievous for the State to interfere more than to prevent the people from starving, we have no call to do more than this, we must not do more than this—can we doubt that these thoughts will have their accomplishment ? Yet this has been the kind of feeling which, for a long

time, has been growing amongst us ; which wise persons have taken pains to encourage ; which good persons have not been ashamed to act upon. I do not say that the clergy have not given in to the prevailing notion ; but just so far as they have done it, they have made their own position an absurd and untenable one : and, on the other hand, just so far as they have understood, what every day must teach them more, that they are not the slaves of the State, but possess a power superior to the State power, they have been able to abate the violence of these cries, and to prevent the whole body politic from being rent in pieces by them. They have been able to show that their very business is to do that which the State cannot do, to deal with men distinctly, personally ; to understand their peculiar circumstances and sufferings ; to provide alleviations for misery when it cannot bring itself under formulas and classifications, but as it presents itself in individual men. This is their direct action upon the poor themselves, just so far as they know their position, and as outward circumstances permit them to fulfil it. For this end your fathers have put them into parishes, and entrusted many of them with civil offices and responsibilities, because they would have it understood that the State, albeit in itself of necessity generalizing and hard-hearted, yet is one with a body which can sympathize with all actual and

particular grievances. Still their indirect action in favour of the poor does more for them than this, because it places the doctrine which they are asserting confusedly and blindly in its true light. That which the poor men are claiming as a right antecedent to the existence of all society, we declare to the rich man as a duty consequent upon the existence of society, and the laws by which God has bound its members together ; therefore not to be transgressed or neglected, but under peril of that catastrophe, the dissolution of society, which the other is threatening. We have done this to a certain extent. It is said, I know, that we make very diligent exhortations to the poor to be obedient ; but seldom to the rich to be just. Those who put forth the assertion, of course ground it upon a long and painful induction from all the principal sermons that have been preached in England for the last three centuries, and as I have not used similar diligence, I cannot contradict them ; but I do know that by some means or other an effect has been produced upon the minds of the English gentry, which I cannot attribute to the mere possession of wealth and political influence, a sense very imperfect indeed, and feeble compared with what one would wish to see, but still enough to constitute a national distinction, that power does involve the performance of a duty, that every relation between two parties imposes upon them reci-

procal services. However, I am quite willing to admit that we have not been nearly bold enough in asserting this, our undoubted privilege of admonishing all classes of which society consists, the highest as well as the lowest; the ignorance and undervaluing of our powers, have in this, as in all other cases, cramped our usefulness. It has been further cramped by that want of influence over the middle class to which I was alluding in my last lecture. The master of the shop, the head of the factory, have in general been out of our reach, and every one must feel how much more these have really to do with the working men, how much more directly they affect their happiness, than even men, who, in the general account of the country, have more weight. But the time is coming, I trust, when nothing shall hinder us from speaking out our minds to the nobles, and, if occasion serve, to the princes of the land, as Bernard Gilpin and many other men did in Edward the Sixth's reign; and when, having given an Education to the middle classes, we shall have opened their ears also to our warnings. To this honesty we are urged by every consideration, and by none more than by the certain ruin which will come upon the State, and upon those who magnify the State above all things, if we fail to exercise it. It is impossible not to perceive that those moral deductions from the science of political economy,

of which I spoke in my fourth lecture, mere unnatural grafts, as I then showed that they are, upon the true science, are exasperating the minds of the people of this country to a most alarming degree. The utterers of these sophisms committed two pious frauds, of which they are suffering the penalty. They issued these dogmas as if they were legitimate and necessary deductions from established principles, hoping by means of them to overthrow what they called the false ecclesiastical morality of the country ; they found that none rejected them with so much indignation as the mass of the people, whom they hoped to influence by them. They then declared that the only reason why these doctrines seemed harsh in their application to the working classes, was that the higher classes had not acknowledged their application to themselves. If once certain evil laws were repealed, if certain measures were not used to keep up rents, and certain other measures to provide a settled maintenance for the spiritual teachers, the poor man would be prosperous and comfortable, the State having made him so. I am not discussing the measures which they recommended in either case ; for ought I know they may have been perfectly right ; I am merely protesting against the attempt to conciliate the working classes, by an utterly dishonest representation of the effects of such alterations. It was a desperate effort on

the part of men who had introduced a set of maxims setting aside all private and personal charity, all kindliness to individual men, all mercy, except through legislation, to re-establish themselves in the estimation of a body whom they had disgusted and alienated. The working classes have shown that they see through the policy, and estimate it at what it is worth. Our business is to save these men from the indignation which first their doctrines, and secondly their feeble cunning, are bringing down upon them; to save the higher classes, if they can be saved, from the effects of the accursed notion that they are to serve the poor only by making laws for them; lastly, to save the lower classes from the intolerable misery that awaits them if they are tempted to assert like brutes the privilege of being treated as men. This we must do, not by flattering the poor, as others are doing; not by talking to them, as we are bound to talk to you, against the notions which pseudo-political economists put forth as principles of that respectable science; but by showing them calmly and unobtrusively that we do look upon them as something better than elements of a mass; that we regard them as human beings to be felt for and cared for; that it is for them more than for their masters we were sent into the world; that we look upon ourselves as having a direct commission from Him who healed the sick and

fed five thousand hungry men, to minister to their bodies as well as their spirit, to their physical, as well as to their moral necessities. It is our business to teach them in the words of a noble-hearted author, who has written an enduring history of the efforts which French philosophy made at the end of the last century, to set all things right by analysis and legislation, and of the efforts which the working classes made to trample down all their experiments, and at the same time to destroy society—it is our business to teach them that we believe “those millions whom we lump together into a kind of dim, compendious unity, monstrous, but dim, far off as the canaille, or more humanely, as the masses, do yet consist all of units, every unit of whom has his own heart, and sorrows; stands covered there with his own skin, and if you prick him will bleed; every unit of whom is a miraculous man, even as thyself, art struggling with vision or with blindness for *his* infinite kingdom.”—*Carlyle's French Revolution*, vol. 1.

It is our business to do this, and happily we have still, in a great measure, the power of doing it. Those who have already assumed an attitude of defiance and revolt, must indeed be addressed in another language; and I think I shall show presently that we have a language in which we can speak to them. Those who are still quiet and orderly, though by no means safe from the infec-

tion of evil doctrines, we can appeal to by acts as well as words—we can show them that we care for them, and that we do not wish to trust their bodies any more than their souls, to the mercies of Work-houses and Parliament-houses. You wish that the children shall be taught political economy and physics. Do you not think there might be a good preparation for this? Would it not be well first to teach domestic economy to the parents—to correct any crude notions they may have formed about physics, if such should chance to come out in conversation—to set them to rights, if they fancy that the legislature could mend matters by adjusting the relation between them and their employers—to tell them why they would not be better off, if they could make all property equal—to settle disputes between neighbours—to illustrate principles by practice? These humble offices do now devolve upon the clergyman, his wife, and children, and those whom he can persuade to assist him in the work. By intercourse with his parishoners, which, I fancy, is considerably more free and unfettered, and embraces a much greater variety of topics, (starting generally from some question about the outward circumstances, or the family history of the poor man,) than persons, living in a metropolis, generally imagine; he is able to communicate facts and principles to them, which, perhaps, are not less prized, or sooner for-

gotten because they come out by accident in their own cottages, among their children, or in the open air, in the fields where they are working, than if they were delivered formally in school-rooms or lecture-rooms. And then would it not be some advantage if the person, who is thus to teach the working-men what is belonging to their lives, were also endued with authority to speak to farmers and squires, concerning theirs? Is it not something that the poor man should feel: Here is a person, who has just the same business with them, that he has with me, and with me, that he has with them; he wishes, for my sake, that I should have comfortable meals every day; and he wishes for their sakes, that they should help me to have them. He evidently does not think that we interfere with one another, he thinks that in some way we are to help one another, and that the man who has more, has it for the sake of him who has less; and that the man who has less, has it that he may call forth the kindness of him who has more. It may be an odd fancy, a queer doctrine, but he evidently believes it, and would wish to act upon it. All this, I think, is a good beginning for Education, a breaking up of the soil in which the seed is to be sown, and making it both a little deeper and softer than it would otherwise have been. And this, therefore, it seems to me, must be the way in which we can ever hope to

educate the lower classes: some one must be felt as the chief mover of the Education, who has not the children only, but the parents under his influence—not the poor only, but the middle class—not the middle class only, but the rich; all acknowledging him as their guide and educator; then, and then only, is it possible, that what is learned in the school shall be real living learning, something that may penetrate through the whole mind, and take possession of it. I hope then it will be owned, that indifference to the physical state of the poorer classes, is not especially the characteristic of those who plead for a clerical Education. We would rest our whole hope of its proving effectual, upon the strength of the poor man's convictions, that those who superintend it care for his outward condition; and for that reason we would place it under the direction of some one who is able effectually to take the oversight of this, making all inferior teachers responsible to him. We would not place it in the hands of some teacher responsible to a council-board in London, who is recognized in the character of a teacher, and of a teacher only, who has no manner of connection with any class, but just that one, over whose children he is appointed, who has no sort of power of conveying the impression, that the business of his life is to educate, who cannot enable the poor to understand what Education means.

This kind of influence over the parents is, I believe, the only means of promoting the Education of the children. Lord Brougham uses some strong expressions in his evidence before the House of Commons on the subject of compulsory Education; he says, "Suppose the people of England were taught to bear it, and to be forced to educate their children by penalties, Education would be made absolutely hateful in their eyes, and would speedily cease to be endured." This is stronger language than I should have liked to use without so considerable an authority to support it; but certainly experience makes in favour of the opinion that direct Education will go very little way among the children where there is not a humanizing influence at the same time over the whole society in which they are dwelling. And if this be the case, it is equally true that the person who has most knowledge of what is actually passing in the minds of the parents, will know best what kind of Education is requisite for the children. Gentlemen in London tell the parish clergy of England that they have very little notion what the people at large are thinking about or wanting. I suspect there is a whole world of thoughts in the minds of our working population of which gentlemen in London have no notion. For if they had, I am sure they would perceive that these notions are the indexes to the Education which we should impart; and if they ad-

mitted that fact, it would be quite impossible that they should devise the schemes of instruction which are now so popular. Let me give you a notion of what thoughts I mean ; I will endeavour to classify them so as to make them intelligible to those who like classification ; though to say the truth, they do not well bear it, but run confusedly one into another without acknowledging any partitions at all. I say then, first of all, that there is a vast variety of *political* thoughts and speculations afloat in the minds of the working classes. This should be an agreeable confession to our opponents, for they often accuse us of leaving this fact wholly out of sight, or at least of being willing to take no notice of it in our teaching. So far from this being the case, I wish to make the greatest account of these feelings. I do not think there is anything the people need so much as a sound political Education. And I do not attach to these words the meaning which, I know, will instantly be imputed to them ; I do not mean by a political Education, one which is to repress all the political feelings that are at work in the minds of the people. I mean, on the contrary, one that is to call them forth and exercise them. I do not mean one that is to contradict their notions, one that is to give them aristocratical notions instead of democratical, tory instead of radical ; I mean on the contrary, one that shall give the fullest development to their radical and

democratical tendencies. The assertion may sound startling; but when I have explained what these thoughts in the minds of the people are, I shall show you that I mean what I say, and that my complaint of the radicals and democrats of our day is that they will not give these tendencies their full play and complete development, but on the contrary keep them within certain dams and mud banks of their own invention. Looking then at working classes, not in those circumstances in which their feelings seem most encouraging and promising, but where there is most to terrify us, and taking these feelings as indications of what may be lying as yet unconsciously in the hearts of numbers who are under different influences, I say that a tendency to union and combination upon some other ground, than as members of a national body, is most conspicuous. It may be on the ground of communion in trade, workmen rising against their masters to assert their right to increased wages, it may be upon the larger ground of their rights as citizens to maintain the claim of universal suffrage, it may be on still more abstract grounds than these, upon certain theories of human nature, and the position of men as social beings, but a tendency to combine on some ground or other, a tendency to build up a fellowship for themselves, which shall be more comprehensive than any into which they seem to have been admitted by the privilege of their birth; this is

assuredly the one great characteristic of our day. Some men like to persuade themselves that it is a mere superficial, accidental feature of the times ; and, as long as they *can* cherish their delusion, by all means let them keep it. But I am satisfied it will not stay by them long ; one trade union may be suppressed, one political association may expire, one form of socialism may sink under the weight of its own absurdities ; but something will come out of the ashes of each, which is more formidable than the last—the experiment of some larger union striving to absorb all existing unions into itself. You may listen with delight to the reports of confusions and ruptures in these bodies, and such you will indeed receive again and again ; but what avails it that there are the seeds of necessary confusion and dissolution in such societies, if they have the power of spreading confusion through the whole of society, and threatening it with dissolution ? What comfort is there in hearing, that men are tearing each other to pieces, when (besides that they are creatures of our own flesh and blood), they may not less have the power of tearing you in peices ? Here, then, are indications which should surely be studied, and from which it is most cowardly to avert our eyes. But if you wish to get at the secret spring of these movements, you must go elsewhere than to newspapers or to speakers in Parliament. You must converse

with human beings, you must converse with yourselves ; and then you will find, I believe, that the necessity for such a fellowship as this which these men are dreaming of, does lie very deep indeed in our being ; that there is the witness of something universal, which is superior to all difference of circumstances and faculties, to all family and national distinctions. You will find, that the witness of this is in your own heart, that you cannot deny it without denying yourself. You will find that the witness of it is coming forth in the hearts of these poor men, and that no statutes which you can plead against it, no arguments from our national constitution, no proofs of the impolicy and injustice of disturbing the settled order of things will at all suffice to put it down. These statutes, this national constitution, this settled order, turn traitors, and desert to the enemy, when they come into his presence ; they themselves do homage to this universal principle, which they are sent to combat. Of equally little avail are the attempts of different sects and parties in the nation to encounter it. They can only preach to it to be quiet, and if it asks what fellowship they will provide if this political fellowship be given up ? they can only say, Our principle is to separate ; we are united on the ground of denying what other men hold. As little can that party which professes to take the will of the majority for its law, produce the slightest

effect upon men who, from a dim perception of this universal principle, are forming themselves into associations and combinations. They feel in the first place, that this phrase, "will of the majority," is a phrase, and nothing more than a phrase. The moment you would bring it to any practical test, it becomes so loaded with qualifications, that it proves itself to have no meaning at all. The people have sense to perceive, that those who use it are not talking honest language; that they are practising impositions which can only last till they are discovered. And, besides, if the phrase did signify anything, it would not the least correspond to what they are feeling; for these poor men have the secret conviction, however confused they may be in their expression of it, that each of them has something precious in himself; and that no man has a right, in order to please a majority, to abase or extinguish himself. In what way, then, can this deep political feeling of the working classes be met? I answer, that truth must be brought home to it, which lies, as I have shown, beneath the Education of our upper classes and of our middle classes; that there is a fellowship for men as men; that there is a universal bond by which they are connected each with the other; that this does transcend all national distinctions, all particular laws, and constitutions, and societies; that to call forth in us

what is capable of claiming and enjoying a universal society, is the end of all instruction, the one great work which men are appointed to do for their fellows. And that this truth may become rooted in the mind of the peasant; and that he may not suppose there is no actual fellowship, resting upon this foundation, and fit to supersede all other combinations and associations; let him be told, first, that he himself is a member of such a fellowship; and that because he is a member of it, men are sent with a commission from heaven to minister to him; and that because he is a member of it, all men, high and low, meet him, and confess him as a brother. Furthermore, let him understand that his children are members of it too, and being such, have a right to be educated or admitted into an apprehension of this state, and of all that is implied in it.

But the poor English labourer has still other thoughts—he has his theories and speculations on morals; I said they were much mixed up with those political feelings of which we have been just speaking, and you will find that they are so; still they may, in a manner, be distinguished. He thinks that it is very right in men to do certain things, and wrong in them to do certain others. This notion of right and wrong he very much refers to the doings of other men towards him; he thinks it right that those who have money should be

kind to those who have none ; and wrong that the pathway should have been stopped up, through which he and his fathers used to go to the church. And he has somewhat greater difficulty in acknowledging any corresponding offences against the relations of society on his side, for he says that gentlemen should know better, and therefore should do better. But still he has these words right and wrong, and he will not part with them. And a person who shall come and tell him that these words do not mean anything, that it is right to follow our own interest, to do what pleases ourselves, and that we are only wrong when we run counter to our own interest, this person may talk a long while before he will get his hearer to understand what he means, and some time longer, before he persuades him that he means anything that is worth listening to. I do not say that he may not persuade him that this is the principle upon which rich people act, and that there is no reason why he, a poor man, should be more righteous than they are ; very likely if the argument is put in that form it will carry weight. But, for all that, the man knows very well that he has been imposed upon, and that he has been imposing upon himself ; he feels that there is something which it is wrong for him to do, and for him to be, and that this would not be altered, let other men behave to him, or be themselves what they

may. I say he has such thoughts as these in him, and they puzzle him very much, and he cannot reconcile them well with the others. And if you wish to educate him, or to educate his children, it must be your business to deal with these, for these are some of the deepest things within him. If you want him to see anything clearly in the heaven above, or the earth beneath, you must at first do your best to make him clear with himself here. And as they are in him so they will be in his child. If you would have him grow up an honest and less confused man than his father, with these thoughts and doubts in him you must converse. You must believe that they are there, and that he will be a brute, and not a man, if they never come forth in him; and that he will be an evil man if they are never brought forth into brightness and clearness. And therefore must every teacher who is really to act upon the working classes, above all things believe the fact of a conscience and make that fact the foundation of his teaching. And this he cannot do with any comfort to himself or good to his pupil, unless he believe that the Being of whom this conscience testifies has interfered to deliver it from its guiltiness and self-accusations. But this brings me to another topic.

Connected with his political and moral feelings, the poor man has also religious feelings,

which are in him, whether we take notice of them or not, and will take some form or other. It is very strange to read the evidence which very learned and profound men give before Parliamentary Committees, and to see how entirely this one fact is forgotten by them; they have the most ingenious suggestions about what instruction may be given, and what may be omitted; how much belongs to general christianity, and how much to particular christianity. The one question which the examiners seem not to have asked, and on which the liberal examiners volunteered no opinion, is, How much do these poor children actually want to satisfy the doubts and questionings which have been in their fathers' minds, and will be in theirs unless they should grow up in the state (from which one would suppose Education was meant to deliver them) of mere unthinking animals? If this point had occurred to them, and if, besides, they had remembered how much it is the boast of liberal wisdom, that it does not suppress or discourage human inquiries, and how many valuable philippics against priests will be spoiled if that boast be abandoned, I think they would have been disposed to view the whole question of Education in rather a different light, and would above all have despaired of effecting those compromises which they now contemplate with so much pleasure. They would then have heard

that there are in men's minds now, and ever have been, longings for a deliverer who should come to set their consciences free from the load that was oppressing them; who should come to set their hearts free from the weight of sensual inclinations, and the confusion of sensible objects; who should bring them sure tidings of their own relation to their Creator; who should establish that relation upon a ground which could not be shaken. All such thoughts and longings as these, philosophers may have got rid of; they can explain them very satisfactorily to their own minds into certain dreams of the good and the beautiful. They can see very clearly, that what philosophers of another day supposed were the fulfilments of the desires, which Plato and the old sages sent up to heaven, were only those same desires inventing a fairy tale to clothe themselves with. They can understand perfectly, how the story which has been told men of an actual living mediator between them and their Maker, taking their nature upon him, and bearing their death, grew to such consistency, that the most cultivated part of the universe believed it for eighteen centuries, and that hundreds of thousands have lived and died in the faith of it. They can do this, and if they find that their opinion is one which satisfies the wants of their being — one which enables them to explain the mysteries of life and death — one which

disposes them to act and live for their fellow-creatures—one which permits them to contemplate their condition, and their own without madness and despair, I have nothing to say. But those of whom I am speaking are not philosophers, they are flesh and blood men and women, creatures, upon whom the burden and the curse of life are pressing, who cannot hug abstractions and call them realities. Either you must believe, that you have good news to tell these men, precisely the good news which they want and are crying for—either you must believe, that you have authority to tell them this news as a fact, trusting it to their conscience, and that which is truest and deepest within them to recognise it—either you must do this, or you must leave them to be brutes—brutes with the capacities of devils. It will be found, and every day will prove it more and more, that there is no alternative. You say these truths are worn out, they will do no more work. Then these labouring classes answer you from their inmost souls, You are worn out, and the world has no more occasion for you, and we will send you out of it. And, therefore, we say every one had better ask himself, Do I feel that I can honestly declare these things to men which they want to know, or can I honestly help those who are doing it; for if not, I may amuse myself with making distinctions between religious and secular, or with any other

diversion that pleases me better; but I have no message to these people, they lie altogether out of my sphere, they must live or perish as they can without my interference.

It appears, then, that we are now arrived at a test of the principle which I have been advocating in these lectures. The cultivation of humanity, I said, of that which is universal in man, should be the end of the Education which we gave to the higher classes; and because this was the end, the administration of their Education should be confided to those who have the powers for cultivating this humanity. Still there were peculiar powers and faculties which persons in this rank of life, were able to exercise in many generous occupations. It was not strange, though we thought it was a great error, that the Education of these peculiar faculties, the preparation of them for these special objects, should be treated as the main object in training them. The cultivation of humanity, of that which is universal in man, I said should be the end of the Education which was given to the middle order, and because this was the end, the administration of their Education must be committed to the same persons. Still there was a peculiar character in this class also, it had a peculiar national work to fulfil. Hence it might plausibly, though falsely, be argued that we could do it most good by preparing

it for this work, without reference to that which it had in common with the other portions of the nation. But now we have come in contact with a class of which nothing answering to either of these remarks can be made—a class which has this thing that belongs to all, or has nothing. According to the estimate then that we put upon the worth of that which is universal in comparison of that which is peculiar, will be our feeling respecting this enormous body of our countrymen, nay, this enormous proportion of the whole population of the earth. According to the degree in which we believe that there is a power given from heaven to cultivate this humanity in men, will be our hope that this class shall ever attain a true moral dignity. According to the degree in which we are exercising that power, is our Education likely to bear fruit, or to be abortive. With these hints for our guidance, we may, I think, determine how far the Education of the lower classes now given in our land is effectual, and, if not, what can be provided in its place. From first to last I have wished you to understand that it is with the principles and the general scheme of Education I am dealing, that I have neither the ability nor the time to look much at details. There are so many admirable men in the country who possess, in the highest degree, the capacity of adapting means to ends, that when once the ends, are un-

derstood, I have no fear of seeing an almost perfect machinery for accomplishing them. I am only afraid from the excess of this talent in the country, and from the natural unwillingness of persons who are endowed with it, to pause while they consider what objects they shall strive after. Being utterly deficient in that quality which I see and admire in my neighbours, I despair of being able to give any assistance to a cause to which every power that one has should be devoted, except it be in the way of offering a few hints to persons already moving nobly forward, as to the direction which they should take. Perhaps I have been emboldened to think that such an undertaking may not be wholly useless by observing the course which Education of late years has followed in our land. Between the two great systems of primary Education, by which our land has been divided, there was the greatest difference in principle: Lancaster, as we all know, attempted the comprehension of all parties in his scheme. Dr. Bell, from the first, maintained that Education should be parochial, that it should be under the conduct of the clergy, that the assertion of the child's position as the member of a universal family, which is made in our catechism, should lie at the foundation of it. But it happened that Bell and Lancaster had each a peculiar machinery attached to their schemes. Who was the inventor

and who was the plagiarist, or whether the plans are so different that neither need have copied from the other, I do not know; nor do I think that these are questions in which any person, at this time of day, feels much interested. The point I wish to fix your attention upon, is this, that disputes about the machinery, and, I must honestly add, in both cases a most absurd conceit about the worth of the machinery, took the place of graver and deeper considerations. How the scheme of mutual instruction, in its respective forms, could be best worked—how boys could be taught to read, or write, or cipher, with the greatest expedition, and in the largest numbers, these, I am afraid, have been the points which we have far too much dwelt upon, and which our grand exhibitions, before visitors especially, have put almost all other objects out of sight. Something like a new era in the history of English Education began when infant schools were introduced, because the founders of these spoke well about the impossibility of dealing with infants as machines, and declared that their great intention was to call forth the life of the child. One saw that there was a little cant in such expressions as these; still they promised well, and great things were hoped from the new system. But one new, clever invention after another was introduced into it—all announced as

means for developing the faculties, calling forth the affections, and so forth, till at last no part of our Education appears to be over-loaded with a more cumbrous and senseless mechanism than this, which was to dispense with mechanism almost entirely. When this habit had thus grown upon us, it was a relief to contemplate the actual doings of the Prussian or the Dutch systems; reading, writing, and ciphering, were not, as it seemed, their main accomplishments — a multitude of subjects, besides these, were comprehended in the instruction of both boys and girls; at the same time it appeared that their method of instruction was a great improvement upon ours; they had found out our weakness, and had observed, moreover, that our intense love for machinery had made our machinery ineffectual. There is a passage on this subject, not flattering to our vanity, but I think by no means unprofitable, in Cousin's book on Education in Holland. As it illustrates some remarks I shall have to make before I conclude, I will take the liberty of reading it to you :—

“ He asked me how we got on with our system of mutual instruction. ‘ Do you expect,’ he said ‘ that by such a mode of tuition, the instruction given in the primary schools will ever form men ? for that in truth is the real purpose. The different things taught in school are but means, and their whole value depends upon the degree of relation

they bear to that object. It never will be attained, unless the system of mutual instruction be given up; it does very well for the purpose of conveying a certain amount of information, but it will never *educate* the pupil; and, I repeat it, Education is the object of all instruction.'

"It may be imagined with what satisfaction I listened to such sentiments, coming, as they did, from the mouth of so competent a judge as Mr. Van den Ende. 'Nothing is more clear,' I replied, 'and both as a philosopher and a moralist, I maintain that simultaneous teaching (individual tuition being unattainable) is the only method that is suitable for the Education of a moral being; but I am obliged to confess it, the system of mutual instruction is still popular in France, to a degree that is truly lamentable.' 'How does that happen,' he said, 'in a nation so intelligent as yours?' 'From a fatal circumstance,' I replied, 'the consequences of which still continue. Under the restoration, the government tried to place the primary schools in the hands of the clergy, and the resistance made to that scheme carried things to the opposite extreme. Some well-meaning persons, but men who did not look below the surface of things, and were utter strangers to the subject of public instruction, having by chance visited some of those semi-barbarous manufacturing towns of England, where, for want

of anything better, they are happy to have Lancasterian schools, mistook for a masterpiece of perfection, that which is only the infancy of the art of teaching; and were dazzled with the exhibition of vast numbers of children taught by one master, assisted only by little monitors, chosen from among the pupils themselves. Seeing children thus governed by children, they found a species of self-government, which they thought would be a useful preparation for the infusion of the democratic principle; and as it is obvious that a Christian Education is impossible under such a system—for what monitor, even of twelve years of age, can give instruction in religion and morals?—they saw that the religious Education amounted to nothing, unless the dry repetition of a catechism, such as we might expect to find in Portugal or Spain, can be called by that name, and this they viewed as a triumph over the clergy. Other persons were pleased with the system on account of its cheapness, and then the eye was caught by the mechanical order and precision in the school exercises; the children went through their evolutions, according to a signal given by a child, as the different parts of the machinery in a factory are set in motion by a crank. This mechanical instruction was set up, in opposition to the church-schools of the Restoration: thus one extreme produces another; the domination of churchmen and despotism has equally unfavora-

ble tendencies. Unhappily the system of mutual instruction survived the struggles which preceded the revolution of 1830, but simultaneous instruction is gradually making progress, and the eyes of honest and disinterested persons will be opened.' I added, that I had not met with a single school-master in Germany who was favorable to the system of mutual instruction; and that I had not seen one school so conducted, either at the Hague, or at Leyden.'

“‘Nor will you,’ replied Mr. Van den Ende, ‘in any other part of Holland;’ a remark in which he was fully supported by Mr. Schreuder, to whom he appealed for the truth of it. ‘And this by no means arises,’ he continued, ‘from our not being sufficiently acquainted with that system; we have studied it well, and it is because we have studied it, that we have laid it aside. The Society for the public good, with which you must be well acquainted from the report of M. Cuvier, gave a prize for the best essay on the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems, and in the work to which the prize was awarded, the system of mutual instruction is analyzed in its most minute details, and is proved to be unsound on every point which bears upon Education in the proper sense of the term, the authority of the master, and the proper lessons to be inculcated. Mr. Visser, a school inspector, was the author of that Essay.’” —*Horner's Translation*, pages 32—35.

Here are two striking opinions from two very intelligent men. Mr. Van den Ende's definition of the end of Education is that which I have been defending, and with which I have tried to show you that the State system is inconsistent. I should not indeed say that Education is to *form* men; I should rather have said that God had formed them, and that by his Education he made his own work manifest. But this is resting too much on a difference of words. If once Mr. Van den Ende's doctrine becomes really acknowledged, I have no fear that Holland, or that any other country will long remain enslaved to a government system. But Cousin's remark is still more important: It was a desire to get rid of the old ecclesiastical Education, which induced his countrymen, he says, to import that machinery from England which has proved so ineffectual. Permit me to deduce a corollary from this proposition. It is this machinery in England which has overshadowed our Ecclesiastical Education, and prevented it from coming forth in its fulness and power. We have the principle recognised that Education is to be conducted by those who, we believe, have the power of what Mr. Van den Ende calls "forming men;" but that this was to be their object we have not perceived, or at least strongly felt. We have been worshipping our own net, and burning incense to our own drag,

looking at our system, and forgetting the beings upon whom the system was to act. While this was the case it was inevitable, that the very reason for which clergymen were made the teachers of the land, should cease to be understood, and that they themselves should become unmindful of their high position. Once let us believe this, that in every poor child there dwells a human spirit which we can speak to, which we have a commission from above to speak to, and to call forth and to instruct in all its divine and human relations—once let us begin to act upon this conviction, and all the instruments we want will speedily gather themselves about us. Possibly we shall find that we want no new instruments at all, that by rightly availing ourselves of all that we have already, we shall effect our purpose much better than by constructing new ones. The country parson may find in many cases that the revival of the old dame-school system for girls, or at least for infants, may save him the expense of building a school-room, and do the work more effectually. For looking upon himself as the head school-master of the parish, he may put the dame upon such a method of appealing to the heart and understanding of her pupils as may give new life both to herself and them. In every case he will care for the teacher more than for the lesson ; him he will try by every means to

inform and cultivate. In the hands of a living teacher the catechism, he knows, will be no dead book ; it will unfold mysteries to the heart of a child which will surround him and possess him and give him a sense of his nothingness, and of his greatness through infancy, and youth, and manhood. In the hands of a living teacher the Word of God will be a revelation not on those subjects only which are technically called religious, it will be the dearest of all story books to the child, the awakener and satisfier of innumerable puzzles about himself in the heart of the boy, the teacher of political wisdom to the youth in whose heart the social impulses are beginning to stir. Not that we would confine Education to this. Although his position as a man is that mainly in which a labourer is to be instructed, he has also a position as an Englishman, and there can be no reason why he should not have lessons in his country's history. He speaks the English language, and he may be taught to speak it freely and well, and to understand the honest, hearty books that have been written in it. He is puzzled about the world that surrounds him, and those puzzles we should try to meet and remove. He has his ear open to the sounds in nature ; he should surely have the opportunity of learning music. All these things will make him more human, they will not give him a greater conceit of himself ; on the

contrary, if his other discipline tends to awaken in him feelings of reverence and awe, this will only make him more humble. To give him such an Education as this, is an object for which every man in the country, who loves his country, should be ready to strive with heart and hand, knowing that such results are not won for the poor without self-denial on the part of the rich; but that being won for him, they become an inheritance for rich and poor, for high and low together. I have said that in this way we may hope to build up a nation, one which God will bless, and to which every one will count it a blessing to belong. But I must not limit my hopes to this issue, wonderful as it is; I would say in the words of a poet, whom I quote with only so much the more pleasure, because in his views of a State Education he seems, I believe only *seems*, to disagree with me:

With such foundations laid, avaunt the fear,
Of numbers crowded on their native soil,
To the prevention of all healthful growth,
Through mutual injury! Rather in the law
Of increase, and the mandate from above,
Rejoice! And ye have special cause for joy.
For, as the element of air affords
An easy passage to the industrious bees,
Fraught with their burdens, and a way as smooth
For those ordained to take their sounding flight

From the thronged hive, and settle where they list
In fresh abodes, their labour to renew ;
So the wide waters, open to the power,
The will, the instincts, the appointed needs
Of Britain, do invite her to cast off
Her swarms, and in succession send them forth,
Bound to establish new communities
On every shore whose aspect favours hope
Or bold adventure ; promising to skill
And perseverance their deserved reward.

* * * * *

Change, wide and deep, and silently performed,
This land shall witness ; and as days roll on,
Earth's universal frame shall feel the effect,
Even till the smallest habitable rock,
Beaten by lonely billows, hears the songs
Of humanized society, and blooms
With civil arts, that send their fragrance forth
A grateful tribute to all-ruling Heaven.
From culture, unexclusively bestowed
On Albion's noble race, in freedom born,
Expect these mighty issues ; from the pains
And faithful care of unambitious schools,
Instructing simple childhood's ready ear ;
Thence look for these magnificent results !

NOTES.

NOTES TO LECTURE I.

NOTE 1.

PESTALOZZI.

I AM afraid the few words I have said of Pestalozzi may seem unjust to his admirers, and may mislead those (if there be any such among my readers) who are not acquainted with his character. Nothing could be further from the intention of this simple-hearted, pious old man than to produce a cultivation at all resembling that which we read of in Athens. The notion of there being certain faculties in a child, which could be developed, was to him a glorious truth at which he could never have arrived, if his heart had not been imbued with a humble, practical Christianity. Nevertheless, it is most evident, from what he has left, and from what his wisest disciples tell us of him, that he never did rise higher than the perception of certain peculiar qualities, or tendencies, in children, and of a method by which these could be called forth. This is the more remarkable, because he is evidently striving after something better and more comprehensive than this—an attempt at universality, or what he called a development of the whole nature, is conspicuous in all his works. But how very vague he was in the use of these phrases; and how soon, in the

hands of his disciples, they degenerated into the cant for which he himself had the greatest abhorrence, those who are acquainted with his own history, and with that of his school, must, I think, be aware. His accomplished biographer, Dr. Biber, has bestowed much worthy pains in explaining the sense which Pestalozzi attached to the word *Nature*. He effectually clears him of the imputations which men, hasty to detect falsehood in those who are better than themselves, had fixed upon him; but he proves as clearly that both Pestalozzi's language and his thoughts upon this subject were throughout his life most indistinct. I know not to what document I could refer with more satisfaction than to this candid and excellent life for a proof of the positions which I have maintained in these lectures. In the first place it proves how inevitably a really Christian man must be haunted with the idea of some common principle, some humanity which is to be awakened in those whom he addresses. Secondly, how inevitably this idea reduces itself into that upon which the Athenian system was built, whenever the necessity of a body to cultivate this humanity is not recognized. Thirdly, how much practical evil results from a failure to distinguish between that in man which answers to the voice of love, and that which must be crushed and subdued. Fourthly, how the most spiritually minded man, when he attempts the cultivation of what is universal merely by his own individual kindness and skill, adopts unawares a refined naturalism or sensualism. Lastly, how closely this is connected with a low appreciation of language, as an instrument of cultivation. The two last points I shall illustrate by quotations from Dr. Biber's book, at the same time begging my readers to believe that they will understand my meaning far better when they have attentively studied his whole book.

“The first leading idea which had come home with clearness to Pestalozzi’s mind, was the necessity of founding the knowledge of the child upon the evidence of his senses. This axiom, which he laid down as the basis of his method, was in fact nothing else but a partial apprehension of the general principle, that true knowledge is knowledge, not of the name, but of the substance. This great truth had as it were identified itself with Pestalozzi’s nature, and accordingly we find him in moral and religious education directing all his attention and energies to one point, which was to surround the child with such influences of virtue and piety as should give him a substantial acquaintance with the elements of moral excellence and of religion. But although, as a matter of feeling and of personal practice, Pestalozzi made the most universal application of the principle which is the characteristic feature of the reform he effected, yet as a doctrine he never saw it in so comprehensive a light. His mind was essentially unphilosophical, equally incapable of abstracting from the world of sense, and of bringing the results of his internal experience under the cognizance of his intellect. The consequence of this deficiency on his part was, that while his treatment of the children rested on the most vital ground, his instruction was consonant with his own principles only so far as the knowledge of the outward world is concerned. The plan laid down for the establishment at Yverdon embraced languages, ancient and modern, geography, natural history, physical science, mathematics, drawing, singing, history, and religion. Of these there were only geography, the mathematical branches, spelling, perspective drawing, and singing, that could be said to be re-modelled on his plan.

“The work, ‘How Gertrude teaches her Little Ones,’ contains the first experimental outline of his mode of

teaching arithmetic and the elements of form. The numbers, lines, figures, etc., whose formation and proportions were to be the object of instruction, were brought before the child's view in visible and tangible realities, not in arbitrary signs or in mere words, and for this reason, he designated his method by the appellation 'intuitive.' As he was not, however, himself aware of the existence of a mental intuition as clear and as certain as the intuition of the senses, he fell into the mistake, not uncommon among reformers of all kinds, that in avoiding the one extreme of mere nominal knowledge conveyed by the usual systems, he ran into an opposite one by keeping the child to the visible representations of number and form in outward objects, long beyond that period when they are conceived in the intellect as mental realities or ideas in the true sense of the word, and thus methodically preventing the mind's emancipation from the external world."

The next extract is on the subject of language. It is the more valuable for the evident partiality with which Dr. Biber regards even his master's failures, and for his sneer at the old grammar-school plans. I add what follows on physical science and history, which also throws great light upon the character of the system.

"Of the other departments of knowledge which have been enumerated, as being comprehended in the plan of instruction laid down for the establishment, little more can be said than that the different teachers upon whom they devolved, attempted, every one in his own manner, to adapt their instruction to the view which they took of the general principles of the method. But as not every one that entered under Pestalozzi's roof, drank into the fulness of his spirit, so many of those experiments proved parodies rather than imitations of his mode of proceeding; and though the children might not fare

much worse under them than under the dead routine of 'the old system,' yet the unsettled state in which these parts of instruction necessarily remained, gave an excellent pretext to the enemies of the cause for crying down an institution in which, under the ægis of 'the new method,' the most unmethodical practices were pursued. This was the case more especially with reference to the instruction in languages, which opened to the pedantic advocates of the old grammar-school plans a wide field for cavil. Pestalozzi himself had drawn up, in the 'Mother's Manual,' a course of elementary instruction in the mother tongue, which, however defective in some of the details, presents an excellent outline of what ought to form the first subjects of conversation between a mother and the child on her lap. But what might be excellent in the nursery, was not on that account sufficient in an institution which extended its plan to preparation for the university; and as Pestalozzi himself, from the peculiar unfitness of his mind for abstract subjects, failed to supply his friends even with leading ideas such as he had suggested to them on other topics, the 'Mother's Manual' was made a general text-book, on which every one founded his own crude notions and ignorant proceedings.

"Natural history and physical science were taught entirely without plan, though, in some instances, in a manner decidedly superior. The children were led to observe and to examine for themselves such objects and phenomena as were within reach; and to enlarge the sphere of their knowledge, their teachers made excursions with them in different directions through the country. Sometimes they would all travel together, at other times they were divided into several troops, who, on their return home, communicated to each other the results of their observations. In an establishment in which there

were no standing vacations, a few weeks every year could well be devoted to such expeditions, without encroaching on the time of their regular studies ; and in a country so eminent for the abundance and variety of its natural productions, it was impossible that the pupils should not, under the guidance of intelligent teachers, acquire rich stores of real information. The only objection that lay against the method pursued in the institution on these subjects, was that the pupils did not acquire a comprehensive view of the sciences, but that their knowledge being gathered as it were upon casualties in the first instance, had a tendency afterwards to remain fragmentary.

“ The historical lessons laboured under still greater imperfections. Pestalozzi, from a sort of prejudice which he had conceived against historical studies, gave but little encouragement to their cultivation in the establishment, and accordingly their treatment by the different teachers was, more than that of any other branch of instruction, subject to endless changes. One man read abstruse lectures, another drew up a set of synchronistical tables ; to some it seemed preferable to connect all history with biographical sketches, while others indulged in lengthy discussions on the different forms of government, and the best polity ; some hurried over the whole of the records of humankind in a few months ; while others found their whole set of pupils changed between their ante and post-diluvian lessons.”

I would refer also to Dr. Biber's remarks on Mr. Niederer's mode of communicating religious instruction, —a mode which he almost admits to be inconsistent with the Pestalozzian principle. The opinion, I think, to which we shall at last be brought respecting Pestalozzi, is something like this—that he made manifest the connection between Christianity and Education ; that he helped in

his own person to disprove and destroy that distinction between religious and secular education, which some persons among us are so eager to establish; that he showed how much more the character of the teacher must always avail than the machinery by which he teaches. For asserting these principles, we owe him infinite thanks, not the less thanks because they were our own principles long before, embodied in the very institutions which he thought antiquated and barbarous, and capable of being realized by us, as he and his disciples have never been able to realize them. It would be a miserable thought that the life of any good, self-denying man had been in vain: it is a most pleasant thought that his goodness survives and does its work, when his theories have perished; and even that it hastens their dissolution, by bringing old truths to light, which explain the secret both of their strength and their weakness.

NOTE 2.

The criticism on the Spartan system referred to in the text, will be found in Aristotle's Politics, Book II. cap. 6. The passage quoted is the following:—

ἀποβέβηκέ τε τὸ νῦν τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῶν συμφέρον-
τος τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποικέν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς
δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

NOTE 3.

I have said in the text, that both Aristophanes and Socrates (through his two disciples) bear witness to the fact, that Athens was ruined by her sophists and rhetoricians. The political objects of the comedian have

been of late years clearly understood and asserted. But the very same persons who represent him as a consummate statesman, have chosen to describe Socrates as a man taking no interest whatever in any questions which are not of a purely speculative kind. I am delighted to see some able articles in support of the position, that *his* object and Plato's were essentially practical, in two recent numbers of the *British Critic*. Any person interested in the subject of Athenian Education, or indeed of education at all, will gain much by studying these essays. Perhaps I may be permitted to suggest, that if English scholarship is to have a character of its own (and unless it has such a character I do not see how it can ever flourish), it must be, in a sense, political. If scholars become party-men they are detestable; but they may be a means of saving us from party spirit, rather than of encouraging us in it. In attempts at merely dogmatic or antiquarian philology, we shall always, I suppose, be surpassed by the Germans; but the moment philology becomes connected with the history of national constitutions, the moment it is used to illustrate the causes which strengthen or impair national life, we feel we have an interest in it—that it belongs in a manner to us. It is a curious fact, in illustration of this remark, that the work of Niebuhr has given birth to no less than four popular English histories of Rome. Here we can understand and appreciate the discoveries of that eminent man, because we have some practical test to which we can bring them. In his own country they will be regarded chiefly as literary curiosities, and will give rise, perhaps, to the most extravagant and grotesque applications. These observations, I hope, will not be considered out of place in a book on National Education; they are submitted, with all humility, to those who can turn them to account.

NOTE 4.

The passage in the speech of Pericles, to which I have alluded, is the celebrated one beginning—*χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ, κ.τ.λ.*—*Thucydides*, Book 2, c. 37.

NOTE 5.

I hope that in nothing which has been said in this lecture, I shall seem to have spoken otherwise than most respectfully of the works which have been published under the auspices of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. It would be most inconsistent in a defender of our English Education to take such a course, for all the most conspicuous volumes on their list have been contributed, I believe, by persons who were educated in our English universities, and derived their scholarship and their science from them. Of course there are, and ought to be, exceptions. I believe some of the interesting, and, as it seems to me, highly useful books, in the entertaining series, had a different origin. Many, both of these and of those which belong to the scientific class, may, I conceive, be employed with great benefit by the teachers of our National and Middle Schools. When we have got rid of the notion that any part of education is secular, when a spiritual body is recognized as the only one which is capable of educating the nation, then every real and honest attempt to communicate truths will be estimated as it deserves. All exclusiveness belongs to those who have invented this distinction; those who resist it can turn everything, whether it is called useful or amusing, human or divine, to the highest good.

NOTES TO LECTURE II.

NOTE 1.

THE account I have given of the manner in which the spiritual and civil powers during the middle ages, acted and reacted upon each other, will approve itself, I hope, to those who are best acquainted with ecclesiastical history. In so very brief a sketch there must be statements which will strike particular persons as inconsistent with particular facts of which they have taken almost exclusive cognizance. My desire is that the whole impression left upon the reader's mind should be a true one. If I seem to any thoughtful person of any party to have failed in giving this, I shall be most thankful to be shown wherein I am wrong. But if this or any thing like this be a fair statement of the position in which these two bodies stood to each other, how utterly strange and inexplicable does much of the language which we hear upon this subject appear. We find persons gravely talking about the church and state as two powers of which we can say when we please, "These shall have nothing to do with each other; their objects are different, *therefore*, there shall be no connection between them." Now, if history means anything it seems that there *is* a relation between them, and that it would be just as wise to affirm, "France shall not border upon Spain; England and Scotland shall shall not touch," as to say this church and this state

shall nowhere impinge one upon the other. We all know that the question, what are the boundaries of these countries, was disputed for centuries with words and swords by diplomatists and soldiers. Nevertheless, each felt that the boundary must exist somewhere, that no strife of theirs could cause, that Scotland should not be Scotland ; or England, England ; or could make an absolute separation between them. Our modern philosophers believe that a separation which cannot be made by geographical lines between material districts, may be effected between two bodies which exist, (one as much as the other) for the mind more than for the eye, and which are acting at the selfsame moment, upon the selfsame human subject. They imagine, because it is the greatest work of reason enlightened by revelation from above, and experience from beneath, to ascertain what is the distinct work of these two bodies ; that it only requires certain acts of Parliament, and a little declamation about a spiritual kingdom and the Emperor Constantine to dissolve for ever all connection between them. And yet the very same persons, who hope to effect this division, can look on with the utmost calmness, and even complacency, while the most outrageous invasions of that which must be a spiritual body, if a spiritual body exist, are attempted by the state. We hold that the state and the church do live to promote the same end ; that both alike are religious societies instituted and ordained by God, that both alike are to accomplish his will towards his creature man, that both alike are to preserve that creature from the mischiefs to which an evil nature exposes him. But seeing that this man is a twofold creature, seeing that there are certain outward acts which he may do to the detriment of himself and his fellows ; and seeing that there are certain inward principles, governing those outward acts, impart-

ing to them their essential goodness or evil, and themselves more sacred and important than the effects which flow from them, we believe that God has appointed one body, the state, as his minister for dealing with the outward, formal, visible conduct of men, and another minister, the church, for dealing with the inward spiritual invisible origin of that conduct. Abolish the distinction, confound acts with principles, and of necessity you merge the one in the other. Divide acts from principles, say that they have nothing to do one with the other, that the act does not flow from the principle, that the principle does not terminate in an act, and inevitably you separate church and state. Till you can do one or the other of these things entirely and completely; you can neither by all your contrivances sever the church from the state, nor amalgamate them. But you may be losing sight of this distinction; you may be continually exalting acts in contempt of principles, or lauding principles till you think acts indifferent; and in every such case you will be doing something by words or deeds, by private persuasions or by acts of Parliament, by speeches at meetings, or by bills of National Education, to produce disorder, by mixing together offices which God has distinguished, or putting asunder bodies whom God has united.

The application of these remarks to some late discussions on this subject, will, I think, be obvious. A gentleman, whom in his own proper sphere we all respect and admire, was last year fetched from the north to teach English churchmen how they were to maintain their own position. Of course, we were delighted to receive lessons from such a man upon any subject, and English clergymen went craving for the information, which their Presbyterian teacher was to give them about themselves and their own history. Doubtless we

heard many things which were very profitable to us ; but much did it puzzle us to be told how we were to act in a predicament, in which we never have been placed, and are never likely to be placed. We were told that we were chosen by the kindness of the state from among a number of other bodies, to receive its favours : We were told that we received our endowments from the state ; and that we were to insist that the state should keep up our endowments : We were told that we had not conducted ourselves so independently as another body, which was named, that we had allowed our theology to be tampered with by the state, more than that body had done ; but that still we were to consider ourselves entitled to a creditable and respectable maintenance ; and that we ought to contend earnestly that this should not be taken from us. We were told, lastly, that in spite of that want of independence on our part, and our consequent inferiority to the model church, we had put forth very strange and insolent pretensions, which that church had never put forth, and which interfered very inconveniently with some arrangements which our friendly counsellor thought would be advisable for us. Now if what I have said be true, it is quite impossible for us, however we may wish it, to act upon this lecturer's suggestions, because we never have been in the state which he describes. We are not pensioners of the state ; we were not selected by the state from among any other bodies ; the state has never presented us with a single article of our theology ; the only pretension we have put forth, is that of maintaining the constitution which is derived to us, as we believe, from heaven ; which certainly has been recognised as our constitution ever since we came into this country. If we had to cavil about the antiquity of powers, we could boast that we were an organised power, when the

state power was a poor weak thing, trying by our help to assert itself, obliged to ask a sanction from us for its proceedings, distinguishing itself from mere military violence, only by the countenance which we gave to it. The state as it grew to strength, as it learned by our teaching that it was not a mere brute power, but had a trust committed to it by God, found that it could not have an orderly people without our help. It therefore employed us to educate this people: It sanctioned a practice which it did not originate of making the land give up a tenth of its produce, that those whom it nourished might receive spiritual culture and enlightenment. This is the only endowment which, properly speaking, we owe to the state as such; the rest are nearly all the benefactions of individual churchmen. Under such circumstances, we submit that the course which Dr. Chalmers recommends to us, would be preposterous: it would be based upon suppositions, which have no sort of warrant in fact. Without the least dictating to the Presbyterian body, what it should do, our line of conduct, I imagine, is clear. We are to tell the state, 'Our province is to educate the people. If you want this work done, we will show you that we can do it, and that you cannot do it. If you are anxious to know how the powers which we have for the work are derived to us, we shall be happy to explain that point to you. As we believe that such powers are necessary for your work: we assuredly shall not give up the assertion of them, to please you, or to please any body. But we do not wish to trouble you with these evidences of our commission; unless you care to hear them. We are willing to put the question to a trial of battle. Let others do what they can, and we will do what we can. Then dispense with our help, if you can afford to do so. If you like to rob us of what means we have for helping you, we

cannot hinder that. Do it if you please, only hear us while we tell you what will be the consequence of your doing it. If you like to assist us to carry on this work we shall not decline your assistance ; only, remember there are no stipulations annexed to the grant. You do not give it us for our sake, but for the sake of the nation, in which you and we are alike interested.'

This is our way of maintaining the freedom of the church, and at the same time of asserting its connection with the state. During the present year another Scotch lecturer has been summoned to London, for the purpose of showing us that this is impossible. I shall give an extract from one of his Lectures, to show in what manner *he* establishes his point.

"But in addition to this injurious influence to the interests of religion, strange and anomalous were the results, in other respects, of the alternations in the dominance of the two powers, and their contests about the boundaries of their respective provinces : the predominance at one time being of civil causes in the ecclesiastical courts, and at others of ecclesiastical causes in the civil courts—now the Church lording it over the State—the priest over the ruler—and, anon, the State asserting its ascendancy over the Church—the ruler getting the better of the priest. It is curious to mark, in civil and ecclesiastical history, the reciprocations of jealousy, the internal dissensions, and even the international wars which for ages arose from this cause."—Page 341.

"To the first of these topics, I had occasion to advert, when speaking of the nature or principle of religious establishments, in the first of these lectures. The quotation then given from the late Principal Hill, sets the case in as plain and decisive a light as possible. Nothing can be clearer. The State gives endowments. I take these alone, independently of any other exclusive

civil privileges; because they are enough for my argument. These endowments are connected with certain articles of faith to be taught, and certain principles of conduct to be inculcated, and modes of worship to be maintained, by the clergy of the religious body on whom they are bestowed. It is plain, that as the provision comes from the State, it belongs to the State to determine how that provision is to be appropriated; that is, to *fix the creed*, for the preaching of whose doctrines it is to pay. Even if a select number of theologians should be nominated to prepare them, still the preparation of them is not their establishment. They must be approved and sanctioned by the government—by the government, not of the church, but of the State. The party that is to pay must, in all reason, have the right, and the sole right to determine *for what*; and when, according to the authority with which all advocates of establishments consider the civil rulers as invested, the creed has been fixed; the church that accepts the endowments becomes bound, by every principle of integrity, to maintain it in all its articles inviolate. The moment the judicatories of that church presume to introduce an alteration on their own authority, without seeking and obtaining the concurrent sanction of the civil power, they have violated their part of the formal or implied bargain, and have forfeited by such infraction, all their right to the emoluments. The distinction between the church *as a church*, and the church *as an established church* is so manifest, that it is surprising it should not by every mind of common sense be instantly perceived, and by every mind of common candour be instantly admitted. Dr. Chalmers may boast, on behalf of his own church, of an ‘unfettered theology;’ but in no endowed church can there, by possibility, be any such thing. The endowment fetters it. That

chain of golden links passes round every article of it, and fastens the whole down. As a church, the Scottish church or the English, may alter its creed—may cancel it entirely, and adopt a new one. This is the undoubted prerogative of either, considered simply *as a church*. But this is precisely what each has relinquished in accepting a state endowment. As churches established by law, they have their articles and their confessions, their liturgies, and their books of discipline, and directories for the worship of God, prescribed to them by royal or parliamentary authority; and a change unsanctioned by that authority must involve a forfeiture of the endowment. How *could* Dr. Chalmers, if he thought at all of the very nature of an establishment, say as he does,—‘But even although the church should be wholly supported by the State in things temporal, and a connection between them be established thus far, it follows not that this connection should proceed any further. There might be an entire dependence on the State in things temporal, without even the shadow of dependence upon it in things ecclesiastical. Although the church should receive its maintenance, and all its maintenance from the civil power, it follows not that it therefore receives its theology from the same quarter.’ What, the State pay for the church, and have no control over the doctrines taught! pay, and have nothing to say as to what it pays for! Would this be fair play? Has it ever been so? Is it so now? Ought it to be so ever? The fact is, that the articles of the Church of England, originally settled and published by regal authority, require the same authority, the authority of her supreme earthly head, to legalise any alteration; and that the confession of faith of the church of Scotland, along with its other authorized standards, is binding on that church, *as an established church*, not by the authority of the word of

God, but solely by sundry acts of parliament; and that by act of parliament alone can any change be introduced. Is *this* independence? Is this 'unfettered theology?' Is this the exclusive deference to Christ's authority which He, as the church's *only Head* demands, and is so supremely entitled to? Away with the unworthy compromise of the church's dignity, and the honour of the church's Lord. — From page 347—350, *Wardlaw's Lectures*.

To the part of this passage which describes the uneasy relations between the church and the state in different periods, I have only to answer, *quis dubitavit?* These facts may be new to Dr. Wardlaw's hearers; they are certainly not so to any tolerably educated English churchman. The only question is, whether such confusions must not exist in every country in the world in which a spiritual power and a state power dwell, until they understand how they are related to each other; whether they do not exist at this moment in the United States of North America, as well as in Russia or in England. All Dr. Wardlaw's facts are our facts. We are just as anxious that men should meditate upon them as he is; just as anxious, because we are certain that no person can meditate upon them patiently and earnestly, without arriving in due time at exactly the opposite conclusion to that at which he has arrived. The question, whether it is fair play that a state should pay a church, and not dictate its theology, I am not careful to answer. Such a huckster's argument, I think, must have sounded strange to the audience which Dr. Wardlaw addressed. I do not think there can be any other body of cultivated Englishmen who would not have rejected it with scorn and disgust. When we talk about the duties of the church to the state, or the state to the church, we presume that each is considering what

is best for the nation ; that each feels itself bound, as in the presence of God, to do that thing which it is meant to do, and no other thing. If you do not look at the question in this way, how absurd it is to look at it at all. Dr. Wardlaw comes four hundred miles to show not how things are, but how they ought to be ; not what churchmen and statesmen are doing, but what they ought to be doing. Surely, then, he assumes each of these parties to be capable of acting upon a principle ; to be capable of doing something else than higgling how much theology they shall have a right to impose in return for so much money given. If the state knows, as it ought to know, that its work is not to provide a theology, and yet that it is most needful for the people that it should have a theology, it will not ask to do that which it cannot do ; it will desire to do that which it can do. If the churchman knows that it is one of his offices, though not his only office, to teach theology, he will as much, because he is a servant of the nation, as because he is a servant of God, for in truth he cannot be one without being the other, let no one, merely because he provides him with money, dictate to him in that matter. If it is not so with those whom Dr. Wardlaw is acquainted with ; if those who pay the money to his ministers say, Give us the theology which we want because we give you what you want, I am very sorry for it. I have often heard it said, that this must be the effect of the system which he advocates ; but I never saw any proof of it so clear and decided as that which he has himself furnished, by hinting that there is no fair play where this giving and taking doctrine is not recognized.

How the notion of these two Scotch divines, that we owe our theology in some respect to the state has originated, I have explained in my third lecture. Be-

cause the church had discovered that it could not exist while it authorized a foreign visible head, and certain consequences which flowed from that acknowledgment, and supported it; because the state discovered at the same time that this acknowledgment was inconsistent with its own existence: and because the state insisted, as a condition of the church continuing to educate its people, that it should subscribe certain documents, and bind itself by certain oaths (which documents and oaths, so far as they bore upon theology, were devised by the church itself), renouncing that which it had already renounced, therefore the state is said to have imposed its articles of faith upon the church. Because the church recognized the king, as in all causes ecclesiastical, as well as civil, within his own dominions, supreme, thereby affirming a position which it had only ceased to affirm, when it had admitted a principle destructive of its own universality and spirituality, therefore the church is said to have accepted its head from the state. We say, you do not know what your king is, you do not know what his office is till we tell you. We do not receive him from the state—we give him to the state, and in giving him, we establish a bond between church and state which makes the one national, and not as it must otherwise be, anti-national; which impregnates the other with a spiritual principle, and prevents it from being (as it would otherwise be) anti-spiritual. This great doctrine of our constitution Mr. Coleridge has beautifully expounded in his book on the Idea of Church and State—a book which Dr. Wardlaw has, it appears, read, but without discovering in it anything at all illustrative of the subject.

I have been reluctantly compelled to differ with both these rival lecturers, and therefore I have the more pleasure in proving that we are not *obliged*, as churchmen,

to reject two opposite doctrines upon this great question ; that, on the contrary, we are often able to reconcile them. An ingenious criticism appeared in the last number of the *Edinburgh Review* but one, upon Mr. Gladstone's work *On the relations of the church with the state*. I do not imagine that the reviewer can have materially diminished any person's respect for that able and interesting work ; but I am not sure that the theory which he broached may not act as a useful counterpoise to some of the statements contained in it. Mr. Gladstone thinks that the state is bound in conscience to promote the spread of Christianity through the nation and all its dependencies. The reviewer thinks that the state has no obligation except to watch over the lives and properties of the persons who compose the nation, but that it may contribute to the propagation of a useful faith, just as it may contribute to the purchase of a picture gallery. One view is not necessarily incompatible with the other. If it should appear that the state cannot promote its own specific object of guarding our lives and properties, unless it contributes to the purchase of a picture gallery, of course that becomes one of its duties, and not any longer merely one of its privileges. If a nation has no security for the lives and property of its people, unless it can provide some means for improving their moral condition ; and if the support of Christianity be that means, then Mr. Gladstone's doctrine and the reviewer's become identical. At the same time it seems to me very advisable that the reviewer's principle should be distinctly understood and asserted, as well as Mr. Gladstone's. It should be distinctly felt, the state as a state, has a commission only to deal with the bodies and properties of men. If any thing beyond this is found to be necessary that this function may not be abortive, some other body must be

found, which has a special commission for that other work. Should the reviewer have the opportunity of enforcing his principle, either through the press, or in Parliament, all the eloquence and ingenuity which he has shown in this article, will, I hope and trust, be engaged in its support. Above all, if he should ever hear of a scheme attempting to invest the state with the office of educating the people, he will, no doubt, be at his post, to prove, by "wise saws and modern instances," that such an undertaking lies entirely beyond the limits of its province; that it may, indeed, give money to this end, as it may give money for a picture gallery; but that it cannot itself do more than minister to the bodies and properties of men, the acts and movements of their spirits being subjected to some other guidance.

NOTE 2.

The remarks which I have made upon mathematics and logic will, I fear, puzzle some of my readers. Not many years ago, a pamphlet by Professor Whewell, respecting the studies of Cambridge, was criticized with some severity in the *Edinburgh Review*. I have not the article at hand, so that I cannot speak confidently about it; but my impression is, that the reviewer denied the usefulness of mathematics as a principal instrument of education, on the ground that mathematics dealt wholly with necessary matter, whereas in all the ordinary transactions of life we are conversant with probable matter. This is, at any rate, a very old and approved argument against this particular science, one which is adopted by persons holding the most opposite opinions on education and morals, and the admission of which must make what I have said wholly unintelligible. I shall there-

fore endeavour to show very briefly why, if this were a satisfactory statement respecting mathematics, it would not prove them to be of small value in education; and why it is a most imperfect and unsatisfactory statement respecting them. I am sure that I speak with perfect impartiality, as no one would be more entirely excluded from the halls of philosophy by the *Ουδεις αγνωμετρητος εισιτω* than I should be.

First, then, it seems to me that the objection to mathematics as an induction to other studies, rests upon a secret disbelief that there is such a thing as a moral science. I fully appreciate the value of Butler's remarks as to the conduct which it behoves men to adopt in probable contingencies; but I do not believe that Butler could have meant to affirm the proposition which some of his disciples are most zealous in affirming, that the whole region of morals is a region of probabilities; that *principles* are under the same rule as *acts*; that in choosing the ends at which we are to aim, and the ends which we are to avoid, we are as much decided, merely by a calculation of likelihoods, as in determining the best manner for attaining these ends. Such a doctrine, I think, must lead any one who adopts it into the most fearful confusion—a confusion from which he does not in the least escape by discovering an authority which (upon the same calculation of likelihoods) he believes competent to pronounce what it is best in each case to believe or not to believe, as well as to do or not to do. The worth of such an authority for the purpose of leading us on to assurance and certainty, I can well understand. The worth of it as dispensing with certainty, or as a substitute for the conviction that any thing is certain, I cannot the least understand. But if there be moral truths which are just as certain as physical truths, the knowledge of these must be most

closely connected with all our practical discipline. If, indeed, this knowledge is *substituted* for all inquiries concerning practical conduct; if our certainty about ends is transferred to the means for reaching them, we shall inevitably become positive and bigotted. But if we want that certainty, if we suppose that all is fluctuating and dubious, because we have to settle what in particular circumstances of difficulty is the fitting course for us to pursue, we shall not be less positive and bigotted, (for we must get a standing point somewhere, and the chances are that we find it first in the quickness or solidity of our own judgment, ultimately in some persons whom we have enthroned in the seat which our own judgments once occupied) and along with this bigotry, too, we shall be capricious, and changeable, not in our thoughts and feelings only, but in our outward actions also. If, however, it be requisite that we should carry a certainty about with us of some kind or another, I own I cannot see what harm it can have done us that the feeling of this certainty should have been imparted through our education; that we should have been in the habit of conversing for many years mainly with that which is certain, that we should have been early initiated into the feeling, "We have a method of arriving at a knowledge, not of that which may be, but of that which is."

But, secondly, I do not admit that the description of mathematics, as that study which is conversant with necessary matter, conveys at all a just notion of their character or their worth. Before this definition could have been invented, mathematics must have been already considered a mere branch of logic. So every disciple of Aristotle does, in fact, consider it; so Aristotle himself considered it: for if we look only at the mathematical machinery of definitions, axioms, propo-

sitions, that is to say, if we look merely at the methods by which one man makes known a mathematical truth to another, we do find nothing but what a logician would call a series of syllogisms in necessary matter. Logic being the science which explains how we communicate and prove our thoughts to one another, it must comprehend this as well as every other mode of proof or enunciation. What, then, does it not comprehend? I should say, precisely the *mathesis*; precisely that which constitutes the essence of mathematics. The proof, that the three angles of a triangle make two right-angles, is a part of logic; the apprehension, in any particular triangle, of a law which applies to all triangles, is the *mathesis*.

All mere logicians, even Aristotle, the most consummate of mere logicians, have refused to acknowledge this distinction; nay, have derided it and those who maintained it. Nevertheless, it has made itself good in spite of them. Men have felt that they were not chained down by mere rules and conditions of logic; that there is a way into the free, open atmosphere of truth—but still a *way*. This road is as much a road or method as the other; no chance path struck out by an adventurous thinker for himself, but a proper highway for men to walk in. The mathematical university has asserted it to be so. Hence all great discoverers of methods, especially Bacon, the chief methodist, have come forth from it. Hence, too, all poets who have felt their want of something freer and less limited than logic, have had their birth here. I earnestly desire that this eye of England, with which especially she has been able to look into the heaven above her, though it may have served less than the other to guide her in choosing her path over the earth, may not be put out. Never, I believe, was it more needed than now. Never do we

more require a set of men to arise who shall teach us the worth of authority, and prescription, and antiquity, as vestibules to the temple of truth, not as barriers to keep us from venturing into it. The science of theology, above all others, has need of such men. May God in his mercy raise them up for us, and endow them with all gifts and graces, and mostly that chief grace of humility, to sustain them in their noble, but hazardous adventure ! It will be one in which few will cheer them on ; in which they will have much obloquy to bear from evil men ; much misunderstanding from the good. No sect will, probably, gather itself around them ; the public will be indifferent to their labours ; their own generation will, perhaps, scarcely know them ; but they will not therefore be useless even to it. They will send many thoughts abroad which will not die ; they will save many truths from perishing, through the ignorance or eagerness of those who assert them ; they will enable the other university, which will always be engaged in a more external, and, in one sense, popular work than theirs, to perform its own functions safely and usefully ; and in future days, the humble will hear of them, and be glad. Surely it will be better for the young men at Cambridge to keep such ends as these before them, than to aspire (as so many of them do) to be men of the age, well thought of for a few years by those among whom they live, well thought of by themselves for their superiority to the prejudices of the place in which they have been educated ; but useless to it, to themselves, and to posterity. Their education (let them be sure of this, will affect them through their lives, however they may despise it. That which they were meant to be will appear in what they are, be the caricature ever so unlike and gross. Let them be up, then, and if not doing, yet preparing to do ; for the age, the nation, the church re-

quires them ; it requires that assurance in principles which their mathematical discipline, if they will receive it aright, is able to impart, which, by the aid of a vital religious cultivation, will extend itself into their thoughts and feelings upon every subject.

I have been the more desirous to make these remarks respecting mathematics, because it is often supposed that a person who values moral studies above physical, must, as a matter of course, regard this science with indifference or dislike. Now I need scarcely say, after the remarks which I have made in my Lectures, that on this last subject I should entirely agree with the sentiments which have been expressed by many accomplished and filial members of the University of Cambridge, and by none more ably and earnestly than by the late Mr. Rose, in his Commencement Sermon. But if the doctrine which I have maintained in this note be true, mathematics is in the highest sense a *humane* study, an invaluable foundation for all humane studies to rest upon. It has been confounded in this age with the physical sciences to which it is applied, just as logic in the middle ages was confounded with casuistry. The effect of this last mistake when a re-action took place, has been an indifference to logic. I think there are some symptoms of a re-action against our physical tendencies, which may result in an indifference to mathematics. The University of Cambridge will do well to consider the danger, and to guard against it. If I might venture to offer a suggestion, it would be this,—that mathematical science should still hold its place as the necessary induction to all Cambridge teaching, but that the different physical applications of it should be left to the different professors, the student being not compelled, or even excited, to consider these as the great subjects to which he is to devote himself, though pro-

vided with every facility for pursuing them, if the bias of his mind should lead him in that direction. But this remark introduces another subject, which requires a separate note.

NOTE 3.

What I have said in this lecture respecting the college and university systems, will probably recal to the reader's memory some articles which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* five or six years ago. It was the purpose of these articles to prove, that the University of Oxford had, in fact, ceased to exist; that it was now merely a collection of colleges; that the change had been brought about by the most nefarious proceedings on the part of those interested in college endowments; that the only remedy for the evils under which we are labouring, is to restore the middle age constitution, which has been so impiously violated; that by this means numbers would be admitted to Oxford, who are now excluded from it; particular vested interests would no longer interfere with the right of visitation and government possessed by the state over the whole body; the necessity of the college system would be almost entirely superseded, and (a necessary consequence of that system) the ineligibility of those who from religious scruples cannot conform to it, would cease. These propositions were maintained in four papers, two of them bearing directly upon the Oxford constitution, two of them applying the principle to the case of the dissenters*. These articles, it will be remembered, displayed very

* See *Edinburgh Review* for June 1831, December 1831, October 1834, and January 1835.

great ability and erudition. In spite of the extreme and even ludicrous ferocity* which characterized them, they would certainly have produced a considerable effect on the public mind, if the enemies of the university had not been far more interested than its friends in checking their influence. The reviewer's doctrine entirely stultified the charges which they had been bringing against it for the last thirty years. If he was right, all past Edinburgh reviewers were absurdly wrong. The favourite complaint of the universities had been, that they had adhered with the most stupid attachment to a system which had its origin in the unenlightened ages before the Reformation. The new accuser discovers the root of all their other errors and evils, in their abandonment of that system. For this reason, these papers must have been exceedingly unpopular among those persons who were in general most glad to profit by the assistance of an erudite and skilful reasoner, in attacking the institutions which they, without learning or argument, had ascertained to be useless. I do not think that they can be nearly as disagreeable to Oxford itself. It is painful, no doubt, to men who are conscious of perfectly honourable and disinterested intentions, to be accused of the most horrible selfishness and baseness,—to be told that nothing else can influence them in maintaining the present system. But such imputations are not new; those who hope to pass

* The article in the number for January 1835, on the admission of dissenters, may be described, without exaggeration, as having for its immediate object the establishment of these two propositions:—1. That all who took the side opposite to that espoused by the reviewer, were villains. 2. That all who took the same side with him were fools. The ultimate object was, of course, to prove the sinfulness and inexpediency of bigotry, and inculcate charity and good will.

through the world without incurring them, or who would go a step out of their way merely to avoid them, must be very weak, and I think only half honest; * and I do not know any set of men who just at this time are proving by more decisive evidence, that they fear God and hate covetousness, and would make any sacrifices to provide a satisfactory education for their countrymen of all classes, than the majority of those who are tutors of colleges at Oxford. What would really grieve these men is, that the immensely valuable influence which they are able to exert over the minds of their countrymen, should be lost; that the college life, which they have found precious to themselves, most precious in giving them an interest in university studies, should be exchanged for a system in which study is regarded as a merely professional thing; that by this means study itself should be ruined by losing its unity, as well as its vitality; that England should receive from her universities not a tone of mind, not a universal culture, but a mere set of doctors and tradesmen. This is what they would dread as the effect of the reviewer's arguments, if ever they took any strong hold of the feelings of our countrymen. But this is a result which they have no occasion to anticipate, or at least it is one which must

* The prophet Elijah said to the woman of Zarephath, who was going to gather two sticks, that she might dress the handful of meal for herself and her son, that they might eat it and die,—“Fear not; go and do as thou hast said, *but make thee thereof a little cake first*, and bring it unto me; and after, make for thy son.” A modern fine gentleman prophet, who was considering what would be said of him in the journals, would have taken care that it should be reported that he had provided, first, for the woman, and then for himself. He would not have let people fancy him to be selfish, and rather than they should, he would have forborne to awaken the woman's faith and hope in God. Elijah was not selfish, therefore he cared not what people thought about him.

be connected with the overthrow of so much else, which is necessary to the preservation of our national character, as would make any particular addition to the mischief unimportant. There are hundreds and thousands who never had, who have not now, and who never can have, the slightest interest in any of these endowments, who feel that all the most valuable influences upon their intellectual and moral being would have been lost, if they had been brought up in a Scotch or German university, and not in an English college. Such persons would lend all the power which belongs to them, of whatever kind it be, to resist such an alteration as that which the reviewer desires, even if he could make out every point of his case against the authors of the collegiate system. At the same time they will never believe that he can make it out. They will never believe that what they feel and know to be a positive blessing, what they are confident is a blessing with which England could not have dispensed, has been conferred upon us by fraud, violence, and usurpation. They have heard wise men affirm, in a thousand cases before, that an evil tree has brought forth good fruit ; but they never yielded their assent in any one of those cases to the proposition. They are sure that the credence given to it arises from men not taking the pains to observe how much good was mingled with the evil in the cause, and from their not having a sufficient body of facts to establish the conclusion, that the proportions of good and evil, in the result, exactly corresponded. They can therefore very well believe the statements of antiquarians, at least as cautious, quite as patient, nearly as good-tempered, as the reviewer ; that the origin, not only of colleges (which he admits) but of the college life and discipline, of the tutorial system, of the influence which the colleges acquired in the government

of the university, may be traced to men who had the very best and noblest conceptions of their own responsibility, and of the education which the nation demanded at their hands. They can quite believe that the pious intentions of these men, co-operated with circumstances over which they had no control, but which being, as we believe, under the direction of a good providence, enabled these, as they did our other institutions, to grow in that direction which was best for them according to the principle originally implanted within them. They can see, especially in the firmness which the education body of the country hereby acquired, in the new obstacles which the interweaving of the college with the university system (as the reviewer confesses and laments), raised against any state interference, in the domestic and social character which it imparted to the religion of the university, proofs that the alleged innovation did, in fact, carry out with singular felicity that which we deem to have been always (however imperfectly expressed at different periods) the idea of English Education.

I have no fear, then, that the reviewer's statements will do any harm, unless the universities should refuse to recognize that which is true and important in them. They ought, I conceive, I do not say cheerfully to endure, but most eagerly to welcome, any appeals to antiquity on the part of those who call for a reform in their system. This is what they must all along have desired. There may be in every body of men a set of persons who blindly worship the present; but there ought to be more men not belonging to this set, in the universities than anywhere else; more who prefer even the wildest Major-Cartwright cry for a reform, which shall bring back some imaginary period of perfection, to the claim that everything should be fashioned according to

the notions of the present century. They know very well that the truth does not lie in either of these fanatical extremes, that a true reformation is wrought neither by conforming institutions to the standard of past times, nor by adapting opinions to fashionable fancies, but by discovering, through the diligent contemplation of both, the principle which has all along been at work in them, and by removing any obstacles which hinder it from working efficiently now. Still they will have more sympathy with the doctrine which must always be the least popular one. I think, therefore, that they are bound to consider seriously whether the reviewer is not right in maintaining, that the professorial system has gone too far into decay. His charges may be exaggerated: I believe they are. His remedy, as I have already hinted, would tend to destroy English education altogether: but yet the fact remains. The professorial system is not what it was meant to be, and the reviewer has made out at least a plausible case for the assertion, that in former days it met with some foul play. I shall quote a passage from an impartial witness presently, which will show that it may have declined very naturally, without any violence. Still the evidence is too strong on my mind to be doubted, that the colleges did not watch very tenderly over that which is the essential characteristic of a university. I have said enough to show that I do not think the same cause has the least operation now; that I believe the fellows and tutors of colleges would most cheerfully co-operate in the work of raising the professorships to greater dignity and importance, or in doing anything else to exalt the character of the university, however much it might affect (and I do not know that this change would at all affect) their private interests. What, then, is the hinderance? I believe that I have pointed it out in the text, where I

have alluded to our ordinary notions of a university career, university examinations, and university honours. The professorships fell into decay at a time when a grievous lethargy had overtaken the universities, and the nation at large. They are hardly able to rise out of that decay, by reason of the respect which the university still feels for those dreamy, half-conscious experiments of reform, which it made on first awaking out of its lethargy. Till we have in some measure retraced the steps which were then taken, (I do not say hastily or suddenly, it is not wise so to imitate modern reformers, even while we are endeavouring to deliver ourselves from the consequences of their acts,) but yet with a steady determination to get into another track, to make study valuable for itself, and not for its results, to hold out truth, and not honours, as the object and the reward of our search—I do not see what chance there is of the university asserting its position as a teacher of this nation, and as a helper in the cultivation of Europe and of the world. I do not mean that Oxford has retrograded within the last twenty years,—far from it; I believe it has advanced greatly: that it has acquired an entirely new feeling of its own duties and importance; that it has improved its college system to a degree which some time ago could not have been anticipated. This alteration I attribute, however, not to the reforms which it has made, but to the spirit which induced the wish for these reforms, and which is now able to conduct them on a far sounder and safer principle. The system of examination and classification, I conceive, is an honest, but an ineffectual and unhappy attempt to connect study with the the student. At the time it was established, there was no other obvious way of doing this; for college instruction was carelessly and slothfully conducted; intercourse between the college

tutors and their pupils hardly existed. Now that instruction is really valuable; that intercourse is becoming, I trust, familiar and affectionate. We have, then, the link that we wanted; no other is necessary. With this kindly encouragement to enter upon a course of study; with this friendly direction in pursuing it; with this assistance in seeing how studies are related to each other, what is the end of them all—what is their bearing upon human life—the youthful collegian wants only the means of freely and effectually engaging in them. These means, I think, the professors should supply; the pupil should not be at liberty to choose which of them he should attend, which he should neglect; his course till he take his bachelor's degree should be strictly defined for him; some exercises, as severe as those in which he now engages, but more in the spirit of the old times (in letter, of course, most unlike what was formerly prescribed), not involving display and competition, but yet providing a sound test of science and scholarship should show that he is worthy of his degree. This is only a hint for better thinkers to work upon. I offer it in full consciousness that the experience of my own wants is almost my only warrant for venturing to do so.

Before I finish this note, let me ask the reader's attention to the following passage from Cousin—part of which is statistical, part argumentative. From the former I think we may safely deduce the inference that the lectures of professors are apt to be perverted from their original intention, and may altogether change their character without the intervention of collegiate wickedness and perjury; from the second, we learn that some contrivance must be resorted to everywhere, for the purpose of reconciling that which M. Cousin so well defines to be the purpose of the university—study—with that which, as truly, he declares to be the object of the school

or college, the mind of the student. That the mere payment of lecturers by the state or by the pupils, or by the state partly, and the pupils partly, will not accomplish the object, is proved, it seems to me, by the experience of both France and Germany; I would ask all persons who are concerned in the question, calmly to inquire, whether the most effectual provision for the purpose, may not be that incorporation of the colleges with the university which the Edinburgh reviewer wishes to destroy.

“ Il faut vous expliquer, M. le Ministre, ce que signifient ces mots *publice*, *privatim*, appliqués aux leçons des professeurs ordinaires. Tout professeur ordinaire, recevant de l'état un traitement fixe, est tenu de faire, pour ce traitement, quelques leçons gratuites sur le sujet le plus inhérent au titre de sa chaire : voilà ce que veut dire *legere publice*. Mais outre ces leçons, il a le droit d'en donner autant qu'il lui plaît sur des sujets qu'il croit convenir davantage aux goûts et aux besoins des étudiants, ou aux intérêts de sa propre réputation, pourvu que ces sujets se rattachent plus ou moins à la chaire dont il est titulaire, et ne sortent point du cercle de la faculté à laquelle il appartient : cela s'appelle *legere privatim*. Ces leçons se font dans l'auditoire de l'université, ou quelquefois dans la maison même du professeur ; elles sont payées, et le professeur fait très-peu d'exceptions à cet usage. N'en fait-il pas du tout, cela s'appelle *legere privatissime*. Le prix des leçons est réglé d'avance par les lois de l'université. Telle est la distinction de *publice* et de *privatim legere* ; mais cette distinction existe plutôt en droit qu'en fait en Allemagne, et elle s'efface de jour en jour davantage, surtout en Prusse, où les professeurs font très-peu de leçons gratuites. A Berlin, la plupart des professeurs ne lisent que *privatim*, et ceux qui, par devoir et pour la

forme, lisent aussi *publice*, ne mettent pas grand soin à cet enseignement gratuit, et ne font qu'une leçon de ce genre par semaine ; tandis que les *privata collegia*, les cours payés, se composent toujours par semaine de quatre ou cinq leçons.

L'objection que l'on fait en France aux leçons payées, est qu'elles mettent le professeur à la merci des élèves, et lui font oublier les intérêts de la science pour ceux de sa fortune. Cette objection serait fondée, si, en Allemagne, outre la rétribution des étudiants, le professeur n'avait pas un traitement fixe de l'état, traitement qui n'est pas le même pour tous, et qui est d'autant plus considérable que le professeur, à mérite égal, a, par la nature seule de son enseignement, moins de chances d'attirer beaucoup d'auditeurs. Le premier devoir du professeur est envers la science, non envers les étudiants ; c'est là la maxime de tout vrai professeur d'université, maxime qui sépare essentiellement l'université du collège. L'état doit donc assurer aux professeurs de l'université un traitement convenable, indépendant du nombre des élèves ; car souvent un cours n'a que sept ou huit élèves, la haute analyse, par exemple, ou la haute philologie, peut être d'une utilité infinie pour la science. Il ne faut pas qu'un grand géomètre, pour avoir de l'argent, perde son temps à enseigner les basses parties des mathématiques. D'un autre côté, l'état n'a pas le devoir de donner pour rien la science à tout le monde, et il est juste que, passé l'enseignement élémentaire, quiconque veut aborder plus ou moins la science, lui apporte son tribut. Cela est incontestable pour les collèges ; cela l'est également, et à plus forte raison, pour les universités : sans quoi il faudrait faire à tous les professeurs d'université indistinctement un traitement trop élevé qui ruinerait l'état, et qu'il serait souverainement injuste de tirer de la poche de tous les ci-

toyens au profit d'un très-petit nombre. Un traitement fixe, convenable, qui assure à un professeur le nécessaire, et des cours payés qui améliorent sa fortune en proportion de ses succès, tel est le juste milieu en cette matière. Par-là le professeur n'est jamais condamné à oublier les intérêts supérieurs de la science, et jamais non plus il ne peut, sous le beau semblant d'être un génie inaccessible, se passer de quelque succès et d'un certain nombre d'élèves. A cet avantage, ajoutez celui-ci, qui me paraît décisif ; c'est que les étudiants suivent avec bien plus de zèle et d'assuidité les cours qu'ils paient. *Chez nous, dans nos facultés des sciences et des lettres, les portes sont ouvertes à tout le monde, et entre qui veut sans rien payer : cela paraît admirable au premier coup d'œil, et digne d'une grande nation ; mais savez-vous ce qui en résulte ? D'abord, un pareil auditoire n'est guère qu'un parterre de théâtre ; on entre et l'on sort au milieu de la leçon ; on vient une fois pour ne plus revenir, si le professeur ne nous charme l'oreille ; on l'écoute avec distraction, et en général il y a des amateurs plutôt que de véritables étudiants. Et puis le professeur, qui ne perd pas une obole à mal faire, se néglige et met à ses leçons assez peu d'importance. Ou bien, aime-t-il la gloire, a-t-il une grande réputation à soigner, il est bien à craindre alors que, désespérant d'avoir un auditoire sérieux, il ne veuille au moins en avoir un nombreux. Dans ce cas, c'en est fait de la science ; car on a beau faire, on se proportionne à son auditoire. Il y a, dans les grandes foules, je ne sais quel ascendant presque magnétique qui subjugué les âmes les plus fermes ; et tel qui eût été un professeur sérieux et instructif pour une centaine d'étudiants attentifs, devient léger et superficiel avec un auditoire superficiel et léger. Enfin, que reste-t-il à toute cette foule, de l'enseignement qu'elle a suivi gratuitement ? une impression confuse qui peut avoir son utilité, comme l'impression plus ou*

moins vive qui laisse au théâtre un drame honnête et intéressant. Mais qu'est-ce que tout cela, comparé à l'assiduité laborieuse de cinquante ou cent auditeurs qui, ayant payé d'avance les leçons d'un professeur, les suivent opiniâtrement, les recueillent, les discutent, et cherchent à s'en rendre compte, parce que sans cela ils auraient perdu leur temps et leur argent ? Il faut que les étudiants paient quelque chose, et il faut aussi que l'état assure à des savans aussi distingués que doivent l'être des professeurs d'université, un traitement fixe convenable. C'est là la combinaison à laquelle toutes les universités de l'Europe se sont arrêtées depuis des siècles, et qui, en Allemagne, donne les plus heureux résultats. Il me paraît urgent d'adopter chez nous cette combinaison ; il ne s'agit même que de la transporter de nos collèges, où elle règne, à l'enseignement supérieur."

NOTES TO LECTURE III.

NOTE I.

The following passage from the article by Mr. Wyse, which is referred to in the lecture, will illustrate my remarks upon the progress of State Education in Prussia.

" Prussia directed her power very early, though somewhat irregularly, to education, especially elementary. Already in 1736 she had declared it to be a duty imposed upon the State, The '*Principia Regulatoria*' of the 30th of June of that year, imposes the

building and maintenance of school-houses on the patrons and communes (*Gemeinde*); applies the incomes of the church to the payment of teachers; determines their duties, rights, appointments, whether in garden, house, or salary; establishes the relations of patron, pastor, and commune, and appropriates a fund of 50,000 rixthalers for the extraordinary support of the schools.—(*Neigeb. sect. 1.*) By more recent ordinances, these provisions are extended, especially by the General School Regulation for Country Schools, (*General Landschul-Reglement*,) 12th August 1763, and by the Regulation for the Catholic Schools of Silesia, (*Katholische Schul-Reglement für Schlesien*,) of the 3rd of November, 1765, two of the most beneficial laws of Frederick the Great.”

“ By the ordinance of the 27th October, 1810, immediately after the peace of Tilsit, a special government department was created for Public Worship, Public Instruction, and Medicine, presided over by a minister of State (for many years the Baron von Altenstein), with a director under him, and composed of a number of counsellors, selected from the higher departments of the administration. This council, or board, determines the estimate or budget, for the establishment or maintenance of all institutions belonging to the higher branches of education, and is entrusted with the application of all funds destined to such purposes. Subordinate to this council, in each of the seven provinces of the kingdom is a Consistory (*Consistorium*), whose head is the president of the provincial government. Besides ecclesiastical matters, as far as they appertain to the State, this body has the management of middle and elementary education. The universities alone are placed under the immediate direction of the ministry. . But as the promises are again subdivided into governments, or

government circles (*Regierungs Bezirke*), each circle, with the exception of that in which the capital is situated, has also its special board of Church and school commissioners, which, under the guidance and direction of the Provincial Consistory, administer those affairs which require a more immediate personal superintendence. The head of this board is a member of the council of the circle, and has the initiative in all school affairs which require the co-operation of that body. He appears once a-year, with the right of voting in the Consistory, at the seat of the government of the province, in order to present a report on the relations existing between them and the board of school commissioners of his circle. This will appear more intelligible from a comparison of the ordinances respecting the better regulation of the provincial authorities, from 30th April, 1815. (*Neigeb.* § 178.)"

The arrangement in the other (in some respects more ecclesiastical) countries of Germany will be understood from the subjoined passages from a part of Cousin's Rapport, which Mrs. Austin has not translated.

Il y a en Saxe deux sortes de ministres : les uns, qu'on appelle ministres de cabinet, et qui sont des ministres politiques : les autres, qui sont, à proprement parler, des chefs d'administration ; on les nomme ministres de conférences. L'instruction publique n'a point en Saxe un ministre de cabinet ; elle est confiée à un directoire suprême, composé en très-grande partie d'ecclésiastiques, comme en Saxe-Weimar, et présidé, comme en Saxe-Weimar encore, par un laïque : mais ce laïque est ici un personnage important ; il est ministre, mais seulement ministre de conférences. C'est M. de Nostitz. Il y a là quelque chose qui ressemble assez à l'organisation de l'instruction publique sous l'empire, où le grand maître était aussi une sorte de mi-

nistre avec un conseil, au-dessous du ministre de l'intérieur.

Je n'ai pu savoir dans quel rapport précis étaient l'autorité du ministre et celle du consistoire ; je sais seulement que la part du consistoire est très-grande. Voilà donc ici un conseil auprès d'un ministre. J'ai déjà trouvé cette forme de gouvernement de l'instruction publique à Francfort et à Weimar, dans un consistoire présidé par un directeur. Je la trouve ici plus développée ; et je puis vous dire d'avance qu'en Prusse l'instruction publique n'a pas seulement un ministre, président d'un consistoire, mais un ministre assisté d'un conseil laïque et plus nombreux que le nôtre. On ne connaît point en Allemagne une autre forme d'administration pour l'instruction publique. Un ministre tout seul, sans aucun contre-poids, pourrait tout bouleverser en un jour, faire et défaire des réglemens à tort et à travers, et distribuer les places contre les règles de l'avancement et selon le bon plaisir. Les lumières d'un seul individu, si grandes qu'on les suppose, ne peuvent s'étendre à toutes les branches d'étude. Les considérations politiques prévaudront toujours auprès d'un ministre que sa position préoccupe et qui doit chercher à se faire des partisans. C'est de cette manière que les plus grands maux ont été faits chez nous de 1822 à 1828. Un ministre sans conseil est plus ou moins livré à des influences extérieures, étrangères aux études ; c'est pourquoi cette forme ultra-monarchique en administration sera toujours réclamée par la médiocrité intrigante et remuante. L'expérience générale démontre qu'un conseil composé d'hommes connus par leurs travaux dans les diverses branches de connaissances qu'embrasse l'instruction publique, est un appui nécessaire au meilleur ministre. C'est ce qu'avait compris Napoléon ; et il n'y a pas deux avis à cet égard en Allemagne.

Le ministre et le consistoire suprême gouvernent ici toute l'instruction publique ; mais la ville de Leipzig a retenu quelque chose d'une ville libre, et le gouvernement, qui la ménage, lui laisse une grande indépendance, particulièrement pour tout ce qui regarde l'instruction publique. Ainsi l'université de Leipzig n'a point, comme celle d'Iéna, un curateur nommé par le ministère, curateur soumis lui-même à une commission ministérielle. Ici, c'est le recteur de l'université, nommé par l'assemblée des professeurs, qui correspond avec le consistoire suprême. Cependant c'est toujours le consistoire qui propose au roi la nomination des professeurs de l'université ; et ces professeurs, outre les honoraires qu'ils tirent des élèves, ont un traitement de l'état. Mais pour les gymnases, une indépendance absolue est laissée à la ville de Leipzig. Ce sont les magistrats de la ville qui paient, et par conséquent qui nomment les professeurs des gymnases, sauf la confirmation du consistoire spécial de Leipzig, qui est tout ecclésiastique. Ce même consistoire surveille les gymnases, quant au spirituel : les magistrats de la ville en ont l'administration matérielle. Le gouvernement de l'instruction publique à Leipzig est donc moitié municipal et moitié ecclésiastique. C'est le caractère général de l'autorité en Saxe. L'influence ecclésiastique est encore plus forte dans la Saxe royale que dans la Saxe grand-ducale, et cette influence y est également bienfaisante et éclairée.

NOTE 2.

M. Cousin says, " Qui connaît une université Allemande connaît à peu près toutes les autres." To illustrate the general statement in the text, it will be suffi-

cient, therefore, to quote a part of his description of Jena. If the reader prefers to know the mechanism of a Prussian university, he will find some good papers upon Berlin and Bonn in the *Journal of Education*, but the details are little different. The subject of German university life is scarcely handled at all by Cousin. The reader is probably acquainted with the popular account of it in Russell's *Germany*, an account written in an unfriendly spirit, and not at all sufficient for a person really wishing to understand the feelings of the Germans, or the influence produced upon them by the late war, but proving clearly how deep the want of a national life in Germany is; how little power the state has to bestow it.

Cette université, comme toutes celles de l'Allemagne, est la réunion des diverses facultés, qui chez nous sont isolées, dans un corps unique, se gouvernant lui-même d'après les lois qui lui sont propres. Ces diverses facultés sont : 1° la faculté de théologie ; 2° la faculté de droit ; 3° la faculté de médecine ; 4° une faculté qui, sous le nom de faculté de philosophie, embrasse une foule d'objets qui chez nous ont été sagement distribués dans deux facultés, celle des sciences et celle des lettres. En effet, dans l'état actuel des connaissances humaines, les sciences et les lettres ont pris des développemens distincts trop considérables pour ne pas exiger deux facultés différentes ; et s'il est digne des efforts du philosophe d'embrasser les unes et les autres dans ses études, c'est une prétention qu'il ne faut pas consacrer officiellement, en donnant le nom de philosophie à la réunion de deux ordres de connaissances qui ont entre elles bien plus de différences que de ressemblances.

Chaque faculté nomme son doyen pour un semestre à tour de rôle. Il y a un recteur perpétuel et purement honorifique, qui est un prince ou un grand personnage

dont le nom paraît à peine dans les actes. Le vrai recteur est le prorecteur, (*prorector*), qui n'est nullement subordonné au recteur, mais qui seul est chargé de toute l'administration universitaire. Il y a de plus un ex-prorecteur, c'est-à-dire, un professeur qui supplée le prorecteur en cas de besoin.

Le prorecteur de l'université comme les doyens de chaque faculté, sont des professeurs qui font toujours leurs cours, et qui touchent de plus un préciput, comme indemnité du temps qu'ils consacrent à leur emploi. Cet emploi se renouvelant deux fois par année, comme le décanat, n'est pas un fardeau trop lourd et est un avantage pécuniaire. Le prorecteur est élu, dans chaque faculté, à tour de rôle. Il forme avec les doyens le petit conseil de l'université, qui suffit au courant des affaires. L'assemblée des professeurs forme le grand conseil, le sénat, *senatus academicus*, devant lequel sont portés les affaires de quelque importance.

Il y a trois classes de professeurs : 1° les professeurs ordinaires (*ordentliche*) qui sont nos professeurs titulaires ; 2° les professeurs extraordinaires (*ausserordentliche*), qui sont nos professeurs adjoints ; 3° des *doctores legentes* ou *Privat-Docenten*, qui ressemblent fort à nos agrégés de médecine. Ces *doctores legentes* sont la pépinière, la force et la vie de l'université. Ce sont des docteurs qui, pourvus de ce grade, se présentent auprès d'une faculté pour en obtenir la permission de faire un cours sur tel ou tel des objets qu'elle embrasse ; pour obtenir cette permission, il y a deux conditions : la première, que le candidat écrive une dissertation latine, comme *specimen sui*, sur un sujet à son gré, qui se rapporte à l'enseignement qu'il veut faire, *pro veniendi legendi* ou *docenti* ; la seconde, qu'il fasse une leçon publique devant le sénat. La permission d'enseigner donne le droit de faire des cours dans les salles de la

faculté. Le *Privat-docent* n'a d'autre salaire que celui qu'il reçoit des étudiants; mais comme ces cours comptent aux étudiants, aussi bien que ceux des autres professeurs, pour être admis à prendre des grades, il n'y a pas de raison pour que le *Privat-Docent*, n'ait autant d'élèves qu'un professeur même ordinaire et ne se crée une position supportable. Le titre de *doctor legens* se perd, si, après l'avoir obtenu, on ne s'en montre pas digne. Quatre semestres passés sans faire de leçons, le détruisent. Le *doctors legens* est aussi obligé, pour la forme, de soumettre ses cahiers au doyen de la faculté, qui autorise le cours en mettant au bas de l'annonce: *Vidi*.

Quand un docteur a enseigné de cette manière pendant quelques années, et quand il s'est distingué ou par ses leçons ou par ses écrits, il obtient le titre de professeur extraordinaire, c'est-à-dire qu'outre le droit de faire des leçons, il a un certain traitement fixe, qui améliore sa position.

Les professeurs ordinaires sont seuls membres d'une faculté; et comme tels, ils participent seuls à tous les actes de cette faculté et composent le sénat. Leur traitement est beaucoup plus considérable que celui des professeurs extraordinaires. C'est le gouvernement qui les nomme; mais le sénat a le droit de présenter plusieurs candidats: cette présentation s'appelle *Denomination*. Les candidats naturels sont les professeurs extraordinaires; mais il ne sont pas candidats exclusifs, et le sénat peut présenter, s'il lui plaît, tel homme célèbre, étranger à la faculté et même au pays. Le nombre des professeurs ordinaires, dans chaque faculté, est très-restreint; celui des professeurs extraordinaires est plus étendu; celui des *doctores legentes* plus considérable encore. Tous ces divers professeurs se soutiennent, s'animent les uns les autres. Le professeur titulaire ne

veut pas avoir moins d'auditeurs que le professeur extraordinaire, qui ne veut pas en avoir moins que le *doctor legens*, lequel fait effort pour s'élever jusqu'à eux et même pour les surpasser dans l'opinion des étudiants. Voilà comment, sans concours et sans intrigue, se recrutent les professeurs dans une université d'Allemagne. La facilité d'arriver à être *doctor legens* représente à peu près la liberté de l'enseignement. Cette facilité n'est pas excessive ; et il ne faut pas qu'elle le soit ; partager l'auditoire d'une faculté, faire des leçons qui comptent pour les grades, est un honneur et un avantage qu'il ne faut pas prodiguer.

Le nombre des professeurs ordinaires, à Iéna, est fixe. Nul ne peut occuper deux chaires à la fois. Le nombre des professeurs extraordinaires est indéterminé, ainsi que celui des *Privat Docenten*. Je ne parle pas ici de ce qu'on appelle les lecteurs, *lectores*, savoir, les maîtres de langues vivantes, de musique, d'armes, d'équitation, etc.

Chaque professeur ordinaire ou extraordinaire, ou *Privat-Docent*, fait sur la matière qu'il a choisie, un cours qui ne doit presque jamais durer plus d'un semestre. Donner un cours s'appelle *lire un collège* (*lesen ein Collegium*). Ce collège a au moins trois leçons par semaine et presque toujours davantage ; et encore chaque professeur lit plus d'un collège, toujours deux et quelquefois trois ; de sorte qu'il n'y a pas de professeur qui n'ait à faire par semaine dix ou douze leçons. Les professeurs sont donc, comme on voit, très-occupés ; mais aussi ils gagnent beaucoup d'argent ; car les étudiants paient pour chaque collège séparément. Le droit, de fréquenter un collège est presque partout d'un louis par semestre. Un professeur distingué peut avoir au moins une centaine d'auditeurs par collège, ce qui lui fait, pour trois collèges, trois cents louis par

semestre et six cents par an, outre son traitement fixe. Il faut ajouter qu'à Léna, par suite de privilèges antiques, les professeurs sont exempts d'une foule de droits et de contributions qu'il est inutile d'énumérer, et qu'ils ont certains avantages, souvent assez considérables, que l'université leur fait sur ses propres biens.

NOTE 3.

Perhaps I may alarm my readers by owning, that the passage which I have quoted respecting France before the revolution of July, is from La Mennais. The question, however, is one merely of fact, and not of opinion, and one on which he can be instantly contradicted if he has spoken falsely. At the same time I should be dishonest if I did not say, that I think any person who can bear with some extravagance and madness, for the sake of understanding the history and feelings of this time, will be wrong not to read the *Affaires de Rome* of this Catholic radical.

NOTE 4.

I have hinted that the admiration of accomplished Frenchmen for the German system, may be in part explained, by the miserable state into which their own education had fallen, through the mixture of jesuitical, infidel, and military notions, respectively bequeathed by the old régime, the revolution, and the imperial dynasty. In confirmation of this remark, I refer to M. Cousin's report, especially the earlier part of it. I

would especially request attention to the following paragraph which occurs in his letter on Leipzig ; it shows, I think, that the division of faculties, which I have censured, as the most calamitous result of state dominion, over the university system, had been carried to the farthest possible extent in France ; and that the combination of these, which seems to us so rude and inorganic in the German universities, was consequently to him a delightful and encouraging spectacle.

Mais le plus inouï est de voir, dans ce même pays, les diverses facultés dont se compose une université Allemande séparées les unes des autres, disséminées et comme perdues dans l'isolement ; ici des facultés des sciences où se font des cours de physique, de chimie, d'histoire naturelle, sans qu'il y ait à côté une faculté de médecine qui en profite ; là des facultés de droit et des facultés de théologie sans faculté des lettres, c'est-à-dire, sans histoire, sans littérature, sans philosophie. En vérité, si l'on se proposait de donner à l'esprit une culture exclusive et fausse, si l'on voulait faire des lettres frivoles, des beaux esprits-étrangers au mouvement et au développement des sciences, ou des savans sans lumières générales, des procureurs et des avocats au lieu de jurisconsultes, des séminaristes et des abbés au lieu de théologiens, je ne pourrais indiquer un plus sûr moyen, pour arriver à ce beau résultat, que la dissémination et l'isolement des facultés. Hélas ! nous avons une vingtaine de misérables facultés éparpillées sur la surface de la France, sans aucun vrai foyer de lumières, comme nous avons un grand nombre de cours royales sans magistrature. Une vingtaine de villes peut-être ont l'avantage d'avoir leur petite faculté avec leur petite cour royale. Mais que sort-il de tout cela pour la science et pour la patrie ? Hâtons-nous, M. le Ministre, de substituer à ces pauvres facultés de provinces, par-

tout languissantes et mourantes, de grands centres scientifiques, rares mais bien placés, qui renvoient au loin une forte lumière, quelques universités complètes, comme en Allemagne, c'est-à-dire, nos cinq facultés réunies, se prêtant l'une à l'autre un mutuel appui, de mutuelles lumières, un mutuel mouvement.

NOTE 5.

The university of Oxford proposed this question as the subject of the essay for the present year. *Quænam sint Academicæ erga Rempublicam Officia.*

In the essay which received the prize, I have met with many passages which I should like to quote in support of the opinions maintained in these lectures; and still more as a proof that there are students rising up at Oxford who thoroughly understand and feel their lofty vocation. But I cannot resist the temptation of defending and explaining my remarks upon the difference between an universal, and a professional education, by the following beautiful and impressive sentences.

Quid verò? Nonne ipsa Natura monet, quantò sit præstantius aliquem intra fines Academicæ illius verecundiæ præscribi, quàm Gorgianâ* (ut ita dicam) insolentiâ abusum, se, ad omnia de quibus quisque audire velit, paratum denunciare? Alia nempe adolescenti, alia jam maturo ingenio ætatum discrimen imponit; huic, vitæ rationes conquirendæ, debellanda fraus, temperanda cupido, indaganda veritas; illi, in certamen nondum initum acuenda sagacitas, arma ministranda, prævertendi hostes, exercendæ vires. Quid autem, si has

naturæ vices malè ominatâ properatione confundamus? quid si ætatis jam adultæ pulverem ac festinationem otio juventutis inferciamus? meridiano splendore oculos vix sublustri lumini assuetos præstringamus? Nullo sanè modo averti potest, quin is qui omnia adolescens didicerit, adultus nihil ritè conficiat. Omnia profectò confusa et temerè intermixta sibi pugnabunt; ipsas (quod ait Poeta) vivendi causas propter vitam prorsus perdiderit; ubi detrectandum certamen, periculis quàm maximis imprudens incidet; ubi dimicandum, dubius hærebit; juvenitas illi præmaturâ quasi canitie deformis; grandiore ætate jam seriùs puerili studio frustra insudandum: Veritas, denique, quam primis annis nimis curiosè et in-verecundè tractaverit, eundem senescentem indignata eludet. Quid? an veterum exempla repetamus? Ubi-cunque nimirum, sive apud antiquiores sive apud nosmet-ipsos, tota sit juventutis disciplina in studiis vitæ navandis posita, continuò unius cujusdam operis remiges aliquos aut bajulos, inopes humanitatis, sui amantes, aliis iniquos reperies; in ipsà Musarum sede literas pœnè intermortuas, protritatas artes, moribundam philosophiam; unde divinum quasi solem ab uno loco omnia collustrantem expectares, crepera tantùm lux per infinitam rerum sylvam diffusa et ferè exhausta vix tenebras circumjacentes dimovet. Si quid denique nos ipsius nostræ Academiæ, nonnisi in facultate "ARTIUM" a primis annis fundatæ, moveat auctoritas; si quid illa veterum Christianorum consuetudo, quæ alumni diu prius exercitatis, cognitionem demum quasi reconditam postea recluserit; nomo inficias ibit hanc esse Academiæ propriam vim, quam complexi sumus et definivimus.

NOTE 6.

I have said, that admiring foreigners, as well as natives, feel the utter want of a national life in Prussia. When about to pass the Prussian frontier, M. Cousin falls, as in official courtesy he was bound, into a rapture. His language while he is in this state is not so calm and philosophical as it commonly is; nevertheless it is worthy to be read, and considered, by Englishmen especially.

Mais il est temps de finir; dans quelques heures je quitterai Leipzig et prendrai la route de Berlin. J'y arriverai demain soir. Là, M. le ministre, je trouverai, au lieu de petits états comme Francfort et le duché de Saxe-Weimar ou même le royaume de Saxe, un empire de treize millions d'habitans, qui touche à la fois à la France et à la Russie, et qui, créé et constitué il y a un siècle par un grand homme, a devant lui autant d'avenir que les vieux empires du midi ont de passé derrière eux. Il ne s'agira plus de gouvernemens paternels et presque ecclésiastiques, mais d'un gouvernement essentiellement laïque et d'une monarchie presque militaire. Je regarde la France et la Prusse comme les deux pays les plus éclairés de l'Europe, les plus avancés dans les lettres et dans les sciences, les plus vraiment civilisés, sans excepter l'Angleterre, toute hérissée de préjugés, d'institutions gothiques, de coutumes à demi barbares, sur lesquels est mal étendu le manteau d'une civilisation toute matérielle. IL NE MANQUE A LA PRUSSE QU'UNE CONSTITUTION POLITIQUE, que sa situation géographique lui fait un devoir d'attendre encore, au sein de libertés municipales et de petites constitutions de détail dans toutes les parties du service public et de l'administration. Les analogies frappantes

qui existent entre la Prusse et la France, rendent d'autant plus intéressantes et curieuses les ressemblances comme les différences des deux pays dans l'instruction publique.

Il ne manque à la Prusse qu'une constitution politique,—That is all! In other words, her accomplished "creator," Frederick the Great, gave her everything *except* a soul; for that, like Undine, she has still to wait. Most earnestly do we of that country which is *toute herissée de préjugés*, desire that she may not have to wait long, and that the spiritual blessing may come to her without her body being rent by any terrible convulsion. We hope it; we scarcely dare expect it. But if we can do anything to help Prussia, whose sons are so willing to learn of us, so generous in admiring us for that wherein we are worthy, even sometimes so ready to copy us in that wherein we are *weak*—if we can do anything to help that other country—far more needing our compassion and assistance, and never proving her want of both so much as when in the midst of her own misery, she grins and rails at us—if we can do aught to help any part of Europe, it must be by prizing and preserving those "institutions Gothiques," those 'coutumes à demi barbares,' which we alone, of all Europeans, have retained; which make it impossible that we should ever own any monarch for our creator; which hinder our government from being essentially lay and almost military; to which we owe it, that the material civilization so justly imputed to us, is still only a veil stretched over us, and has not yet become the substance of the national heart. Let M. Cousin consider this fact well, and bring it under what category he likes; there are men in England who believe, and are ready to act on the belief, that in those Gothic institutions, those half barbarous costumes, lie the germs of a cultivation, which the world has never yet received, but which it may one day receive, and re-

ceive from us—a cultivation which shall utterly supersede that material civilization whereby England has been defiled, Prussia hindered from attaining freedom, and France we fear for a time destroyed.

NOTE 7.

That an enlightened state does feel the necessity of something more than a professional culture, and makes most awkward and ineffectual attempts to obtain it, I think will be evident to any one, who reads the following passage from Cousin's third letter on Weimar.

Et même, de peur que les étudiants se bornent à suivre les cours de la faculté spéciale à laquelle ils sont attachés, ce qui rendrait leur instruction exclusive et incomplète, une ordonnance du grand-duc, en date du 8 Avril dernier, a décidé qu'à l'avenir tout étudiant qui se présentera, après avoir fait son temps d'université, aux examens de candidature (*Candidaten-Examen*), pour obtenir quelque emploi, comme théologien, comme juriste ou comme médecin, devra, pour être admis à ces examens, présenter des certificats constatant qu'*outré les cours de la faculté à laquelle il appartient*, il a, pendant chaque semestre de ses trois années d'université, suivi exactement un cours de philosophie ou d'histoire ou de mathématiques ou de philologie. La logique et la métaphysique, la psychologie, l'histoire de la philosophie, et pour les juristes une encyclopédie des sciences politiques et administratives (*Staats und Kameralwissenschaften*), sont des cours indispensables. Trois années d'études à l'université seront désormais légalement suffisantes pour que l'on puisse se présenter aux examens de la candidature. Mais en raison des connaissances

étendues que l'état actuel de la civilisation exige, on engage les étudiants à prolonger leurs études une quatrième année, ou du moins, si des obstacles les en empêchent, il leur est expressément recommandé de suppléer au temps qui leur manquerait, par des efforts redoublés et par une distribution bien entendue de leurs travaux.

According to this ingenious scheme it will be seen, that a course of mathematics, philosophy, or philology, is considered a good *supplement* to the particular discipline requisite for forming the physician or the jurist. It is comely and ornamental, for a professional man, to have a little spice of what is human !

NOTE 8.

The speaker who maintained in the House of Commons, that public opinion should be the great moving power in education, was Mr. D'Israeli. See report of his speech, Times, Saturday, June 22nd.

This ingenious reasoner referred to the absence of public opinion in China, and the consequent degradation of the people, notwithstanding great efforts on the part of the state to civilize them, as a proof of his proposition. No doubt the history of China, is one that should be seriously meditated on by any one who is hoping to produce a spiritual effect, by a material machinery. But has Mr. D'Israeli considered what a country is, with *only* a public opinion as well as what a country is without one ? Has he studied North America as well as China ? Has he ever thoughtfully perused the following passage from De Tocqueville ?

Je ne connais pas de pays où il règne en général

moins d'indépendance d'esprit et de véritable liberté de discussion qu'en Amérique.

En Amérique, la majorité trace un cercle formidable autour de la pensée. Au dedans de ces limites, l'écrivain est libre, mais malheur à lui s'il ose en sortir. Ce n'est pas qu'il ait à craindre un auto-da-fé ; mais il est en butte à des dégoûts de tous genres et à des persécutions de tous les jours. La carrière poétique lui est fermée ; il a offensé la seule puissance qui ait la faculté de l'ouvrir. On lui refuse tout, jusqu'à la gloire. Avant de publier ses opinions il croyait avoir des partisans ; il lui semble qu'il n'en a plus, maintenant qu'il s'est découvert à tous ; car ceux qui le blâment s'expriment hautement, et ceux qui pensent comme lui, sans avoir son courage, se taisent et s'éloignent. Il cède, il plie enfin sous l'effort de chaque jour, et rentre dans le silence, comme s'il éprouvait des remords d'avoir dit vrai.

Des chaînes et des bourreaux, ce sont là les instruments grossiers, qu'employait jadis la tyrannie. Mais de nos jours la civilisation a perfectionné jusqu'au despotisme lui-même, qui semblait pourtant n'avoir plus rien à apprendre.

Les princes avaient, pour ainsi dire, matérialisé la violence ; les républiques démocratiques de nos jours l'ont rendue tout aussi intellectuelle que la volonté humaine qu'elle veut contraindre. Sous le gouvernement absolu d'un seul, le despotisme, pour arriver à l'âme, frappait grossièrement le corps ; et l'âme échappant à ces coups, s'élevait glorieuse au-dessus de lui ; mais dans les républiques démocratiques, ce n'est point ainsi que procède la tyrannie ; elle laisse le corps et va droit à l'âme. Le maître n'y dit plus : Vous penserez comme moi, ou vous mourrez ; il dit : Vous êtes libre de ne point penser ainsi que moi : votre vie, vos biens, tout vous reste ; mais de ce jour vous êtes un étranger

parmi nous. Vous garderez vos privilèges à la cité, mais il vous deviendront inutiles ; car si vous briguez le choix de vos concitoyens, ils ne vous l'accorderont point, et si vous ne demandez que leur estime, ils feindront encore de vous la refuser. Vous resterez parmi les hommes mais vous perdrez vos droits à l'humanité. Quand vous vous approcherez de vos semblables, ils vous fuiront comme un être impur ; et ceux qui croient à votre innocence, ceux-là même vous abandonneront, car on les fuirait à leur tour. Allez en paix, je vous laisse la vie, mais je vous la laisse pire que la mort.

Les monarchies absolues avaient déshonoré le despotisme ; prenons garde que les républiques démocratiques ne le réhabilitent, et qu'en le rendant plus lourd pour quelques-uns, elles ne lui ôtent, aux yeux du plus grand nombre, son aspect odieux et son caractère avilissant.

NOTE 9.

The writer in the Edinburgh Review, to whom I referred in a former note as the ablest opponent of our college system, differs altogether from the writer in the Journal of Education, in his notion of rights. He sees the monstrous absurdity of a State pleading its naked omnipotence, and refusing to recognise those principles of order which are the foundation of its own existence. But then he says : By the very constitution of the university, the sovereign, who is but one branch of the legislature, has the right of visiting and remodelling them ; therefore, *a fortiori*, the whole legislature has the same right. The argument is exceedingly plausible, yet I should not despair of convincing any one who has got so far as to acknowledge the existence of relations which must not be violated, that it is an un-

tenable one. If what I have said elsewhere be true, the king, according to the idea of our constitution, is precisely the bond between the state power and the ecclesiastical power in the country. The king, then, as visitor of the universities, is not merely a branch of the legislature; the *a fortiori* argument will not apply. I do not expect the reviewer to admit my doctrine to be true, I only want to show that we have a case—that we can maintain our objection to state interference upon a principle which we have previously admitted on different grounds, and in application to other circumstances. If he sees this, he will be more ready to listen to our arguments from expediency. I have tried to show, in this lecture, that the State has need of an education power independent of itself; nay, cannot dispense with it. If this be once admitted, I suppose statesmen will not gain much by pleading either their power or their rights, seeing that both alike would lead them to do mischief. With respect to precedents of interference on the part either of kings or parliaments, they are worth no more than Hume's precedents for the tyranny of the Stuarts. He did not prove that the privileges of the House of Commons were not inherent in our constitution, but only that they had very often not been recognized. I have admitted again and again, that the state power and the education power, have each frequently misunderstood their relative position; but I have said that through these very misunderstandings we discover what their relative position is.

NOTE 10.

I might have found a direct excuse, if I had desired one, for adverting in a lecture upon Education, to the

disputes between the Prussian government and the Archbishop of Cologne. For any one who has watched the progress of that interesting controversy, must be aware that it turns almost as much upon the government and discipline of the University of Bonn, and the respective rights of the Catholic Archbishop, and the Royal power to interfere with it, as upon the question of mixed marriages. Nearly one half of the official documents presented by the Prussian government to the other courts of Europe, has reference to this point.

NOTES TO LECTURE IV.

NOTE 1.

I am well aware that there are persons who will be much startled by my remark, that the priests, at the Reformation, did not assert their priestly power less than those that had preceded them, but only asserted it for a different end. I know that the Reformation has been described (and by a person for whose opinions I entertain a sincere respect) as the rising up of the *man* against the *clergyman*. Such a phrase once uttered, takes hold of our minds, and we are not easily able to lose the impression of it afterwards. Still the facts notoriously stand thus:—The authors of this movement were themselves clergymen, and they did not assume some other office than that of clergymen in order to create this movement, but precisely that office, and they were not less revered by the persons who gave heed to them, than former clergymen had been,

but more revered. The question then is simply this :—Is the truth of the words, “This was an insurrection of man against clergyman,” better explained by my doctrine, that at this time clergymen discovered their office to be expressly that which enabled them to call forth the humanity in men, and not to suppress it? or by the other, that at this time their office was discovered to be one which all men possessed equally? I ask every one, putting aside pretty antithetical phrases, and cant, and quackery of all kinds, calmly to consider the history, and declare which of these statements accords best with it. Do I mean then to say that no such effect as that which is thus described, was an ultimate result of the Reformation? Do I mean that the office of a clergyman is now as much respected as it was then? I mean no such thing. I fully admit that the denial of any difference between the clerical office and other offices, is remarkably characteristic of modern times, and is one of the accidental results of the Reformation. But I mean this too, that the effect of this change has not been to exalt the man into the place of the clergyman, but to degrade both. I mean that the effect of denying that an order has been sent into the world for the express purpose of cultivating the humanity in men, has led to a disbelief that there is a humanity to be cultivated. I mean that these two opinions have grown up side by side, and cannot be separated. I mean that the worshippers of intellect and genius in this day are propagating both together, and while they pretend to be putting all men on a level, and for that purpose to be deposing clergymen from their authority, are really striving to set up a few men as objects of idolatry, and to debase and degrade the rest of their species. I mean that the denial of any meaning or validity in the clerical ordination, or the clerical

office, is leading men rapidly to a low and contemptuous estimate of their fellows as actual living creatures ; all the reverence for a man, as a man, being changed into reverence for certain peculiar powers which certain peculiar men have put forth. I mean that a cold, hard-hearted, savage state of mind is thus forming in our men of letters, which will assuredly be avenged by a general rise of poor and suffering men to assert their place in creation, and to sweep away all the monuments of art and wisdom which have been set up to the disparagement of them. I mean, that to avert this catastrophe no less than to maintain the rights of these poor men, we are bound to stand forth and say, we have this office, and, by God's help, we will assert its powers and exercise them. I mean, that for doing this we shall be scorned or hated by all the intellect worshippers of the day. But I mean also, that the thought of the good we may do them and the whole land. should be a sufficient motive, had we no better guide, to persevere, not bating a jot of heart or hope, but bearing right onwards.

NOTE 2.

A most able and accomplished patroness of state Education has made some remarks upon the power of the clergy, which I must do myself the pleasure of extracting :

“The people of England will not grudge much more than their Church, wealthy as it is, enjoys, if they are once persuaded of its utility. It would be easy to convince them of the expediency of rewarding to profusion (if that were the only means of attaining the end) a body of men taught their business as guides, friends, eachers of the people ; accurately informed as to the

sort of intellectual wants which it should be their business to minister to; thoroughly armed with weapons against all popular prejudices and delusions; imbued with so much of the physical, moral, and social sciences, as to keep up a constant and unwearied warfare against the evils that poverty and ignorance engender; superior to all around them in knowledge, intelligence, and virtue, yet the servants of the lowest. We appeal to all who have ever seen some of those rare exceptions which approach to this Ideal, whether the power of such men is not as boundless and absolute as it is salutary and merited? Something very far short of this will give a man an influence, such as no wealth, no rank, no political power, can ever bestow. A parish priest is officially a party to all the most important and touching incidents of the lives of his flock. He is the only person living in whom it is not an impertinent intrusion to inquire into their comings and goings, their works and ways, their joys and griefs; for he is their natural adviser, friend and consoler; it is through his mouth that all they love or reverence most, speaks. Would to God that they understood their mission! that they saw wherein their strength lay!

“ People talk of the power of demagogues;—but what could the subtlest brawler oppose to the influence of him who visits the poor man’s lowly hearth as a familiar friend; who tells him how to make the most of his small earnings; how to cultivate his field or his garden; who makes peace between him and his neighbour; who watches over the education of his children; who reclaims the one from his wanderings; stands by the sick bed of the other, and instructs its anxious but ignorant mother how to alleviate its pains; and, when it dies, binds up her broken heart, and, after he has blessed the sod where its body is laid to rest, ceases not to direct

her thoughts to its spirit in Heaven;—the man who is witness and partaker of the deepest joys and sorrows of this life, and whose vocation it is to hallow them all?

‘A parsonage,’ says one who felt the duties of his calling, ‘should be a place of refuge—a house of mercy. The very sight of it should be pleasing to the poor and desolate.’*

“Are these too laborious duties that we exact?—say, rather, too glorious privileges that we confer? We hope not. Such, and none other, do we understand the calling of a Christian pastor to be; nor can we abate one jot of the piety or the knowledge required for its fulfilment, in those who take upon themselves the awful responsibility which, in the eyes of God and man, attaches to the teachers of a nation.”

I trust that no clergyman would wish that one jot of Mrs. Austin’s acquirements should be abated.

NOTE 3.

I extract the following important passage from Mr. Robert Wilberforce’s letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, in reference to the remarks of Professor Pillans, upon the mixed schools in Prussia :

“In the year 1834, three mixed schools were said by Dr. Julius to exist in Prussia, there being at the same time forty of the contrary kind. I have authority for stating that the Prussian government some time since determined that these three should be suspended, and a similar resolution was taken in regard to one or two

* Life of the Rev. H. Venn.

Gymnasia (as that at Dusseldorf), where the same system had been adopted. In Prussia, therefore, the plan now recommended in England is not only in theory held to be injurious, but has been abandoned on the testimony of experience."

NOTE 4.

I have not pressed so much as I wished, the argument for the danger of a State Education, at this time especially, and for the necessity of an Ecclesiastical Education at this time especially, which is derived from the tendency of modern civilization to produce a special, professional, and consequently, material habit of mind; I am delighted, therefore, to avail myself of a passage from one of the papers of the Central Society contributed by a scholar of first-rate eminence, Mr. George Long. The article is on the subject of endowments, and it is mainly occupied in proving that these, and the Education of the country generally, ought to be placed under the control of a Minister of Public Instruction. The testimony, therefore, which is furnished by the passage beneath is of immense value :

"We shall not omit what we consider to have been one of the unfavourable effects, or accompaniments, of this development of our natural industry; and in doing this, it cannot be supposed that we would undervalue the services of those truly great men, whose genius and whose labours have contributed, and are contributing daily, to the happiness of every individual, by bringing within his reach a greater number of those objects which tend to make life desirable and happy. But we must not shut our eyes to the fact, that the energies of this people

have long been turned nearly altogether to material objects, and their thoughts to the consideration of the properties and relations of matter, without further reference to the condition of society than as it affects production and consumption. Thus the ingenuity of a small number is exercised as discoverers and inventors, and the mass are occupied in producing and distributing; and such must be the state of a nation where the arts are progressive, where capital is accumulated, and industry is habitual; but we must observe, that such a state of progress and prosperity in one direction may co-exist with a state of society which viewed, in all other relations, may be stationary, or even retrograde. Thus in this country, while the nation was for many years increasing in wealth and external prosperity, there was little progress made in those sciences which embrace the noblest objects of human contemplation, and also the most difficult, because the relations of the things to be considered are the most varied and complex—the conditions on which depend the happiness and stability of society—those conditions without which wealth when acquired cannot be enjoyed, when accumulated cannot be preserved, and without which it cannot ultimately be either accumulated or acquired. Thus at the close of the last century, and for a considerable part of this, almost the only results of thought and industry that command our admiration were, with some few exceptions, those which belong to the improvement of the useful arts of life, as they are termed. Valuable as these arts are, they are of diminished value and of doubtful security in a country where they co-exist with a mass of ignorance and misery, which, though not produced by them as causes, must, as things are constituted, exist with them.

“ Barren and unprofitable as many of those branches of knowledge appear to be which are now cultivated with so

much assiduity, it cannot be said that even the most trivial among them does not occasionally lead to discoveries or results calculated—to use the words of one who formed a juster judgment of the ends of science than many who have more successfully laboured in it—‘to enrich human life with new discoveries and wealth.’—(*Organum*, 1 aph. 81). And those who are occupied even on an unproductive soil, have at least the enjoyment which accompanies and is one of the rewards of labour—the satisfaction of struggling with and conquering difficulties, and seeing, numbering, registering, describing, or arranging something that nobody, or very few, have seen numbered, registered, and described or arranged. But the tendency both of the higher exertions of the intellect, when confined to the study of the phenomena called those of nature, and the tendency of these much less elevated exertions of the mind, which are more particularly limited to observation, description, naming, registration, and arrangement, are both opposed to the investigation of those phenomena which make up the existence of society, and of those principles according to which, in order to exist happily, it must be governed. Thus in running after matter, as it is termed, we have become most *material*, and we might almost conclude, from looking at the nature of those studies which largely occupy the youth of this country, and of those objects for which learned societies and other similar associations exist, that there are no other objects but those *special* objects that are deserving our notice. It would seem to have been hardly considered that there are *general* objects of inquiry and of research which embrace the interests of the whole community, and to which those *special* objects are so far subordinate as to depend for their effectual prosecution on the previous conditions being fulfilled.”

NOTES TO LECTURE V.

NOTE 1.

The principal difficulty I have found, in making the importance of middle schools intelligible, arises from a floating apprehension in the minds of our countrymen, that the Education of tradesmen, must be either to fit them for trades, or else may be carried on effectually in the old grammar-schools. I therefore made it one chief object in this Lecture, to show why neither of these courses is right on principle, or adapted to our present emergencies. What I said, is of course intended for England; nevertheless, since I delivered the Lecture, I have met with a passage in Cousin, which argues with singular clearness and precision, for the adoption of the same course in France on precisely the same grounds. The passage will be found in Mrs. Austin's translation.

NOTE 2.

In a pamphlet by Mr. Hussey, of Christ-church, I find that an opinion is given respecting Latin instruction, which differs somewhat from mine.

“ The principles of language are the same universally, so that learning them in one is learning them for

all: and hence it is, that in classical education the languages first learned grammatically take a very long time to learn, because in them the universal principles must be acquired; but others which are studied afterwards are soon mastered. It will be enough, therefore, to have one language taught theoretically. But *what* language? There are obvious reasons why English is not the best. It is very irregular in every part, and inconsistent with itself; and inferior in point of construction to some others. There is not yet any good English grammar fit to teach *that*, for learning which the study of languages is to be introduced into our system. Very little more labour than would be needed for learning English grammatically, would serve to teach Latin, if Latin were thought desirable in itself. Now if we allow ourselves to connect these schools in idea with the National Schools, think of them as designed at all for the same class of persons, or rank them under the same kind of school, (as perhaps some are unthinkingly inclined to do,) it is clearly absurd to introduce Latin. But it is a great mistake so to conceive of them; and they can hardly be set on anything like a proper footing, if they are in any degree confounded with the National Schools. They ought to be schools fitted for all who can pay for their own education, from the poorest of that class, up to those who are only just below a classical education. It is beyond dispute, that many in this class would find a knowledge of Latin beneficial. If it were not useful to them in their business, as it would be to many, at least they would be capable of benefit from that additional means of gaining information; and no doubt this accomplishment would be valued, and bring respect to those who possessed it from those who did not. *You* know that a desire to have this included in the system, and a decided opinion of the

estimation in which it is held, has been strongly expressed in the class of tradesmen, in one instance at least. I think, therefore, that Latin should be taught in your schools; if not to all, at least to all who wish for it." *

I do not think these arguments conclusive, for these reasons:—I do not happen to have ever met with any persons who have become acquainted with the principles of language merely by studying Latin. I do not say there are not such persons; and Mr. Hussey's experience, which is very far more extensive than mine, may have brought him acquainted with them; but it seems to me, that at least in nine cases out of ten, the boys in the grammar-schools grow into an acquaintance with the principles of language, by comparing the two languages which they are taught together, not formally, perhaps, but unconsciously and habitually. And of the two, I should say, they acquired far more knowledge of principles through Greek than through Latin. Yet Mr. Hussey does not propose to teach Greek in the middle schools, or to give the pupil the means of connecting this language in his mind with any other. It seems to me, then, that the best compensation for the disadvantage of not studying language in the universal way in which it is studied in the grammar schools, is the interest which we take in our own language. Why this interest may be even stronger in a middle school-boy than it would be in a grammar school-boy, I have explained in my lectures. I have explained also why,

* Latin is taught to this class in Ireland; but to what extent, or in what manner, I do not know. I have met with the keeper of a public-house, of a very low class, who could read a Latin inscription on a tomb-stone, which he did with a foreign pronunciation.

with the help of it, and of a scholar-like master, the want of an English grammar, which Mr. Hussey laments, may not be an insuperable evil. The argument, from the wishes of the middle class, would have great weight with me. But I have already met those wishes by proposing that Latin should be taught, not as an induction to English, but as the reward for understanding it. The boy who has gone through both courses in an orderly manner, will then be able to compare his own language with the Latin, and so to obtain a portion, at least, of the good, which I spoke of as especially belonging to the other method of study.

Mr. Hussey also maintains that the middle school, and the training school ought to be united. Here I am at issue with him, though, perhaps, more in words, than in reality. He urges the advantage which has resulted to the universities, from the mixture of embryo clergymen, the direct teachers of the land, with embryo lawyers, statesmen, etc. This advantage I feel to be most important, and I have shown how I think it may be ultimately attained in the training schools. But the question, as it appears to me, is not whether Oxford and Cambridge should be merely places for teaching clergymen, but whether Oxford and Cambridge should be confounded with Eton and Westminster. The training schools I would have answer to the first, the middle schools to the second. As it is the *sine quâ non* of clergymen that they should go to the university; it would be the *sine quâ non* of teachers that they should go to the training school. As higher professional men may go and do go to the universities, so the higher tradesmen may go, and I think would go to the training school. Still there must be an Education for those who cannot do this, and this Education will be conducted in what I have called the middle schools. With the rest of Mr.

Hussey's pamphlet the views which I have expressed, are, I am happy to say, in accordance; only that he has illustrated them, and especially the application of poetry to education, at greater length, and with far greater ability.

NOTE 3.

I thought I had ventured enough in proposing the study of Anglo Saxon in the middle schools, and that it was better to abstain from any other very flagrant suggestion. Otherwise I should have taken courage to hint that the studies of the Latin class in these schools, might, like the English studies, bear upon the history of their own country. It may shock the prejudices of some that I should propose the substitution of Matthew Paris for Livy — of William of Malmsbury for Tacitus. But I cannot help thinking, that middle-age Latin, may have a worth of its own, nay, that it may even enable boys educated in the manner I have described, to understand the language better than classical Latin would. I do not think even that there would be any great harm in reading the old ecclesiastical hymns, as well the modern poetry of Buchanan, Milton, or Gray, instead of Virgil and Horace. Certainly if this were the only poetry put into the pupil's hands, it might hurt him to study what is not purely genuine and native. But I suppose him to be already well schooled in the best English poetry, and being so, I think, the very defects of modern Latin Poetry, might rather assist him, than otherwise, to feel the strength and beauty of that which is original. Then if he liked, afterwards, at his own leisure to study true Roman literature, he would be able only the more heartily to appreciate it. But these are thoughts to which I attach no value and

should never think of offering, except to those who are too earnest to make any experiments, in deference to a theory, and too wise to reject any hints which after due sifting and consideration may be turned to a practical account.

NOTES TO LECTURE VI.

NOTE 1.

I have spoken of the great practical talent which is to be found in England at the present time, and which may be turned to the best possible account in education, if it is not exalted above that wisdom which deals with principles and objects. A work lately published by Mrs. Tuckfield, entitled *Education for the People*, exhibits a very high form of this practical talent, united with a very unusual measure of the other and still nobler quality. I must complain of this clear and excellent writer for some remarks which she has made upon the Corresponding Committee of the National Society, a committee with which I have not the slightest connection, but which, so far as I am able to judge, is working with more simplicity of purpose, with more steadiness and consistency, with less regard to mere system, and more anxiety to discover the true and practical method of educating the whole people, than any body which has been in this country for a very long time indeed. No persons are striving more, in Miss Edgeworth's happy phrase, 'to make themselves useless,' by engaging the whole ecclesiastical force of the country in the work which they have for a time taken upon themselves, than those whom Mrs. Tuckfield so hastily and unadvisedly censures for as-

suming functions which they cannot fulfil. Thus much I have felt bound to say, in justice to these able and indefatigable labourers, and I say it the rather, because I have expressed an opinion in accordance with Mrs. Tuckfield's on the subject of the machinery which Dr. Bell introduced, and which for some time was thought an indispensable part of the National School system. But I am quite satisfied that this committee and the society to which they belong, will readily pardon any of this lady's hard sayings, in consideration of the admirable help which she has afforded them and all other persons concerned in the practical part of education. I willingly supply from her valuable little book the deficiencies which, partly time, but chiefly inability, occasioned in my last lecture. The following specimen of a catechetical lecture seems to me excellent. I wish no better exposition of what I said respecting the use which a living teacher might make of our manual of education.

"I have commenced my Sunday-School Catechetical lectures; and I will, as I promised, give you some account of my plan of proceeding. We agreed, you recollect, that it would break poor old Crabbe's heart, if we deprived him of his post as Sunday-School-master, or even if we appeared to undervalue the proficiency of his scholars, who, as he informed us, could 'say all the catechize, broken catechize, and whole catechize right through—texts, proofs, chief truths, and not miss a word of 'em,' I was very anxious not to mortify this good old soul—so I told him that as the elder boys could say it all so perfectly, they should sit by and help me to teach the younger children, and should also write portions of what they knew by heart, on their slates. I begged them to begin by writing their duty towards their neighbour. This was so very moderately done, so many words ill spelt, etc., that I said they should dictate the

words to me, and that I would write them on the black board for the benefit of the little ones, who had not yet learned the catechism ; and I desired them to correct their slates, while I read very slowly and distinctly what I had written, the little boys repeating the words after me very distinctly ; and in a subdued tone of voice. We then talked over the subject as familiarly as we could. I need not trouble you with the familiar illustrations of the different ways in which we could prove our desire to obey God by loving our neighbours, which I elicited from my little attentive congregation : even old Crabbe smiled, and put in a cheerful word now and then, occasionally reminding me, they knew it all, because he was ‘always keeping a telling ’em.’

“ I asked the elder boys whether they could recollect some texts of Scripture to write on their slates, in which the love of our neighbour was enjoined. I soon found that all the texts, and proofs, and Scripture references which they had learned by heart, were forgotten, when I put them out of their usual routine—but of this I took no notice.

“ I have often observed that it is a common and pernicious error, to deride and undervalue before children the former teaching they have received.

“ When they could not answer, I suggested the answer ; and often contrived to draw out and arrange the little they did know, so as to make it appear they were really helping me to instruct and question the younger children. My great object was to break up the old mechanical routine, without mortifying the old master, or the scholars, and to bring about gradually and insensibly an easy, natural attitude of mind. Of course, we made but little progress at first ; but I am happy to say that in the course of a month we have gained something ; and my catechetical lectures are every Sunday eagerly anticipated.

“ I have advised that before I come into the school, a short portion of the catechism should be written on the slates by the boys who can write, and dictated by those who cannot write, to John Roberts, who chalks the portion on the wall from the dictation of the children ; and these portions are afterwards read *very slowly, softly, and distinctly*, (distinct, clear utterance, I endeavour to enforce, as well as subdued tones of voice) ; no attempt at comment or explanation is made. Poor old Crabbe I have desired to overlook the slate-writing of the elder boys ; and by showing him always kindness and respect, I have avoided all jealous, sore feelings on his part on this change of system. When I arrive, I take up any portion of the catechism I find, from accidental circumstances, that I can best illustrate and dwell upon.

One Sunday, several of the children had been attending the christening of little Henry Williams. My theme that day was the first part of the catechism. I did not attempt to explain every sentence : we repeated slowly and exactly, “ *the promise and vow, first, secondly, and thirdly ;*” and it did not distress me, that I could not easily simplify these answers, so as to make them perfectly intelligible to my young hearers. As a clergyman of the Church of England, it is my duty to take care that the Church catechism is learned by my young flock. My business is not to consider whether it is exactly adapted to the comprehension of children,* but gradually to connect with it ideas and feelings which will remain impressed on their hearts and minds, and which this form of words may hereafter serve as a framework to retain and recal to their memories.

I asked them if they had seen little Williams placed in my arms in the Church, and whether they had seen me sprinkle water over his forehead, and then make

* See Keble's Christian Year—Hymn on the Church Catechism.

the sign of the cross on his forehead I reminded them how we had all knelt down in the Church, and prayed to God to bless little Henry, and to grant that he might learn and know the will of God, and, obey all the commands Jesus Christ had given us. I turned to Henry's elder brother, and asked him whether he knew what the godfathers and godmothers had said little Henry must do. They had said that he must keep from all bad and wicked ways, and become a very good child, and follow the example of Christ. I asked Henry's elder brother James, whether he thought that when baby was old enough to understand him he could help him to keep these promises made at his baptism. James said he would 'always be a telling him.' I then consulted all the class on the best way in which they could persuade others to do their duty : and the effect of good examples was discussed ; and gradually I drew from them a pretty accurate account of all their little duties, and of the manner in which they must act and behave, if they would have God for their Father and Friend, and if they desired to be members of Christ ; that is, so to belong to Christ, as to be one with him, to walk in his steps ; and then, I said, they would belong to Christ their Lord and Master, the Head of the body of all Christians ; then they might hope to be inheritors of the kingdom of heaven. I cannot exactly repeat our conversation : my great wish was to let the children lead the way ; but I find it difficult to avoid the error which all teachers fall into, of saying and teaching too much, and thus overstraining or bewildering the minds of my little auditors. We touched on the use of water in baptism, and I think that they entered into the idea of the outward sign of inward purification. I occasionally addressed myself to the elder boys, and referred to several passages of Scripture, which they wrote on their slates, on the subject of baptism. We spoke of

John the Baptist; of Christ coming to him to be baptised that he might fulfil all righteousness; of the voice from heaven, saying, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased;" and the commission of Christ to his disciples, to "baptise all nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost." When any portion of the Creed is our theme, we always talk over different incidents in our Saviour's life to which it relates; sometimes we take up one part, sometimes another; and I open the Bible and read some passages illustrating the subject. But though I branch out in this way, and elicit questions and observations from my hearers, I try not to wander too far, nor to introduce too great a variety of subjects; we perhaps talk over only one point in the portion of the catechism selected for the morning: but then before we conclude, we repeat reverently and distinctly the whole passage, thus replacing in its framework the part we have been endeavouring to render interesting and intelligible."

The remarks on Infant Schools are equally as sensible.

"I believe that in the over-crowded state of our great cities, infant schools are invaluable; and whatever mistakes or puerilities I sometimes observe in the manner in which they are conducted, I am too thankful for their existence to be disposed to criticise very severely. I believe that the use of infant schools is to keep children good, safe, and happy, where their homes are unsafe and injurious. If the mother is kind and judicious, and has time to attend to her children, I think, that till four or five years old, children should not be taken from home. But this is seldom the case; and, therefore, infant schools are the greatest blessings to the poor. Certainly, if it is necessary to collect very large numbers of young infants together, many methods become useful which are not the best in themselves. I must

own, however, that that expression, "*The Infant System*," recalls to my mind some errors and absurdities, which I think will be avoided whenever sensible women are better educated and fitted to undertake preparatory schools, with the assistance of elder girls.

"When we consider how inevitably the care of young children devolves upon mothers of families, we should be disposed to think it probable that Providence would have endued the female mind with the qualities most requisite for training infants; and accordingly, we find that women, much more often than men, possess the gentleness, patience, playfulness, the persevering attention to little details, which are so needful.

"They seem often intuitively gifted with the art of interesting and catching the attention of children; and without any effort they can simplify their expressions, and descend to the level of the capacities of their little hearers.

"It is painful to witness the awkward efforts of men, in a course of training for infant-school-masters, to become infantine. They seldom, if ever, hit the right mark. Sometimes they appear like Mountebanks or Merry-Andrews; at other times they give childish lessons in a solemn, dictatorial tone, and seldom catch that easy, calm manner, which awakens, without straining the attention; and my own conviction is, that there should be no such beings as *infant-school-masters*.

"I have seen men learning the *infant system*, as it is called, either condemned to wearisome puerilities and repetitions, or attempting to excite the reasoning powers, and to crowd the tender minds with what they suppose to be knowledge. They endeavour, in short, to create little prodigies, who are to astonish their hearers by answers on Scripture history, natural history, astronomy, geography, etc.; and after all, they only give a sort of confused smattering; and often the seeds of vanity are

sown, that fatal weed, destructive of all genuine love and desire of knowledge, of all vigour of mind. The oldest, most forward, sharp, bold girls and boys, are often detained in the infant schools till eight or nine years old, to make a display in the gallery lessons, and to surprise the visitors.

“These displays of infant prodigies are very melancholy. In these, as in the national schools, the methods which have been found necessary in order to manage large numbers by one master, have been very injurious to the true interests of education. The public examinations violate all the beauty and tenderness of infantine modesty.

“A good, cheerful, sensible woman, keeping a little quiet village school, with her little troop knitting and sewing around her, is much better employed without maps, models, or specimens, which, at an early age, create only a smattering of knowledge.

“There is a quiet, simple, affectionate manner of training little children, for which certainly women are much more fitted than men. Then, women are often to be obtained for very moderate salaries. About thirty or forty children paying each two-pence per week, would, with some little assistance from a charity fund, produce an income which a mere sempstress could not obtain. Suppose an infant school, near a school for elder girls, and in union with it; the elder girls in the classes could not be more usefully employed, than if engaged, each one day in the week, assisting the infant-school-mistress, and thus learning how best hereafter to fulfil their maternal duties.”

And the following passage is most true and beautiful—always excepting the implied sanction of Dr. Watts’s hymns.

“But above all, let the teacher watch over his own heart, and cultivate in himself Christian simplicity,

humility, and piety. There is something infectious in real goodness and piety. His feelings, even when not expressed, will communicate themselves in some mysterious way. Sometimes they will burst forth inevitably from the abundance of the heart—well and good! They come forth as spontaneous effusions from a mind which seeks relief from feelings it cannot suppress, and by no means with a view of imposing on the hearers the duty or necessity of feeling in the same manner. I am persuaded that the mind revolts from this sort of dictation of feeling. I would never try to make a child express any feeling; and when I accidentally expressed my own, I would beware of waiting or watching for a corresponding emotion. Feelings may be at work mysteriously, while the countenance remains unmoved; and true feeling probably often delights in concealment and secrecy. Yet I do not mean that children should not be required to join in outward acts of prayer, praise, and thanksgiving; and this I should require to be done decently, and with due reverence. For instance, I would take the National School hymns, and say, ‘Let us all join in singing a hymn on the wisdom and goodness of God.’ Then I would read very slowly and devoutly, the text, Ps. c., 4, 24.; and afterwards read the little simple hymn, in the same manner, and then repeat, ‘Now let us all join our voices in praising God.’ Watts’s second hymn is excellent for the same purpose. Now, probably, by joining in these simple acts of devotion, some devotional spirit will be caught. There is the same tendency to create piety by these means as there is a tendency to create respect, kindness, and goodwill towards each other by the usual daily forms of ‘Good morning—Good night, sir—How do you do?’ and bows and curtsseys. Of course, the strictest attention to this frame-work of good feeling must exist; and all outward violations of respect and

decorum be repressed : but the reality and intensity of the feelings must, in both cases, win their way silently and secretly, and would only be checked by drawing forth any premature expression of them. A child who is taught to declare that he is born in sin—is a miserable sinner, etc., says all this as a matter of course : I mean to declare *individually* ; for, to require the repetition of the Confession, the Litany, etc., at Church, is another thing. This is the introduction to habitual devotion ; and the heart will join in these expressions in its own way, and at its own time, and will never betray its deep feelings to another. Certainly all deep feelings are very secret and sacred. Young children are, I believe, susceptible of religious emotion. Many, I doubt not, can recollect, in their very early days, praying secretly for those they loved, and delighting in private religious exercise : but these prayers, these feelings, should not be talked about in the school.”

NOTE 2.

It will, I have no doubt, be a matter of consideration with our ecclesiastical authorities, whether the teachers in the middle schools ought not to be, at least, in many cases, regularly ordained. How far it is possible to revive a perpetual order of deacons, I do not know. I have heard very grave arguments against such a course urged by practical men, but they may not be of sufficient weight to counterbalance the advantages of enabling the teacher, on the one hand, to perform some of the principal services of the church ; and on the other, of connecting its highest functions with the highest learning. I conceive that it would be an absurd attempt to lay down any invariable rule. Where the parish is not so large, but that the ordinary clergyman

may exercise a control over the school, it will not be necessary that the teacher should have a clerical office, or, at all events, this office may be only that of a reader. Wherever the parish clergyman is positively in want of assistance for his clerical duties, and it is convenient that the teacher should be able to manage the whole business of the school without his help, it will become almost a matter of necessity that the latter should be admitted at least into the lowest ecclesiastical order. By such means, more effectually, I conceive, than by any that have been suggested in different prize essays, the character and estimation of the educator will be raised throughout the country. In fact, it would be felt that we all, in our different spheres, so far as we are doing anything for the glory of God or the good of men, are educators. The distinctness of the clergyman's position being asserted, it being understood that there is a divine commission and ordination, by which alone men can be fitted for the highest office of administering the Christian sacraments, all subordinate professions and employments will be invested with a new dignity and glory; men of science, men of art, literary men of all kinds, will feel that they indeed constitute what Mr. Coleridge has called a clergy; no class of men will think the work mean or unworthy of teaching the poorest of their brethren to be men; we shall become, in very deed, not by disparaging the regal and sacerdotal offices, but by honouring and exalting them, a nation of kings and priests unto God.

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